土地财政、官员特征与地方债务膨胀——来自中国省级市政投资的经验证据

发布时间：2018-11-12 10:58

【摘要】：地方政府有限借债放开之后,如何使得地方政府合理借债是规范的地方政府债务融资体制建立的关键。只有找到地方政府隐性债务膨胀的原因,才能有效控制地方政府债务风险。笔者建立了关于地方政府的财政激励、官员晋升激励对债务扩张影响的研究框架,通过对2003—2010年省级面板数据的实证研究,主要发现:第一,财政集权的不断深化,加重了地方财政负担和债务水平;第二,土地财政与预算内市政投资中的借债资金之间表现出收入上的互补性;第三,省级官员的政治网络形成了地方政府债务的软约束,且省长比省委书记更为显著。在现行体制下,地方政府面临的财政激励背离了地方政府应有的职能目标是造成地方债务膨胀的重要原因。规范政府融资渠道、转变"土地财政"模式和变革官员考核机制是化解地方政府债务风险的关键。
[Abstract]:How to make the local government reasonable borrowing is the key to the establishment of the standard local government debt financing system. Only by finding the reason of the local government implicit debt inflation can the local government debt risk be effectively controlled. The author establishes a research framework on the financial incentives of local governments and the impact of official promotion incentives on debt expansion. Through empirical research on provincial panel data from 2003 to 2010, the main findings are as follows: first, the deepening of fiscal centralization. Increased local financial burden and debt level; Thirdly, the political network of provincial officials forms the soft constraint of local government debt, and the provincial governor is more prominent than the provincial party secretary. In the current system, the financial incentives faced by the local governments deviate from the functional objectives of the local governments, which are the important reasons for the local debt inflation. Standardizing government financing channels, changing "land finance" mode and reforming official appraisal mechanism are the key to resolve the debt risk of local government.
【作者单位】：中国社会科学院财经战略研究院;中央财经大学税务学院;中央财经大学税务学院国际税收系;清华大学国情研究院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大项目“深化税收制度改革与完善地方税体系研究”(项目编号:142DA028) 中央财经大学青年团队“我国生态文明建设中的能源财政问题研究”课题组中央财经大学中国财政发展协同创新中心中央财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目“优化我国增值税税率设计研究”(项目编号:201305)
【分类号】：D625;F812.5

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