我国上市公司职工持股计划与公司绩效的实证研究

发布时间：2019-03-06 16:06

【摘要】：职工持股制度(Employee Stock Ownership Plans,简ESOP),是指由企业内部职工出资认购本公司部分股权,委托专门机构(如职工持股会,信托基金会等)对股票进行托管运作、集中管理,职工股持股机构作为整体参股公司,参与公司的经营决策并且按股分享红利获得收入。西方关于职工持股制度的理论主要开始于50年代,学者们分别从产权理论、委托代理理论与人力资本理论等方面分析职工持股制度的重要性,得到了广泛的关注。经过多年的发展,职工持股制度在西方已经成为诸多企业激励职工首选方式。但是,关于职工股是否能够促进企业的经营绩效,职工持股制度是否对职工有激励作用,相关的实证分析并没有统一的结论。一方面,职工持股可以减少企业的代理问题,减缓职工与管理层之间的矛盾,鼓励职工努力工作,分享信息,提高企业生产率；另一方面,职工持股制度作为团队激励的一种,可能会引起“搭便车”等问题使激励作用消失。本文选取中国A股市场1999-2010年上市公司数据,利用SAS等统计软件,对职工持股与公司绩效进行回归发现： (1)我国的职工持股制度对职工并没有激励作用,职工持股并不能促进企业财务绩效的增加。 (2)我国的职工持股制度与公司的市场绩效显著负相关。 (3)企业发行职工股,更多的是希望职工通过股票上市流通后抛售套利。通过以上结论,可以看出,我国实行职工股制度的目的并不在于促进企业发展,提高企业竞争力,而是把职工持股制度当成企业股份制改革的一部分,这就使职工希望通过上市后抛售股票套利获得收益,并不会关心企业的经营发展。职工持股制度并不具有长期的激励作用。最后,本文针对我国职工持股制度出现的问题提出了相应的政策规范建议。
[Abstract]:ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plans, simple ESOP) refers to the enterprise's internal staff to subscribe for part of the shares of the Company, entrust specialized agencies (such as employee stock-holding associations, trust foundations, etc.) to carry out the escrow operation and centralized management of the shares. As a whole, the employee-owned company participates in the decision-making of the company and receives income from the share-sharing dividend. The western theories about the ESOP mainly began in the 1950s. Scholars analyzed the importance of ESOP from the aspects of property right theory, principal-agent theory and human capital theory, and got extensive attention. After years of development, ESOP has become the preferred way to encourage employees in many enterprises in the West. However, there is no unified conclusion as to whether the employee stock can promote the performance of the enterprise and whether the employee ownership system has an incentive effect on the staff and workers, and there is no unified conclusion in the relevant empirical analysis. On the one hand, employee shareholding can reduce the agency problems of enterprises, alleviate the contradiction between workers and management, encourage workers to work hard, share information, and improve the productivity of enterprises; On the other hand, employee shareholding system, as a kind of team incentive, may cause some problems such as hitchhiking and so on, so that the incentive function disappears. This paper selects the data of listed companies from 1999 to 2010 in Chinese A-share market, and makes use of SAS and other statistical software to regression the employee ownership and company performance: (1) the ESOP system in China has no incentive effect on the staff and workers, and the results are as follows: (1) Employee shareholding can not promote the increase of enterprise financial performance. (2) there is a significant negative correlation between the ESOP system and the company's market performance. (3) it is hoped that workers will sell arbitrage after their shares are listed in circulation. Through the above conclusions, we can see that the purpose of implementing the occupational stock system in China is not to promote the development of enterprises and improve the competitiveness of enterprises, but to take the system of employee stock ownership as part of the reform of joint stock system of enterprises. This makes workers want to sell stock arbitrage after the listing to gain profit, and will not care about the business development of the enterprise. The employee shareholding system does not have long-term incentive effect. Finally, this article puts forward the corresponding policy and standard suggestions to the problems of the employee stock ownership system in our country.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92

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