2004年至2012年我国商业银行次级债券市场约束效应实证分析
发布时间：2018-09-19 10:46
【摘要】：我国的次级债券市场在2009年之后经历了迅速而蓬勃的发展。2009年银行次级债券发债规模为2681.4亿人民币,2010年为1227.9亿人民币,2011年我国发行次级债券的规模更是空前高涨达到了3241亿人民币。而在2009年之前,发债规模最多的年份不过828.85亿人民币,最少的年份只有95亿人民币。可见,我国的次级债券在2009年之后进入了一个新的发展阶段。在2011年五家国有商业银行都发行了次级债券,并且都在百亿以上。股份制银行和城商行发债也非常活跃。国内银行次级债券市场的爆发引起了我的关注,使我对2009年之后发生的与之相关的事情进行思考。 次级债券的求偿顺序排在存款人之后,不能在银行破产时第一时间获偿,同时也不同于股东,不能享受银行从业高风险带来的高收益。这种天生对风险就敏感的特性使之具有市场约束功能。从国际的角度看,巴塞尔协议将“市场约束”列为三大支柱之一,可见全国银行监管机构对于市场约束在银行监管、保障银行业稳健经营中发挥的作用非常重视。 从国内的角度看,2009年为金融危机爆发后的第一年,也是我国推出四万亿投资计划振兴经济的一年。我国的财政政策由“稳健”变为“积极”,货币政策由“从紧”变为“适度宽松”。宏观政策导向的调整使得我国2009年银行贷款同2008年比增加9.59万亿,贷款余额达到39.97万亿,同比增长31.74%。在资产不断扩张的情况下,为了满足银行资本充足率的监管要求,商业银行大规模发行次级债券补充资本金。次级债券也成为我国商业银行补充资本金最重要的渠道。并且2009年银监会对于银行之间互相持有次级债券在计入附属资本时的具体计算方法进行了明文规定,要求将银行持有的其他行的次级债券全额从本行的附属资本中去除。并且规定银行持有单一银行和所有银行的次级债券的规模不得超过其自身核心资本的15%和20%。这种“新老划断”的计算方法在2009年是一个改革。 作为一个重要的金融工具,次级债券的市场约束作用是否存在?国内外的学者对其进行了广泛而深入的探讨。美国的学者对美国的次级债券市场分析的结果认为次级债券的市场约束作用在上世纪90年代初之前几乎不存在,90年代之后市场约束作用逐渐显现,2000年之后风险抵御能力明显增强。日本学者的研究显示日本存在市场约束效应。尤其是在允许北海道银行倒闭之后,次级债券的市场约束作用增强了。新兴市场和资本成熟的市场相比,由于市场缺陷导致市场约束作用不明显。政府的隐性担保对于市场约束作用的阻碍很大。另外,有学者建议应该强制定期发行次级债券,有利于市场约束作用的发挥。国内的研究从2002年开始,很多学者从理论上对次级债券的特性、功能以及重要性进行了探讨,并对外我国商业银行发行次级债券目的过于单一以及银行间互持比率过高等问题进行分析。实证研究显示我国2009年之前次级债券的市场约束几乎不存在。不良贷款率、资本充足率等银行重要的风险指标都不显著,只有流动性指标和资产结构指标得到了大多数人的认可。2009年之后的实证结果显示,我国次级债券市场的约束作用虽然不是很强但是确实存在。由于最新的实证文献采用的数据只到2010年,所以本文将对直到2012年3月份为止的所有次级债券进行分析,研究我国的次级债券市场约束效应是否有提升。另外,学者们普遍认为政府对银行的隐性担保一直存在,并且阻碍了次级债券的发展。本文认为,我国应该尽快建立显性存款保险制度以改善政府隐性担保造成的投资者对风险漠视的现状。 第四章主要介绍次级债券的相关理论和我国次级债券市场发展的现状。次级债券的理论方面主要是分析他独有的、不同于股权和债权的特性。并从补充银行资本金、助力银行监管、主动负债改善资产结构以及推动银行信息披露透明化四个角度阐述了次级债券的功能。次级债券市场约束的功能发挥也需要一定的前提条件,首先银行要对其信息进行及时、准确、充分的披露,其次投资者有能力对其进行分析判断,再次市场有充分的流动性并且投资者有动力采取行动影响市场价格,最后银行管理层需要对市场反应以及投资者的态度采取回应,控制银行的风险。这四个条件缺一不可。在此基础上,我对本国的次级债券市场进行了简单分析。首先是从银行监管当局对其制度规定的沿革上进行称述,我国最近一次对次级债券的规定就是在2009年的“新老划断”政策。2011年年底,我国金融年会上将建立存款保险制度提上日程。接着我从发行规模、发行期限、发行利率以及利差、募集方式、投资主体五个方面,对2004年至2012年发行的138只次级债券的情况进行了分析。我国国有银行、股份制银行和城商行在各方面差别都比较大。国有银行发债规模很大,主要集中在50亿到150亿之间,期限以15年为主,并且给予投资者的回报率比较小。股份制银行的发债规模适中,主要以10年期10亿人民币到50亿人民币的为主。城商行的发债规模最小,只有10年期的产品,并且以10亿人民币以下的为主。我国次级债券主要采用固定利率发行,浮动利率的较少,般都是与固定债券的产品搭配发售。在募集方式上,大部分的银行都采用公开发行的方式,城商行有采取定向私募的方式,主要是由于其规模较小,般都由当地的企业认购。整体而言,我国的股份制银行在这五个方面都是市场化程度最高的。但是我国的次级债券市场存在投资主体单一,银行之间相互持有次级债券严重的情况。在了解了我国次级债券市场的基本情况之后,实证部分对我国是否存在市场约束情况进行了统计分析。 第五章的实证主要分为两个部分,对样本进行描述性分析和回归分析。描述性分析主要是对样本的特征、趋势和相关性进行分析。结论为我国次级债券市场国有银行规模占比最大。我国近三年来以国有银行为代表发债规模剧增、股份制银行和城商行也呈稳步增长趋势。对利差和银行风险变量走势图进行观察,没有观察到明显的相关性。回归分析中采用次级债券收益率与同期国债利差作为因变量,发债规模作为控制变量,银行类别和发债期限为虚拟变量,银行的资产规模、资本充足率、资产利润率、不良贷款率、流动性比率五个指标作为自变量。对2004年至2012年全样本数据进行回归。为了对比2009年之后市场情况是否有变化,对2009年之后的样本数据进行了单独回归。结果为,我国次级债券市场约束效应整体上确实存在,并且在2009年之后有所增强。银行资产规模、资本充足率和资产利润率三个指标都显著。但是不良贷款率和流动性比率对利差的影响不显著。另外,我国不同类别银行的情况显著不同,政府对国有银行进行了隐性担保。 在对我国现状和实证结果分析的基础上,我提出了对我国次级债券市场的几点想法。我国的次级债券市场要想更好地发挥市场约束效应,应该尽快建立存款保险制度,消除政府对银行的隐性担保的影响。加强对银行之间相互持有次级债券的监管,以防系统性风险传染。多元化投资主体,增加整个市场的流动性。在产品设计上,应该更加合理,开发对投资者有利的产品如赋予投资者赎回权。对债券的评级应该逐步转为投资者主动评级,切断发行人和评级人的利益链条。我国可以尝试以股份制银行为试点,强制定期发行次级债券。 本文的创新之处有以下几点。 第一,本文使用了从2004年到2012年3月的96只固定利率发行的次级债券样本做实证分析。样本数据全面,时效性强。可以分析到目前为止整个次级债券市场约束作用的效应。对于我国次级债券市场约束效应的实证研究最新的文献是万冰魂、张海(2010)采用的2004-2009年数据,并且只有46个样本。可见,国内的实证文献数据都比较陈旧,并且样本量都很小,这对实证结果必然有影响。 另外,2009年之后我国次级债券市场发展非常迅速。经历了四万亿投资计划、贷款规模迅速增长,银行为了补充资本金,开始大规模的发行次级债券。这种增长的势头在2010年、2011年一直持续。市场容量的增加对市场约束作用是否有影响?这非常值得研究。除此之外,一直以来我国银行间大量互持次级债券现状十分严重。2009年我国银行监管当局发文要求对2009年7月1日之后银行持有的其他商业银行的次级债券在计入附属资本时全额扣除。这种新老划断的改革是对银行间互相持有次级债券风险的监控。这个举措对我国次级债券市场约束效应是否有影响? 以上两点都说明,本文的实证研究有一定的意义。另外,本文还专门对2009年之后发行的66只次级债券进行单独回归研究。研究2009年之后我国次级债券市场约束作用是否伴随着发债规模的迅速增长而增强。 第二,本文将发债银行进行分类,从时间顺序和银行类别两个维度,对发债规模、发债期限、发债利差以及采用的发行方式等方面进行分析,对我国次级债券市场进行了全面剖析。国内的实证文献绝大多数是采用收益率差-风险模型做回归分析。本文在描述性统计部分,首先将样本按时间顺序分类,对每年次级债券的发行情况做趋势分析,并且说明在每年中各类别银行的发债情况以及占比；然后又将全样本按银行类别分类,分析各类银行按照时间顺序的发债情况变化趋势。对发债规模、发债期限、发债利差以及采用的发行方式等方面的分析总结出我国国有银行、股份制银行和城商行的发债特点。 第三,本文在对实证思考的基础上提出了以股份制银行作为试点对象,强制我国银行发行次级债券以促进次级债券市场约束作用的发挥的观点。本文通过研究发现,国有银行发行次级债券的规模很大,但发行频率很低,并且主要是国有银行之间相互持有次级债券。城商行发行次级债券的频率较高,但是每只次级债券的规模很小,大部分都小于10亿。发行频率过低,使得投资者不能及时获得银行风险信息；发行规模过小,又使得投资者对风险分析的动力不足,并且对整个次级债券市场的影响力不足,这些都导致市场约束作用不能很好地发挥。只有股份制银行,发行规模适中,基本集中在50亿到100亿；发行频率也适中,每年平均发行6只。股份制银行大部分都进行了股权改革,有良好的治理结构,竞争意识和风险意识都很强,并且以利润最大化为目标,是我国银行体系中市场化程度最高,最有活力的群体。因此,可以尝试以股份制银行为试点对象,推行强制发行次级债券以增强市场约束力的政策。 本文的不足之处有以下几点：第一,银行的财务数据指标原则上是采用与发债日期最接近的日期发布的报告,但是实际中很多银行定期公告数据不全,导致有些样本的财务数据采用的是年度数据,存在时滞。第二,本文主要研究市场对于银行内部风险的敏感度问题,因此没有将信用评级纳入实证分析的变量中。第三,本文本想对银行之间相互持有次级债券的情况进行具体分析,但是由于银行信息披露不足或披露的过于隐蔽,加之笔者搜寻信息的能力有限,导致没有找到相关信息,不能对其分析。这是我的遗憾,望各位老师和读者谅解!
[Abstract]:China's subordinated bond market has experienced rapid and vigorous development since 2009. The scale of issuing bank subordinated bonds in 2009 was 268.14 billion yuan, in 2010 was 122.79 billion yuan, and in 2011 the scale of issuing subordinated bonds rose to 324.1 billion yuan unprecedentedly. In 2011, five state-owned commercial banks issued subordinated bonds, and all of them were more than 10 billion yuan. Joint-stock banks and city commercial banks also issued bonds very actively. The subordinated bond market of domestic banks was also very active. The outbreak has caught my attention and made me think about what happened after 2009.
Subordinated bonds, which rank after depositors in the order of claims, cannot be repaid in the first place when a bank goes bankrupt. They are also different from shareholders and can not enjoy the high returns brought about by high risks in the banking industry. As one of the three pillars, it can be seen that the national banking regulators attach great importance to the role of market constraints in banking supervision and ensuring the sound operation of the banking industry.
From the domestic point of view, 2009 is the first year after the outbreak of the financial crisis, and also the year when China launched a four-trillion-dollar investment plan to revitalize the economy. In order to meet the regulatory requirements of bank capital adequacy ratio, commercial banks issue large-scale supplementary capital of subordinated bonds. Subordinated bonds have also become the most important channel for commercial banks to supplement capital in China. And in 2009, Silver The Regulatory Commission expressly stipulates the specific calculation method for the mutual holding of subordinated bonds between banks when accessory capital is taken into account, requiring that the total amount of subordinated bonds held by other banks be removed from the bank's subsidiary capital, and stipulating that banks should not hold subordinated bonds of a single bank and all banks in excess of their own. 15% and 20%. of core capital is a reform in 2009.
As an important financial instrument, whether subordinated bond market restraint exists? Scholars at home and abroad have conducted extensive and in-depth discussion on it. American scholars believe that subordinated bond market restraint almost did not exist before the early 1990s, and listed after the 1990s. The market restraint effect of subordinated bonds has been strengthened, especially after allowing the bankruptcy of Hokkaido Bank. In addition, some scholars suggest that the periodic issuance of subordinated bonds should be compulsory, which is conducive to the exertion of market restraint. Since 2002, many scholars have theoretically discussed the characteristics, functions and importance of subordinated bonds. Empirical studies show that the market constraints of subordinated bonds are almost non-existent before 2009. Nonperforming loan ratio, capital adequacy ratio and other important risk indicators of banks are not significant, only liquidity indicators and asset balance. The empirical results after 2009 show that the restraint of China's secondary bond market is not very strong, but it does exist. As the latest empirical data used only in 2010, this paper will analyze all the secondary bonds up to March 2012 and study China. In addition, scholars generally believe that implicit government guarantees for banks have always existed and hindered the development of subordinated bonds. This paper argues that China should establish explicit deposit insurance system as soon as possible to improve the current situation of investors'ignorance of risk caused by implicit government guarantees.
Chapter Four mainly introduces the related theories of subordinated bonds and the current situation of the development of China's subordinated bond market.The theory of subordinated bonds mainly analyzes its unique characteristics, which are different from equity and creditor's rights.It also analyzes the characteristics of subordinated bonds from supplementing bank capital, promoting bank supervision, initiative debt to improve asset structure and promoting transparency of Bank information disclosure. Secondly, investors have the ability to analyze and judge the subordinated bonds. Secondly, the market has sufficient liquidity and investors have the motivation to take action. In the end, the bank management needs to respond to the market reaction and the investor's attitude to control the risk of the bank. These four conditions are indispensable. On this basis, I have made a simple analysis of the domestic secondary bond market. First, from the banking regulatory authority to describe the evolution of its system provisions, China recently. At the end of 2011, deposit insurance system will be set up at the annual financial meeting of our country. Then I will issue 138 subordinated bonds from 2004 to 2012 in five aspects: issuing scale, issuing term, issuing interest rate and interest margin, raising method and investors. China's state-owned banks, joint-stock banks and city commercial banks are quite different in various aspects. The scale of issuing bonds by state-owned banks is very large, mainly between 5 billion and 15 billion yuan. The term of issuing bonds is mainly 15 years, and the rate of return given to investors is relatively small. The issuance scale of the city commercial bank is the smallest, only 10-year products, and mainly less than 1 billion yuan. Subordinate bonds in China are mainly issued at fixed interest rates, with less floating interest rates, and are generally sold with fixed bonds. In the way of raising money, most banks adopt public issuance. As a whole, China's joint-stock banks have the highest degree of marketization in these five aspects. However, there is a single investor in China's secondary bond market, and banks hold secondary bonds seriously among each other. After knowing the basic situation of China's subordinated bond market, the empirical part makes a statistical analysis on whether there is market constraint in China.
The fifth chapter is mainly divided into two parts, descriptive analysis and regression analysis. The descriptive analysis is mainly to analyze the characteristics, trend and correlation of the samples. Banks and city commercial banks also showed a steady growth trend. There was no significant correlation between interest rate spreads and bank risk variables. In regression analysis, subordinated bond yields and current bond spreads were used as dependent variables, bond issuance scale as control variables, bank types and bond maturity as virtual variables, and bank assets as assets. In order to compare whether the market situation has changed after 2009, a separate regression is made on the sample data after 2009. The results show that the subordinate bond market restraint effect in China. The scale of bank assets, capital adequacy ratio and asset profit margin are all significant. But the non-performing loan ratio and liquidity ratio have no significant effect on interest margin.
Based on the analysis of the present situation and empirical results in China, I put forward some ideas on the subordinated bond market in China. If the subordinated bond market in China wants to exert the market restraint effect better, it is necessary to establish a deposit insurance system as soon as possible, eliminate the influence of the government on the implicit guarantee of banks, and strengthen the mutual holding of subordinated bonds between banks. In product design, it should be more reasonable to develop products that are beneficial to investors, such as giving investors redemption rights. China can try to issue subordinated bonds regularly with joint stock banks as a pilot project.
The innovations of this paper are as follows.
Firstly, this paper uses 96 samples of subordinated bonds issued with fixed interest rates from 2004 to March 2012 to make an empirical analysis. Zhang Hai (2010) used 2004-2009 data, and only 46 samples. It can be seen that the domestic empirical literature data are relatively old, and the sample size is very small, which will inevitably have an impact on the empirical results.
In addition, China's subordinated bond market has developed very rapidly since 2009. After four trillion yuan investment plan, the loan scale has increased rapidly. Banks began to issue subordinated bonds on a large scale in order to replenish capital. This growth momentum has been sustained in 2010 and 2011. Does the increase of market capacity have any impact on the market restraint? It is worth studying. In addition, a large number of inter-bank subordinated bonds have been very serious in China. In 2009, China's banking regulatory authorities issued a request to deduct the subordinated bonds of other commercial banks held by banks after July 1, 2009 in full when accessory capital is taken into account. To monitor the risk of holding subordinated bonds. Does this move affect the restraint effect of the subordinated bond market in China?
The above two points show that the empirical study of this paper has certain significance. In addition, this paper also conducts a separate regression study on 66 secondary bonds issued after 2009.
Secondly, this paper classifies bond issuing banks from two dimensions of time sequence and banking category, analyzes bond issuing scale, bond issuing term, bond issuing spreads and issuing methods, and makes a comprehensive analysis of China's secondary bond market. In the part of descriptive statistics, this paper firstly classifies the samples in chronological order, analyzes the trend of the issuance of subordinated bonds each year, and explains the issuance situation and the proportion of different types of banks in each year; then classifies the whole sample according to the types of banks, and analyzes the trend of the issuance of subordinated bonds in chronological order. Tendency. Analysis of the scale, maturity, interest spread and issuing methods of bonds issued, summarizes the special features of bonds issued by state-owned banks, joint-stock banks and city commercial banks in China.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224
本文编号：2249910
[Abstract]:China's subordinated bond market has experienced rapid and vigorous development since 2009. The scale of issuing bank subordinated bonds in 2009 was 268.14 billion yuan, in 2010 was 122.79 billion yuan, and in 2011 the scale of issuing subordinated bonds rose to 324.1 billion yuan unprecedentedly. In 2011, five state-owned commercial banks issued subordinated bonds, and all of them were more than 10 billion yuan. Joint-stock banks and city commercial banks also issued bonds very actively. The subordinated bond market of domestic banks was also very active. The outbreak has caught my attention and made me think about what happened after 2009.
Subordinated bonds, which rank after depositors in the order of claims, cannot be repaid in the first place when a bank goes bankrupt. They are also different from shareholders and can not enjoy the high returns brought about by high risks in the banking industry. As one of the three pillars, it can be seen that the national banking regulators attach great importance to the role of market constraints in banking supervision and ensuring the sound operation of the banking industry.
From the domestic point of view, 2009 is the first year after the outbreak of the financial crisis, and also the year when China launched a four-trillion-dollar investment plan to revitalize the economy. In order to meet the regulatory requirements of bank capital adequacy ratio, commercial banks issue large-scale supplementary capital of subordinated bonds. Subordinated bonds have also become the most important channel for commercial banks to supplement capital in China. And in 2009, Silver The Regulatory Commission expressly stipulates the specific calculation method for the mutual holding of subordinated bonds between banks when accessory capital is taken into account, requiring that the total amount of subordinated bonds held by other banks be removed from the bank's subsidiary capital, and stipulating that banks should not hold subordinated bonds of a single bank and all banks in excess of their own. 15% and 20%. of core capital is a reform in 2009.
As an important financial instrument, whether subordinated bond market restraint exists? Scholars at home and abroad have conducted extensive and in-depth discussion on it. American scholars believe that subordinated bond market restraint almost did not exist before the early 1990s, and listed after the 1990s. The market restraint effect of subordinated bonds has been strengthened, especially after allowing the bankruptcy of Hokkaido Bank. In addition, some scholars suggest that the periodic issuance of subordinated bonds should be compulsory, which is conducive to the exertion of market restraint. Since 2002, many scholars have theoretically discussed the characteristics, functions and importance of subordinated bonds. Empirical studies show that the market constraints of subordinated bonds are almost non-existent before 2009. Nonperforming loan ratio, capital adequacy ratio and other important risk indicators of banks are not significant, only liquidity indicators and asset balance. The empirical results after 2009 show that the restraint of China's secondary bond market is not very strong, but it does exist. As the latest empirical data used only in 2010, this paper will analyze all the secondary bonds up to March 2012 and study China. In addition, scholars generally believe that implicit government guarantees for banks have always existed and hindered the development of subordinated bonds. This paper argues that China should establish explicit deposit insurance system as soon as possible to improve the current situation of investors'ignorance of risk caused by implicit government guarantees.
Chapter Four mainly introduces the related theories of subordinated bonds and the current situation of the development of China's subordinated bond market.The theory of subordinated bonds mainly analyzes its unique characteristics, which are different from equity and creditor's rights.It also analyzes the characteristics of subordinated bonds from supplementing bank capital, promoting bank supervision, initiative debt to improve asset structure and promoting transparency of Bank information disclosure. Secondly, investors have the ability to analyze and judge the subordinated bonds. Secondly, the market has sufficient liquidity and investors have the motivation to take action. In the end, the bank management needs to respond to the market reaction and the investor's attitude to control the risk of the bank. These four conditions are indispensable. On this basis, I have made a simple analysis of the domestic secondary bond market. First, from the banking regulatory authority to describe the evolution of its system provisions, China recently. At the end of 2011, deposit insurance system will be set up at the annual financial meeting of our country. Then I will issue 138 subordinated bonds from 2004 to 2012 in five aspects: issuing scale, issuing term, issuing interest rate and interest margin, raising method and investors. China's state-owned banks, joint-stock banks and city commercial banks are quite different in various aspects. The scale of issuing bonds by state-owned banks is very large, mainly between 5 billion and 15 billion yuan. The term of issuing bonds is mainly 15 years, and the rate of return given to investors is relatively small. The issuance scale of the city commercial bank is the smallest, only 10-year products, and mainly less than 1 billion yuan. Subordinate bonds in China are mainly issued at fixed interest rates, with less floating interest rates, and are generally sold with fixed bonds. In the way of raising money, most banks adopt public issuance. As a whole, China's joint-stock banks have the highest degree of marketization in these five aspects. However, there is a single investor in China's secondary bond market, and banks hold secondary bonds seriously among each other. After knowing the basic situation of China's subordinated bond market, the empirical part makes a statistical analysis on whether there is market constraint in China.
The fifth chapter is mainly divided into two parts, descriptive analysis and regression analysis. The descriptive analysis is mainly to analyze the characteristics, trend and correlation of the samples. Banks and city commercial banks also showed a steady growth trend. There was no significant correlation between interest rate spreads and bank risk variables. In regression analysis, subordinated bond yields and current bond spreads were used as dependent variables, bond issuance scale as control variables, bank types and bond maturity as virtual variables, and bank assets as assets. In order to compare whether the market situation has changed after 2009, a separate regression is made on the sample data after 2009. The results show that the subordinate bond market restraint effect in China. The scale of bank assets, capital adequacy ratio and asset profit margin are all significant. But the non-performing loan ratio and liquidity ratio have no significant effect on interest margin.
Based on the analysis of the present situation and empirical results in China, I put forward some ideas on the subordinated bond market in China. If the subordinated bond market in China wants to exert the market restraint effect better, it is necessary to establish a deposit insurance system as soon as possible, eliminate the influence of the government on the implicit guarantee of banks, and strengthen the mutual holding of subordinated bonds between banks. In product design, it should be more reasonable to develop products that are beneficial to investors, such as giving investors redemption rights. China can try to issue subordinated bonds regularly with joint stock banks as a pilot project.
The innovations of this paper are as follows.
Firstly, this paper uses 96 samples of subordinated bonds issued with fixed interest rates from 2004 to March 2012 to make an empirical analysis. Zhang Hai (2010) used 2004-2009 data, and only 46 samples. It can be seen that the domestic empirical literature data are relatively old, and the sample size is very small, which will inevitably have an impact on the empirical results.
In addition, China's subordinated bond market has developed very rapidly since 2009. After four trillion yuan investment plan, the loan scale has increased rapidly. Banks began to issue subordinated bonds on a large scale in order to replenish capital. This growth momentum has been sustained in 2010 and 2011. Does the increase of market capacity have any impact on the market restraint? It is worth studying. In addition, a large number of inter-bank subordinated bonds have been very serious in China. In 2009, China's banking regulatory authorities issued a request to deduct the subordinated bonds of other commercial banks held by banks after July 1, 2009 in full when accessory capital is taken into account. To monitor the risk of holding subordinated bonds. Does this move affect the restraint effect of the subordinated bond market in China?
The above two points show that the empirical study of this paper has certain significance. In addition, this paper also conducts a separate regression study on 66 secondary bonds issued after 2009.
Secondly, this paper classifies bond issuing banks from two dimensions of time sequence and banking category, analyzes bond issuing scale, bond issuing term, bond issuing spreads and issuing methods, and makes a comprehensive analysis of China's secondary bond market. In the part of descriptive statistics, this paper firstly classifies the samples in chronological order, analyzes the trend of the issuance of subordinated bonds each year, and explains the issuance situation and the proportion of different types of banks in each year; then classifies the whole sample according to the types of banks, and analyzes the trend of the issuance of subordinated bonds in chronological order. Tendency. Analysis of the scale, maturity, interest spread and issuing methods of bonds issued, summarizes the special features of bonds issued by state-owned banks, joint-stock banks and city commercial banks in China.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224
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