控制权、自由现金流与企业投资行为：基于中国制造业上市公司的分析

发布时间：2018-07-27 09:22

【摘要】：我国企业的投资行为一直是一个颇受关注的问题,一方面是重复和低效率投资受到“十二五”规划的明令禁止,另一方面是大量有投资需求的非国有企业的资金困难；一方面是企业如火如荼的海外投资并购,另一方面是国内产业结构亟待升级改造。在次背景下宏观调控也往往陷入两难的困境,本文试图以公司内部治理机制的视角探讨这类问题存在的产权制度背景。本文基于我国上市公司市场化进程中所有权和控制权的分配格局和衍生的多重委托代理关系的背景,将公司治理的主要决策者—大股东和高级管理层的控制权水平为切入点,沿着“控制权—自由现金流—投资行为”的分析思路,设计多维度指标综合衡量大股东和管理层的控制权水平,并将大股东和高级管理层的投资行为置于同一分析框架下,通过构建大股东控制权和管理层控制权对投资规模、资本投向和投资效率影响的模型,检验“自由现金流量假说”和“代理成本理论”在我国的适用性。本文对2008-2010年间735个我国制造类上市公司样本的研究发现,企业现金再投资水平与大股东和高级管理层的控制权水平显著正相关,即存在大股东和高级管理层出于自利动机而利用或干预企业自由现金流水平扩大投资规模的可能。此外,本文也发现了大股东和管理层合谋的投资行为,可见大股东对管理层见的监督制约力量薄弱。在资本投向上,大股东和管理层都有在利用自由现金扩大长期经营资产投资规模、控制金融资产投资规模的动机；大股东和高级管理层与股权投资规模负相关,存在管理层出于“壕沟防御”和大股东降低控制层级而规避股权投资的可能。在投资效率上,过度投资和投资不足同时存在。60%的制造类上市公司由于投资不足导致了非效率投资,企业的投资不足并不是由于治理机制而是融资约束引起的；然而过度投资的程度更高且导致的投资效率低下确是由于代理问题引起的,即大股东和管理层控制权水平越大,企业投资效率越低。根据上市分析可以发现,过不投资和投资不足并存的局面下,我国制造类上市公司内部治理的主要决策者—大股东和高级管理层存在利用其在投资决策中的控制权力有影响企业资本投资和投资规模,从而导致低效率投资。规范我国上市公司控制权分配和监督方式是今后完善企业治理机制应考虑的内容。
[Abstract]:The investment behavior of Chinese enterprises has always been a subject of concern. On the one hand, repeated and inefficient investment is prohibited by the 12th Five-Year Plan, on the other hand, a large number of non-state-owned enterprises with investment needs have difficulty in capital. On the one hand, enterprises are in full swing of overseas investment mergers and acquisitions, on the other hand, the domestic industrial structure needs to be upgraded and reformed. Under the secondary background, macro-control is often caught in a dilemma. This paper tries to explore the background of the property rights system of this kind of problems from the perspective of the corporate internal governance mechanism. Based on the distribution pattern of ownership and control rights in the process of marketization of listed companies in China and the background of multi-principal-agent relationship derived from it, this paper takes the level of control rights of the main decision-makers of corporate governance as the breakthrough point, that is, the level of control of the major shareholders and senior management. According to the idea of "control, free cash flow and investment behavior", the author designs multi-dimensional indexes to measure the level of control of large shareholders and management, and puts the investment behavior of large shareholders and senior management under the same analytical framework. By constructing a model of the influence of large shareholder control and management control on investment scale, capital investment and investment efficiency, this paper tests the applicability of "free cash flow hypothesis" and "agency cost theory" in China. In this paper, 735 samples of Chinese manufacturing listed companies from 2008 to 2010 are studied. It is found that the level of corporate cash reinvestment is significantly positively correlated with the level of control of large shareholders and senior management. That is, it is possible for large shareholders and senior management to use or interfere with the free cash flow to expand the scale of investment. In addition, this paper also found that the large shareholders and management collusive investment behavior, we can see that the supervision and restriction power of the large shareholders to the management is weak. In terms of capital investment, both major shareholders and management have the motive of using free cash to expand the scale of long-term operating assets investment and control the scale of financial assets investment, while large shareholders and senior management have negative correlation with the scale of equity investment. There is the potential for management to circumvent equity investments because of "trench defenses" and lower levels of control by large shareholders. In terms of investment efficiency, 60% of manufacturing listed companies invest inefficiently because of insufficient investment, which is not caused by governance mechanism but by financing constraints. However, the degree of overinvestment is higher and the inefficiency of investment is caused by the agency problem, that is, the greater the level of control of large shareholders and management, the lower the investment efficiency of enterprises. According to the analysis of listing, we can find that under the situation of over-investment and underinvestment, The main decision makers of the internal governance of the manufacturing listed companies in China are the large shareholders and senior management who make use of their power of control in the investment decision to influence the capital investment and investment scale of enterprises, which leads to inefficient investment. Standardizing the distribution and supervision of the control rights of listed companies in China is the content that should be considered to perfect the corporate governance mechanism in the future.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F406.72;F832.51;F224

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