央企控股上市公司治理特殊问题研究

发布时间：2018-11-11 21:16

【摘要】：央企控股上市公司作为国有控股上市公司的重要组成部分，其公司治理区别于英美等发达资本主义国家的上市公司治理，具有传统的行政干预色彩。在所有权与控制权分离的现代公司结构下，央企部分改制上市的发展路径、国有资产特定的所有制模式、以及央企身份的特殊性使央企控股上市公司形成了异于一般上市公司的特殊治理问题。在国有资本的法律保护与现代公司制度法律完善的双重目标下，央企控股上市公司治理具有一定的特殊性。本文将围绕央企控股上市公司治理中因其治理特殊性而引发的独立性缺失以及控股股东的泛行政管理问题，分别从原因以及危害两个方面进行阐述，最后再初步探索解决特殊性问题的有效途径，以寻求央企控股上市公司治理特殊性、合法性和有效性的统一。本文分为引言、正文、结论三大部分。引言简要介绍了央企控股上市公司治理的背景和特殊性，阐明本文研究的意义与目的。正文分为三章。第一章主要介绍央企控股上市公司概念及其治理的特点。央企控股与上市公司的结合，令央企控股上市公司呈现出多层委托代理机制、负责人选聘行政化、政府部门并行监管以及垄断的事实化的特点，，成为央企控股上市公司治理特殊问题出现的源头。第二章主要围绕央企控股上市公司独立性缺失和控股股东泛行政管理两大问题，来阐明其成因、表现及危害。独立性问题体现在人员与机构、资产与业务两个方面，并因此造成董事、高管人员的寻租以及出现同业竞争和关联交易问题。而控股股东的泛行政管理则不利于央企控股上市公司治理机制的完善，并可能引发内幕交易行为。第三章则主要围绕特殊性问题，初步探索其解决之道。在协调好部门监管职责的前提下，加强央企控股上市公司内部治理机构之间的制约与平衡，为中小股东利益的保护提供切实可行的法律途径，外部治理上则着力减少行政管理方式的干预，并充分利用央企同类及相关资产的重组或者央企整体上市的契机，规范央企控股上市公司资产、业务的独立性。结论部分则通过归纳总结全文观点，重申央企控股上市公司治理的特点，存在的特殊性问题，以及针对问题可以采取的改进建议。
[Abstract]:As an important part of the state-owned listed companies, the corporate governance of the state-owned enterprises is different from that of the listed companies in the developed capitalist countries such as the United States and the United States, and has the traditional color of administrative intervention. Under the structure of modern company with the separation of ownership and control, the development path of partial restructuring and listing of central enterprises, the specific ownership mode of state-owned assets, And the particularity of the identity of the central enterprises makes the listed companies to form a special governance problem different from the general listed companies. Under the dual goals of the legal protection of state-owned capital and the legal perfection of the modern company system, the governance of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises has its own particularity. This paper will focus on the lack of independence caused by the particularity of corporate governance and the pan-administrative management of controlling shareholders in the governance of listed companies controlled by central enterprises, respectively from the two aspects of reasons and harm. Finally, the author explores the effective way to solve the problem of particularity, in order to seek the unity of governance particularity, legitimacy and validity of the listed companies controlled by central enterprises. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction briefly introduces the background and particularity of corporate governance, and clarifies the significance and purpose of this study. The text is divided into three chapters. The first chapter mainly introduces the concept of the listed company and its governance characteristics. The combination of the holding of central enterprises with listed companies has made the listed companies under the control of central enterprises present the characteristics of multi-layer principal-agent mechanism, administrative selection and appointment of responsible persons, parallel supervision by government departments and the fact of monopoly. Become the source of the special problems in the governance of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises. The second chapter mainly focuses on the lack of independence and the pan-administrative management of controlling shareholders to clarify the causes, performance and harm. The issue of independence is embodied in the aspects of personnel and institution, assets and business, and has resulted in the rent-seeking of directors and executives, as well as the problems of peer competition and related party transactions. The pan-administrative management of controlling shareholders is not conducive to the improvement of corporate governance mechanism and may lead to insider trading. The third chapter mainly focuses on the particularity of the problem, preliminary exploration of its solution. Under the premise of coordinating the responsibility of department supervision, we should strengthen the restriction and balance among the internal governance institutions of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises, and provide a practical legal way for the protection of the interests of the minority shareholders. On the external governance, we should reduce the intervention of administrative management, and make full use of the opportunity of the reorganization of the similar assets of the central enterprises and related assets or the whole listing of the central enterprises, and standardize the independence of the assets and business of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises. In the conclusion part, the author summarizes the views of the full text, and restates the characteristics of the governance of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises, the particularity of the problems, and the suggestions to be taken to improve the problems.
【学位授予单位】：中国社会科学院研究生院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;D922.291.91

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