我国机构投资者持股行为对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究

发布时间：2018-07-10 14:20

本文选题：机构投资者 + 盈余管理　；参考：《复旦大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：上市公司的盈余管理行为扭曲了财务信息的真实性,为投资者决策提供了错误的信息,扰乱了正常的资本市场秩序,是提高上市公司信息披露质量和规范资本市场所不容忽视的一个问题。机构投资者在近年来在资本市场中取得了迅速的发展,目前已经成为资本市场中的重要力量,由于其所具有的规模优势和专业优势,能够有效监督公司管理层行为,降低信息不对称问题带来的影响,能够形成对控股股东的制衡,通过行使股东投票权、股东提案、股东诉讼、私下协商、联合其他机构投资者等方式对公司发挥监督作用,因而各方均对机构投资者对上市公司的监管寄予厚望。然而在以往的实证分析中发现,机构投资由于在持股集中度、持股期限、监管成本等方面的差异对上市公司监管也表现出不同的态度,积极的机构投资者会积极参与上市公司的公司治理,主动担任监督者的角色,对盈余管理起到抑制作用；消极的机构投资者对上市公司的公司治理不感兴趣,采用“用脚投票”的方式,因而不但不会抑制盈余管理行为,反而会加剧上市公司采取盈余管理行为。因此,本文从机构投资者的持股特征出发,重点研究不同类型机构投资者的不同持股行为对上市公司盈余管理的影响。本文首先回顾了机构投资者股东积极主义的兴起和盈余管理的相关理论,对已有的有关机构投资者持股行为与上市公司盈余管理关系的研究进行了梳理和评述,提出了机构投资者异质性的观点,并论述了机构投资者异质性划分的理论基础和相应标准；在理论分析的基础上,本文通过实证提取了机构投资者的不同持股行为变量,并验证了机构投资者持股差异性对上市公司盈余管理的影响,证实了积极的机构投资者持股行为能够抑制上市公司的盈余管理,消极的机构投资者持股行为反而会加剧上市公司的盈余管理。
[Abstract]:The earnings management behavior of listed companies distorts the authenticity of financial information, provides the wrong information for investors to make decisions, and disturbs the normal order of capital market. It is a problem that can not be ignored to improve the quality of information disclosure and standardize the capital market of listed companies. In recent years, institutional investors have made rapid development in the capital market, which has become an important force in the capital market. Because of its advantages of scale and specialty, institutional investors can effectively supervise the behavior of the management of the company. Reducing the impact of the information asymmetry problem can form checks and balances on controlling shareholders and play a supervisory role over the company through the exercise of shareholders' voting rights, shareholder proposals, shareholder litigation, private negotiations, and the association of other institutional investors. As a result, all parties to institutional investors on the supervision of listed companies high expectations. However, in the past empirical analysis, it is found that institutional investment has different attitudes to the supervision of listed companies because of the differences in ownership concentration, stock holding duration, supervision cost, etc. Active institutional investors will actively participate in the corporate governance of listed companies, act as supervisors, and play a restraining role in earnings management; negative institutional investors are not interested in the corporate governance of listed companies. Adopting the method of "voting with feet" will not only not restrain earnings management behavior, but also aggravate earnings management behavior of listed companies. Therefore, from the perspective of institutional investors' shareholding characteristics, this paper focuses on the impact of different types of institutional investors' shareholding behavior on earnings management of listed companies. This paper first reviews the emergence of institutional investor shareholder activism and the relevant theories of earnings management, and reviews the existing research on the relationship between institutional investors' shareholding behavior and earnings management of listed companies. This paper puts forward the viewpoint of institutional investors' heterogeneity, and discusses the theoretical basis and corresponding criteria for the division of institutional investors' heterogeneity, and on the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper extracts the variables of institutional investors' different shareholding behaviors by empirical analysis. It also verifies the influence of institutional investors' shareholding differences on earnings management of listed companies, and proves that active institutional investors' shareholding behavior can restrain earnings management of listed companies. The negative behavior of institutional investors will aggravate the earnings management of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F275;F224

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