我国A股上市公司管理层股权激励与公司绩效的关系研究
发布时间：2018-08-24 17:09
【摘要】：生产力发展使得社会分工进一步细化,企业的所有者由于知识、能力和精力的原因不具备最优的经营企业的实力,而专业化分工产生了一大批具有专业知识的代理人,他们有精力、有能力代理行使好被所有者委托的工作。但在委托代理的关系当中,由于委托人与代理人的效用函数不一样,委托人追求的是自己的财富最大化,而代理人则是追求自己的工资收入、在职消费和闲暇时间最大化,这必然导致两者的利益冲突。在没有有效的制度安排下代理人的行为很可能最终损害委托人的利益,这便是委托代理问题产生的根源。 管理层在现代企业所有权和经营权分离的状态下扮演着重要的角色,他们虽然未能拥有企业,但却站在企业经营决策的最前线,股东如何监督管理层,让其行为和股东利益保持一致,是所有企业共同面临的难题,由于股东不参与公司日常经营决策,因此难免和管理层之间存在信息不对称,道德风险和逆向选择问题造成的代理成本不可避免。对于追求公司价值最大化的股东来说,为了最大程度增加公司价值,就需要激励管理层在日常经营决策上与股东利益保持一致。股权激励给予了管理层对于公司价值的剩余索取权,将管理层的利益与股东的利益绑在了一起,在管理层利益与公司绩效之间建立了一个正相关的关系,这样能够有效的激发管理层的敬业精神、降低代理成本、改善公司经营管理机制以及增加公司的绩效水平。 自上世纪五十年代的美国开始,股权激励作为针对管理层和员工的长期激励制度开始在实践中萌芽,在发展初期这种激励制度并没有引起人们的广泛关注,直到上世纪六十年代,美国硅谷的一些高科技、高成长性的公司,由于创业初期缺乏资金,在保持核心人员稳定性并确保公司在竞争中保持优势的压力之下,大规模的对管理层等核心人员实施股权激励以留住优秀人才,在接下来的七十年代,职业经理人卖方市场得到进一步强化,高级人才的流动性日趋增大,这些现象也给企业造成了威胁,同时,由于股权激励不计入会计成本,不会降低企业的账面利润,因此这种激励方式尤其受到处在成长期且现金流吃紧的创新型公司的青睐,由此,股权激励迅速发展成为欧美发达国家施行管理层激励的重要工具。 为提升经营业绩,完善治理结构,我国上市公司在管理层股权激励方面借鉴西方经验并进行了积极的探索,然而,由于市场环境和制度环境的缺陷,股权激励曾面临诸多障碍,特别是我国证券市场所独有的股权分置问题,它造成了我国资本市场国有股一股独大、流通股比例偏小,股价不能充分反映公司的价值,因此以股权对管理层进行激励显然缺乏现实逻辑的支撑,同时,市场化程度的不足和公司治理结构的不完善导致企业经理人员受行政任命的现象比较普遍,他们更关心自己的行政地位等非经济因素以及是否能够足额完成上级给定的指标任务,而不愿承担风险,尽管这些风险可能给企业带来巨大的收益,因此,对此类管理者实施股权激励并不能达到理想的效果,2005年股权分置改革的开展为上市公司股权激励的实施创造了良好的条件,2005年12月,证监会颁布《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》(以下简称《管理办法》),监管层的推动也成为我国上市公司实施股权激励的一针强心剂,自此,越来越多的上市公司开始在公司治理实务中使用股权激励这一“金手铐”。 国外对股权激励相关的研究起步很早,也比较成熟,因此相关研究结论对本文有一定的参考作用,但由于我国资本市场起步较晚,法律制度和公司治理结构亦不完善,与西方发达国家成熟的资本市场体系存在很大差距,因此国外学者在股权激励相关领域得出的结论并不能照搬到我国的市场环境当中,中国正处在经济转型期,2006年1月《管理办法》开始实施,我国上市公司从这个时候才开始真正意义上的实行股权激励,目前,相关的实证研究比较有限,我国学者对于股权激励能否真正提高公司绩效还未形成一致观点。 本研究的总体目标是考察我国上市公司实施股权激励对公司绩效是否具有正面影响,以及这种影响得到显现的时间跨度,《管理办法》和股权分置改革之前实施股权激励还面临许多制度和法律法规上的障碍,因此相关的研究文献都是将管理层持股比例等同为股权激励比例,而我国上市公司真正意义上开始实施股权激励是06年以后的事情,因此目前国内研究真正意义上股权激励的文献并不是很多,本文选取2006年至2009年实施了股权激励计划的沪深两市A股138家上市公司作为样本,考察真正意义上的管理层股权激励对公司绩效的影响。 本文的结构大致如下： 第一章,导论部分,这章阐述了管理层股权激励的选题背景；研究的意义、思路及方法。 第二章,文献综述部分,这章首先阐述了“委托—代理”理论等股权激励相关的四个经典理论,接着阐述与股权激励效果有关的两个假说：利益趋同假说以及管理者防御假说,然后对国内外关于股权激励实证研究的相关文献进行分析、总结与评述。 第三章,阐述管理层股权激励的概念,比较各种股权激励模式的优点与缺点,并就管理层股权激励在我国的发展做一个整体的回顾。 第四章,管理层股权激励的实证部分,本章选择2006年至2009年实施了股权激励计划的沪深两市138家A股上市公司作为样本,通过构建多元回归计量模型来研究我国A股上市公司绩效和股权激励之间的关系,将经行业均值调整后的公司ROE作为因变量,并全面考察滞后期为0年、1年、2年、3年的ROE情况,以期全面分析股权激励对公司绩效影响的时滞性,模型选择股权激励股本占公司总股本的比例SRAT以及它的平方SRAT2作为自变量,控制变量选择企业性质、股权集中度、股权制衡度、公司规模、资本结构、公司成长性、高管薪酬、独立董事占董事会成员比例、监事会成员占整个公司管理层的比例,研究股权激励与公司绩效之间的关系。 第五章,就实证部分的成果得出结论：①管理层股权激励具有增进公司绩效的时滞性；②管理层股权激励与公司绩效之间存在“倒U”关系：③股权集中度、企业规模以及监事人数占管理层的比例与公司绩效负相关；④高管薪酬与公司绩效正相关。同时,根据实证结果提出相关建议： 本文的创新之处主要在于：一是本文全面考察股权激励的时滞性,和以往大部分文献仅考察滞后0年和1年的ROE不同,本文全面考察滞后期为0年、1年、2年、3年的ROE情况,从更加长的时间跨度内把握股权激励与公司绩效的关系,而且实证的结果也表明,股权激励的对公司绩效的时滞性影响确实存在,并且比普遍认为的1年时间还要长,达到了2年甚至3年；二是本文采用的数据处理方式较好的将各年样本整合到了一起,本文将样本根据证监会的行业分类标准分为13个行业,分别将各企业每年的ROE减去其所属行业当年平均ROE,得到经过每年的行业均值调整后的ROE。调整后的ROE反映单个企业自身所特有的ROE,不受行业和年份等因素的影响,只受到该企业自身因素的影响,因为我国A股上市公司在06年以后才开始真正意义上的实施股权激励,每年的样本容量数较小,采用此种方式可以将各年的样本整合到一起以获得更好的参数估计值。 本文的不足之处在于：一是本文考察了管理层股权激励对公司绩效的时滞性影响,但是对什么因素影响股权激励这个变量却没有进一步考察,即没有对股权激励的内生性问题做进一步探讨,未来笔者会试着站在这个角度对股权激励问题做一个更加全面的考察；二是本文虽然采取了合理的方式整合各年的样本数据,但由于截止本论文定稿之日,大部分上市公司的2011年年报还未公布,因此考察股权激励时滞性影响的时候样本稍显不足,相信随着样本数据的越发充分,未来的研究成果会得到更好的数据支撑；三是影响公司绩效的因素非常多,本文在选取解释变量的时候可能遗漏了某些比较重要的变量,希望在日后的研究当中,能够更加全面的选择相关变量进行分析,以期得到更好的实证结果。
[Abstract]:The development of productive forces further refines the division of labor in society. Owners of enterprises do not possess the best strength of operating enterprises because of their knowledge, ability and energy. Professional division of labor produces a large number of agents with professional knowledge. They have the energy and ability to perform well the work entrusted by owners. Because the utility function of the principal and the agent is different, the principal pursues the maximization of his own wealth, while the agent pursues his own salary and income, and maximizes his in-service consumption and leisure time, which will inevitably lead to the conflict of interests between them. Finally, it will damage the interests of the principal, which is the root cause of the agency problem.
Management plays an important role in the separation of ownership and management rights of modern enterprises. Although they can not own the enterprise, they stand at the forefront of enterprise management decision-making. How to supervise and manage the shareholders and keep their behavior in line with the interests of shareholders is a common problem faced by all enterprises, because shareholders do not participate in the company day It is inevitable that there is information asymmetry between management and management, and the agency cost caused by moral hazard and adverse selection is inevitable. Equity incentive gives the management residual claim to the company's value, binds the interests of the management and the shareholders together, and establishes a positive correlation between the interests of the management and the company's performance. This can effectively stimulate the management's professionalism, reduce agency costs, and improve the company's management mechanism. And increase the performance level of the company.
Since the 1950s in the United States, equity incentive as a long-term incentive system for management and employees began to germinate in practice, in the early development of this incentive system did not cause widespread concern until the 1960s, the United States Silicon Valley, some of the high-tech, high-growth companies due to the early start-up stage. Lack of funds, under the pressure of maintaining the stability of the core personnel and ensuring the company's competitive edge, large-scale equity incentives were implemented to the core personnel such as management to retain outstanding personnel. In the following 1970s, the professional manager seller market was further strengthened and the mobility of senior personnel was increasing. This phenomenon also poses a threat to enterprises. At the same time, because equity incentive does not include accounting costs, it will not reduce the book profits of enterprises, so this incentive method is especially favored by innovative companies in the growing period and cash flow is tight. Therefore, equity incentive has rapidly developed into an important incentive for management in developed countries in Europe and the United States. Tools.
In order to improve business performance and improve governance structure, listed companies in China have learned from western experience and made active exploration in the management of equity incentives. However, due to the defects of market environment and institutional environment, equity incentives have faced many obstacles, especially the unique equity division in China's securities market, which has caused the capital of China. In this market, the state-owned shares are dominant, the proportion of circulating shares is small, and the stock price can not fully reflect the value of the company. Therefore, it is obviously lack of practical and logical support to encourage the management with equity. At the same time, the lack of market-oriented degree and the imperfection of corporate governance structure lead to the phenomenon that managers are appointed by the administration is more common. More concerned about their administrative status and other non-economic factors as well as whether they can fulfil the target task given by their superiors in full, and are unwilling to take risks, although these risks may bring enormous benefits to the enterprise, therefore, the implementation of equity incentives for such managers can not achieve the desired results. The implementation of the split share structure reform in 2005 is the top priority. The implementation of equity incentive in listed companies has created favorable conditions. In December 2005, the SFC promulgated the Measures for the Management of Equity Incentive in Listed Companies (Trial Implementation). The promotion of the regulatory authorities has become a stimulant to the implementation of equity incentive in Listed Companies in China. Since then, more and more listed companies have begun to implement corporate governance. The "golden handcuffs" are used in stock affairs.
The research on equity incentive abroad started very early and is relatively mature, so the relevant conclusions have a certain reference for this paper. However, due to the late start of China's capital market, the imperfect legal system and corporate governance structure, there is a big gap with the mature capital market system of western developed countries, foreign scholars in The conclusions drawn in the related fields of equity incentive can not be transferred to the market environment of our country. China is in the period of economic transformation. The implementation of "Management Measures" began in January 2006. The listed companies in our country began to implement equity incentive in real sense only at this time. At present, the relevant empirical research is limited, and the scholars in China have limited knowledge about equity. Whether incentive can really improve corporate performance has not yet reached a consensus.
The overall objective of this study is to examine whether the implementation of equity incentives by Listed Companies in China has a positive impact on corporate performance, and the time span of this impact. Before the reform of "management measures" and non-tradable shares, there are still many institutional and legal barriers to the implementation of equity incentives. The proportion of managerial ownership is the same as that of equity incentive, and it is after 2006 that listed companies in China begin to implement equity incentive in a real sense. So there are not many literatures about equity incentive in China. This paper selects 138 A-shares listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets which implemented equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2009. As a sample, the company examines the impact of managerial equity incentive on corporate performance in real sense.
The structure of this article is as follows:
The first chapter, the introduction part, this chapter elaborated the management stock right incentive topic background; The research significance, the mentality and the method.
In the second chapter, literature review, this chapter first expounds four classical theories related to equity incentive, such as principal-agent theory, and then elaborates two hypotheses related to equity incentive effect: interest convergence hypothesis and managerial defense hypothesis. Summary and comment.
In the third chapter, the concept of management equity incentive is expounded, the advantages and disadvantages of various equity incentive modes are compared, and the development of management equity incentive in China is reviewed as a whole.
In the fourth chapter, the empirical part of managerial equity incentives, this chapter chooses 138 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2009 which have implemented equity incentive plans as samples, and studies the relationship between performance and equity incentives of A-share listed companies in China by constructing a multiple regression econometric model. The ROE of listed companies adjusted by industry mean is taken as the example. As a dependent variable, ROE with a lag of 0 years, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years is comprehensively investigated in order to comprehensively analyze the time lag of the impact of equity incentives on corporate performance. The model chooses SRAT and its square SRAT2 as independent variables, and controls the choice of corporate nature, ownership concentration and equity checks and balances. This paper studies the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance.
In the fifth chapter, the results of the empirical study are summarized as follows: (1) management equity incentives have time lag to improve corporate performance; (2) there is a "inverted U" relationship between management equity incentives and corporate performance; (3) ownership concentration, enterprise size and the proportion of supervisors in management are negatively correlated with corporate performance; (4) executive compensation and corporate performance are negatively correlated. The company's performance is positively correlated.
The main innovations of this paper are as follows: firstly, this paper comprehensively examines the time lag of equity incentive, which is different from the previous literature which only examines the ROE lagging behind 0 years and 1 year. This paper comprehensively examines the ROE situation with lag of 0 years, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years, and grasps the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance from a longer time span, and it is empirical. The results also show that the delayed impact of equity incentives on corporate performance does exist, and it is longer than the one year generally believed, reaching 2 years or even 3 years; second, the data processing method used in this paper is better to integrate the samples of each year together, the sample is divided into 13 industries according to the industry classification standards of the SFC. The adjusted ROE reflects the unique ROE of a single enterprise, which is not affected by the factors of industry and year. It is only affected by the factors of the enterprise itself, because the A-share listed companies in China only opened after 2006. In the real sense of equity incentive, the sample size per year is small, which can be used to integrate the samples of each year to obtain better parameter estimates.
The shortcomings of this paper are as follows: Firstly, this paper examines the delayed effect of managerial equity incentives on corporate performance, but it does not further investigate what factors affect the variable of equity incentives, that is, there is no further discussion on the endogenous issues of equity incentives, the future author will try to stand in this perspective on equity incentives. Second, although this paper has adopted a reasonable way to integrate the sample data of each year, as the date of finalization of this paper, most of the annual reports of Listed Companies in 2011 have not been published, so the sample is slightly inadequate when investigating the impact of equity incentive delay, I believe that with the sample data become more and more abundant. Third, there are many factors that affect corporate performance. This paper may omit some important variables when choosing the explanatory variables. We hope that in the future research, we can choose the relevant variables more comprehensively to analyze in order to get better empirical results.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F224
本文编号：2201472
[Abstract]:The development of productive forces further refines the division of labor in society. Owners of enterprises do not possess the best strength of operating enterprises because of their knowledge, ability and energy. Professional division of labor produces a large number of agents with professional knowledge. They have the energy and ability to perform well the work entrusted by owners. Because the utility function of the principal and the agent is different, the principal pursues the maximization of his own wealth, while the agent pursues his own salary and income, and maximizes his in-service consumption and leisure time, which will inevitably lead to the conflict of interests between them. Finally, it will damage the interests of the principal, which is the root cause of the agency problem.
Management plays an important role in the separation of ownership and management rights of modern enterprises. Although they can not own the enterprise, they stand at the forefront of enterprise management decision-making. How to supervise and manage the shareholders and keep their behavior in line with the interests of shareholders is a common problem faced by all enterprises, because shareholders do not participate in the company day It is inevitable that there is information asymmetry between management and management, and the agency cost caused by moral hazard and adverse selection is inevitable. Equity incentive gives the management residual claim to the company's value, binds the interests of the management and the shareholders together, and establishes a positive correlation between the interests of the management and the company's performance. This can effectively stimulate the management's professionalism, reduce agency costs, and improve the company's management mechanism. And increase the performance level of the company.
Since the 1950s in the United States, equity incentive as a long-term incentive system for management and employees began to germinate in practice, in the early development of this incentive system did not cause widespread concern until the 1960s, the United States Silicon Valley, some of the high-tech, high-growth companies due to the early start-up stage. Lack of funds, under the pressure of maintaining the stability of the core personnel and ensuring the company's competitive edge, large-scale equity incentives were implemented to the core personnel such as management to retain outstanding personnel. In the following 1970s, the professional manager seller market was further strengthened and the mobility of senior personnel was increasing. This phenomenon also poses a threat to enterprises. At the same time, because equity incentive does not include accounting costs, it will not reduce the book profits of enterprises, so this incentive method is especially favored by innovative companies in the growing period and cash flow is tight. Therefore, equity incentive has rapidly developed into an important incentive for management in developed countries in Europe and the United States. Tools.
In order to improve business performance and improve governance structure, listed companies in China have learned from western experience and made active exploration in the management of equity incentives. However, due to the defects of market environment and institutional environment, equity incentives have faced many obstacles, especially the unique equity division in China's securities market, which has caused the capital of China. In this market, the state-owned shares are dominant, the proportion of circulating shares is small, and the stock price can not fully reflect the value of the company. Therefore, it is obviously lack of practical and logical support to encourage the management with equity. At the same time, the lack of market-oriented degree and the imperfection of corporate governance structure lead to the phenomenon that managers are appointed by the administration is more common. More concerned about their administrative status and other non-economic factors as well as whether they can fulfil the target task given by their superiors in full, and are unwilling to take risks, although these risks may bring enormous benefits to the enterprise, therefore, the implementation of equity incentives for such managers can not achieve the desired results. The implementation of the split share structure reform in 2005 is the top priority. The implementation of equity incentive in listed companies has created favorable conditions. In December 2005, the SFC promulgated the Measures for the Management of Equity Incentive in Listed Companies (Trial Implementation). The promotion of the regulatory authorities has become a stimulant to the implementation of equity incentive in Listed Companies in China. Since then, more and more listed companies have begun to implement corporate governance. The "golden handcuffs" are used in stock affairs.
The research on equity incentive abroad started very early and is relatively mature, so the relevant conclusions have a certain reference for this paper. However, due to the late start of China's capital market, the imperfect legal system and corporate governance structure, there is a big gap with the mature capital market system of western developed countries, foreign scholars in The conclusions drawn in the related fields of equity incentive can not be transferred to the market environment of our country. China is in the period of economic transformation. The implementation of "Management Measures" began in January 2006. The listed companies in our country began to implement equity incentive in real sense only at this time. At present, the relevant empirical research is limited, and the scholars in China have limited knowledge about equity. Whether incentive can really improve corporate performance has not yet reached a consensus.
The overall objective of this study is to examine whether the implementation of equity incentives by Listed Companies in China has a positive impact on corporate performance, and the time span of this impact. Before the reform of "management measures" and non-tradable shares, there are still many institutional and legal barriers to the implementation of equity incentives. The proportion of managerial ownership is the same as that of equity incentive, and it is after 2006 that listed companies in China begin to implement equity incentive in a real sense. So there are not many literatures about equity incentive in China. This paper selects 138 A-shares listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets which implemented equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2009. As a sample, the company examines the impact of managerial equity incentive on corporate performance in real sense.
The structure of this article is as follows:
The first chapter, the introduction part, this chapter elaborated the management stock right incentive topic background; The research significance, the mentality and the method.
In the second chapter, literature review, this chapter first expounds four classical theories related to equity incentive, such as principal-agent theory, and then elaborates two hypotheses related to equity incentive effect: interest convergence hypothesis and managerial defense hypothesis. Summary and comment.
In the third chapter, the concept of management equity incentive is expounded, the advantages and disadvantages of various equity incentive modes are compared, and the development of management equity incentive in China is reviewed as a whole.
In the fourth chapter, the empirical part of managerial equity incentives, this chapter chooses 138 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2009 which have implemented equity incentive plans as samples, and studies the relationship between performance and equity incentives of A-share listed companies in China by constructing a multiple regression econometric model. The ROE of listed companies adjusted by industry mean is taken as the example. As a dependent variable, ROE with a lag of 0 years, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years is comprehensively investigated in order to comprehensively analyze the time lag of the impact of equity incentives on corporate performance. The model chooses SRAT and its square SRAT2 as independent variables, and controls the choice of corporate nature, ownership concentration and equity checks and balances. This paper studies the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance.
In the fifth chapter, the results of the empirical study are summarized as follows: (1) management equity incentives have time lag to improve corporate performance; (2) there is a "inverted U" relationship between management equity incentives and corporate performance; (3) ownership concentration, enterprise size and the proportion of supervisors in management are negatively correlated with corporate performance; (4) executive compensation and corporate performance are negatively correlated. The company's performance is positively correlated.
The main innovations of this paper are as follows: firstly, this paper comprehensively examines the time lag of equity incentive, which is different from the previous literature which only examines the ROE lagging behind 0 years and 1 year. This paper comprehensively examines the ROE situation with lag of 0 years, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years, and grasps the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance from a longer time span, and it is empirical. The results also show that the delayed impact of equity incentives on corporate performance does exist, and it is longer than the one year generally believed, reaching 2 years or even 3 years; second, the data processing method used in this paper is better to integrate the samples of each year together, the sample is divided into 13 industries according to the industry classification standards of the SFC. The adjusted ROE reflects the unique ROE of a single enterprise, which is not affected by the factors of industry and year. It is only affected by the factors of the enterprise itself, because the A-share listed companies in China only opened after 2006. In the real sense of equity incentive, the sample size per year is small, which can be used to integrate the samples of each year to obtain better parameter estimates.
The shortcomings of this paper are as follows: Firstly, this paper examines the delayed effect of managerial equity incentives on corporate performance, but it does not further investigate what factors affect the variable of equity incentives, that is, there is no further discussion on the endogenous issues of equity incentives, the future author will try to stand in this perspective on equity incentives. Second, although this paper has adopted a reasonable way to integrate the sample data of each year, as the date of finalization of this paper, most of the annual reports of Listed Companies in 2011 have not been published, so the sample is slightly inadequate when investigating the impact of equity incentive delay, I believe that with the sample data become more and more abundant. Third, there are many factors that affect corporate performance. This paper may omit some important variables when choosing the explanatory variables. We hope that in the future research, we can choose the relevant variables more comprehensively to analyze in order to get better empirical results.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F224
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