我国上市公司独立董事辞职行为的信号传递效应研究

发布时间：2018-11-09 20:21

【摘要】：独立董事制度是现代公司组织结构中的重要组成部分，，也是降低公司治理中代理成本的重要方式之一。上个世纪90年代我国引入独立董事制度以来，独立董事在改善我国公司治理水平中扮演了重要的角色，但其独立性和有效性也一直受到质疑。检验独立董事制度的有效性，并且提出更好的发挥其作用的方式，这是独立董事相关研究的主要内容。本文的研究也属于这一领域。本文以独立董事的辞职行为为研究对象，分析发现独立董事的辞职行为有助于改善公司治理中的信息不对称程度，为独立董事发挥自身作用提出了新的途径。本文的主要内容如下：首先，回顾了独立董事的相关理论，介绍了关于独立董事辞职行为的国内外文献，为本文研究奠定了理论方面的基础。其次，探讨独立董事制度在我国的发展状况，提出独立董事在公司治理中作用有限的原因。并以投资者、独立董事和上市公司三者之间信息不对称作为出发点，分析投资者的逆向选择。另外，建立信号传递模型，分析独立董事与投资者的博弈中可能出现的分离均衡、混同均衡和准分离均衡的条件和表现形式。以此为基础，提出本文的研究假设。然后，通过案例分析和实证研究中的事件研究法两种途径，对理论假设作以验证。最后，总结研究结论，提出相关政策建议。理论分析发现，在特定的条件下，独立董事可以用自身行动向市场传递信号。本文的实证研究也证实了，独立董事的辞职行为通常会伴随着公司股价的异常下跌。这表明，独立董事辞职行为确实能够传递某种信息，帮助投资者作出正确决策。这不失为独立董事发挥其在公司治理中作用的一个新途径。本文的研究同时也发现，独立董事从公司领取的薪酬高低与辞职后公司股价的负面波动强度正相关。这表明，独立董事薪酬的高低显著影响了其辞职行为的信息含量。因此合理的薪酬激励体系，对独立董事制度的完善至关重要。本文研究的主要创新之处在于：第一，以信息不对称为假设前提，建立信号传递模型。通过分析该模型的均衡状态发现独立董事的辞职行为可以传递公司经营状况的信息。同时用案例分析和实证研究的方法对这一结论进行验证。第二，研究发现薪酬状况可以显著影响独立董事辞职行为信息含量，说明合理的薪酬是独立董事制度发挥作用的重要条件。第三，在分析独立董事辞职后公司股价波动强弱的影响因素时，剔除了限定性原因的辞职行为，这契合了本文信息不对称的分析前提，使研究结论更具针对性和说服力。与已有的文献相比，本文主要关注的不是独立董事辞职的原因，而是这一行为的意义。理论和实证分析表明，从有风险的公司中辞职可以成为独立董事制度发挥作用的一种方式。独立董事的薪酬体系越完善，则这种方式的作用就越明显。本文的研究既有助于投资者更好的作出投资决策，也有助于独立董事寻求更灵活有效的履行义务的方法，同时对于制定更合理的独立董事法规和制度也有很好的参考价值。
[Abstract]:Independent director system is an important part of modern company's organizational structure, and is also one of the important ways to reduce agent cost in corporate governance. Since the introduction of the independent director system in the 1990s, the independent director plays an important role in improving the corporate governance level of our country, but its independence and effectiveness have been questioned. It is the main content of the independent director's research. The study of this paper also belongs to this field. This paper, taking the resignation behavior of independent director as the research object, analyzes and finds that the resignation behavior of the independent director can help to improve the information asymmetry in the company's governance, and put forward a new way for the independent director to play its own role. The main contents of this paper are as follows: First, the relevant theory of the independent director is reviewed, and the domestic and foreign literature on the resignation behavior of the independent director is introduced, which lays a theoretical foundation for the research of this paper. On the basis of the development of independent director system in our country, the author points out that the independent director plays a very limited role in corporate governance. The reason is that the information asymmetry between the investor, the independent director and the listed company is the starting point, and the reverse of the investor is analyzed. In addition, a signal transmission model is established to analyze the conditions and performance of the separation, equalisation and quasi-separation equilibrium that may occur in the game between the independent director and the investor The study of this paper is based on this. The theoretical assumption is then made by the case analysis and the case study in the empirical study. Verification. Finally, the conclusions of the study are summarized and relevant policies are put forward It is suggested that, under certain conditions, the independent director can move to the market with his own actions. The empirical study of this paper also confirms that the resignation behavior of the independent director is usually accompanied by the share price of the company The abnormal fall. This suggests that the independent director's resignation is indeed capable of delivering some kind of information to help investors Make the right decision. It's an independent director's role in corporate governance. A new approach is also found in this paper. The research of this paper also shows that the independent director's compensation from the company is the same as the negative fluctuation of the company's stock price after the resignation. The strength is positively related. This means that the independent director's compensation has a significant impact on his resignation The information content of the independent director system is the reasonable salary incentive system. The main innovation of this paper is that the first, the information is not the premise of the hypothesis, The signal transmission model is established. By analyzing the equilibrium state of the model, it is found that the resignation behavior of the independent director can be transferred to the public. The information on the operation status of the Division. The case analysis and the method of the empirical study are also used. The second, the research finds that the compensation condition can significantly affect the information content of the independent director's resignation, and the reasonable compensation is the independent director's system. Third, when analyzing the influence factors of the stock price fluctuation of the company after the resignation of the independent director, the resignation behavior of the non-limiting reason is eliminated, which is in agreement with the analysis premise of the information asymmetry in this paper, so that the research conclusion is more Compared with the existing literature, the main concern of this paper is not the original of the independent director's resignation. The theory and the empirical analysis show that the resignation from a risky company can become an independent director A way in which the system works. The more complete the remuneration system of the independent director, The more obvious the effect of this approach is, the study of this paper is helpful for investors to make investment decisions better and to help independent directors to seek a more flexible and effective way to perform their obligations, and at the same time to make more reasonable and independent directors' rules and regulations.
【学位授予单位】：河南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51

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