高耗能制造企业节能方式选择研究

发布时间：2017-12-27 21:36

本文关键词：高耗能制造企业节能方式选择研究　出处：《南京大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：当今社会,能源成本的快速增加、日益严厉的环保政策和消费者环保意识的不断增强正成为众多高能耗制造企业必须面对的“三座大山”。而节能成为制造企业(为简洁起见,下文的制造企业均指高耗能制造企业)应对这“三座大山”的一种有效手段。在实际中,制造企业可以选择主要依靠自身的力量购买节能设备／节能技术或设计节能方案、建设和运行节能项目而达到节能的效果,其具有一些典型的特征,如主要依靠自身的力量、需对节能项目进行融资、承担所有的项目风险、独自享有所有的节能收益等,为简洁起见,在本文中我们称之为自我节能。然而,自我节能方式存在诸多缺陷,如由于制造企业不具备专业的节能改造技术知识和经验导致节能方案制定和设备的选择可能不合理、制造企业自运行项目可能导致设备使用方法不科学造成设备过快老化或没有达到预期的节能效果等,最终导致节能效益不能弥补项目投资,从而造成许多潜在的有利可图的节能项目无法执行。为了解决制造企业选择自我节能所存在的问题,其也可以选择将节能服务外包给节能服务公司或能源服务供应商。通常,节能服务公司提供的绩效合同的形式是合同能源管理,其主要包括节能效益分享和节能量保证两种运作模式。因此,在节能管理中,制造企业必须解决一个重要的运营决策,即,面对现实中的各种节能方式,选择哪一种节能方式对自身最有利。基于此动机,本文聚焦于制造企业一个重要的节能动机,即降低能源成本,研究制造企业面临自我节能和合同能源管理两种常见的节能方式,如何选择最优节能方式问题。具体来说,包括以下三个子问题：(1)有限期时变需求情况下制造企业节能方式选择问题；(2)单位产品节能量内生情形下制造企业节能方式选择问题；(3)竞争环境下制造企业节能方式选择问题。作为尝试用数学模型的方法研究制造企业最优节能方式选择问题的第一步,第二章以现实中被广泛应用的动态经济批量模型为基础,假设不存在节能政策,建立了自我节能、节能效益分享和节能量保证三种情形下的动态批量生产决策模型,之后基于模型分析有限期时变需求情况下制造企业如何选择最优的节能方式。研究发现：(1)面临自我节能和节能效益分享两种节能方式时,当节能服务公司与制造企业的节能投资成本系数比率和合同能源管理情形下的单位产品预计节能率较小时,制造企业应选择节能效益节能方式；当节能服务公司与制造企业的节能投资成本系数比率和合同能源管理情形下的单位产品预计节能率增大到一个阈值之后,制造企业应选择自我节能；(2)制造企业面临节能效益分享和节能量保证两种节能方式,假定分享期等于节能量保证期,当合同能源管理情形下的单位产品预计节能率较小时,制造企业选择节能效益分享或节能量保证无差异；当合同能源管理情形下的单位产品预计节能率增大到一个阈值之后,制造企业应选择节能效益分享；(3)当制造企业面临自我节能和节能量保证两种节能方式时,具有与(1)相类似的性质。进一步将基本模型拓展到能源税情形,分析能源税对制造企业最优节能方式选择决策的影响。研究发现：(4)能源税没有改变制造企业的最优节能方式选择决策。不同于第二章的假设,考虑到单位产品的节能量往往是制造企业或节能服务公司的重要决策,制造企业或节能服务公司通过设置不同的单位产品节能量来优化节能项目的经济性,即单位产品节能量内生。基于此动机,第三章研究单位产品节能量内生情形下制造企业最优节能方式选择问题。首先,仅考虑自我节能和节能效益分享两种节能方式,建立自我节能情形下的优化模型和节能效益分享情形下的斯坦科尔伯格博弈模型。通过模型分析发现：(1)面临自我节能和节能效益分享两种节能方式,当节能服务公司与制造企业投资成本系数的比率较小时,制造企业应选择节能效益分享,反之,制造企业选择自我节能方式更优。进一步将基本模型拓展到价格内生、需求不确定、节能量不确定和考虑节能间接效益四种情形,并分析这四种情形对制造企业最优节能方式选择决策的影响。研究结果表明：(2)价格内生和需求不确定性对制造企业的最优节能方式选择决策不会产生影响；(3)当实际节能量不确定时,制造企业引入了第三种节能方式-节能量保证,与基本模型不同的是,若节能服务公司与制造企业投资成本系数的比率较小,制造企业由选择节能效益分享转向选择节能量保证；(4)当考虑节能间接收益时,则制造企业的最优节能方式选择决策在某些情形下发生较大的变化(具体可见3.4.4节或5.1节)。前两章的相关结论都是基于完全垄断假设前提下,在现实中,制造企业常须面对激烈的市场竞争。因此,第四章研究竞争环境下制造企业如何选择最优的节能方式。首先假设两家制造企业在市场上进行数量竞争且相互对称(即两者具有相同的特征),建立两家制造企业的多阶段博弈模型并分析高耗能制造企业的节能方式选择均衡策略。研究结果表明：(1)此时存在两个对称的纳什均衡；当节能服务公司与制造企业的投资成本系数比率较小时,两家制造企业均应选择节能效益分享；反之,两家制造企业均应选择自我节能。之后将基本模型分别拓展到两家制造企业的投资成本系数不对称、初始能效不对称和分享期小于节能系统的生命周期三种情形,分别探讨每种情形对制造企业节能方式选择均衡策略的影响。结果表明：(2)若一家制造企业的投资成本系数比另一家制造企业的投资成本系数大时,则存在两个对称的纳什均衡和一个不对称的纳什均衡；当节能服务公司和制造企业的投资成本系数比率处于中间值时,两种制造企业选择不同的节能方式,即前一家制造企业应选择节能效益分享,而后一家制造企业应选择自我节能；当节能服务公司和制造企业的投资成本系数比率较小或较大时,两家制造企业的最优节能方式选择均衡策略与基本模型一致；(3)初始能效不对称和分享期小于节能系统的生命周期均不会改变两家制造企业节能方式选择的均衡策略。第五章总结了论文的研究成果,并进一步指明了未来的研究方向。
[Abstract]:In today's society, the rapid increase in energy costs, increasingly stringent environmental protection policies and constantly enhance consumer awareness of environmental protection is becoming a large number of high energy consumption of manufacturing enterprises must face the "three big mountains". The energy has become the manufacturing enterprise (for the sake of simplicity, the following manufacturing enterprises refer to high energy manufacturing enterprises) is an effective way to deal with the "three mountains". In practice, the manufacturing enterprises can choose to rely mainly on their own strength to buy energy-saving equipment / energy saving technology or energy saving design, construction and operation of energy-saving projects and energy-saving effect, it has some typical characteristics, such as mainly rely on its own strength, to the financing of energy saving project, take all the risk, enjoy alone all of the benefits of energy saving and so on, for the sake of simplicity, in this paper we call self saving. However, such way has many defects, such as manufacturing enterprises do not have the professional knowledge and experience in the energy saving technology of energy-saving scheme and equipment selection may not be reasonable, since the operation of the project manufacturing enterprises may lead to equipment using scientific method of equipment caused by excessive aging or did not reach the expected energy-saving effect, resulting in such benefits can make up for the project investment, which causes a lot of potentially profitable energy-saving projects cannot be performed. In order to solve the problem that manufacturing enterprises choose to choose self saving energy, they can also choose to outsource energy saving services to energy saving service companies or energy service providers. Generally, the form of the performance contract provided by the energy saving service company is the energy management of the contract, which mainly includes two operating modes: energy saving benefit sharing and energy saving. Therefore, in energy saving management, manufacturing enterprises must solve an important operation decision, that is, facing the various ways of energy saving in the real world, choose which energy saving way is most beneficial to themselves. Based on this motivation, this paper focuses on an important energy-saving motivation of manufacturing enterprises, that is, to reduce energy costs, and study the two common ways of energy saving for manufacturing enterprises, which are self energy saving and contract energy management, and how to choose the best way to save energy. Specifically, include the following three questions: (1) the limited period of time varying selection of manufacturing enterprise energy demand situation; (2) energy saving unit product endogenous manufacturing enterprises such circumstances; (3) selection of manufacturing energy saving mode in enterprise competition. As an attempt by a mathematical model of first step in making the optimal energy saving enterprise selection problem, dynamic EOQ model is widely used in the second chapter, in reality based on the assumption that there is no such policy, set up a self energy saving, energy saving benefit sharing and dynamic energy savings guarantee under the three situations of mass production decision model. Based on the enterprise how to choose the optimal way of making such model analysis of finite period time-varying demand situation. The study found that: (1) self facing energy-saving and benefit share two energy saving mode, when the unit product energy service companies and manufacturing enterprises energy saving investment cost coefficient ratio and energy management contract under the expected energy saving rate is low, manufacturing enterprises should choose the way of energy saving energy saving; when the unit product energy service companies and manufacturing the company's energy investment cost coefficient ratio and energy management contract under the expected energy saving rate increases to a threshold, the enterprise should choose self energy; (2) manufacturing enterprises are facing energy efficiency share and energy saving guarantee two energy saving, energy saving is assumed to share the period of guarantee period, when the unit product energy management contract under the condition of the expected energy saving rate is small, the selection of manufacturing enterprises or energy saving benefit sharing to ensure that no difference; when the contract energy management under the condition of single When the bit product is expected to increase its energy efficiency to a threshold, the manufacturing enterprises should choose energy saving benefit sharing. (3) when manufacturing enterprises are faced with two ways of energy saving, which are self energy saving and energy saving, they have similar properties to (1). Further, the basic model is extended to the energy tax situation, and the influence of energy tax on the decision making of the optimal energy saving mode selection of the manufacturing enterprises is analyzed. It is found that: (4) the energy tax does not change the choice of the best way of energy saving of the manufacturing enterprises. The second chapter is different from the assumption, considering the amount of energy saving unit is an important decision of manufacturing enterprises or energy service companies, economy of manufacturing enterprises or energy service companies by setting different products to optimize the energy saving unit of energy saving project, namely the unit product energy saving endogenous. Based on this motive, the third chapter studies the choice of the optimal energy saving mode of the manufacturing enterprise under the energy endogenous situation of the unit. First, we consider only two ways of energy saving, which are self energy saving and energy saving benefit sharing. We set up the Stan Kolberg game model under the condition of self energy saving and the sharing of energy saving benefits. The model analysis shows: (1) self facing energy-saving and benefit share two energy saving mode, when the ratio of energy service companies and manufacturing enterprises investment cost coefficient is small, manufacturing enterprises should choose energy-saving benefit sharing, on the other hand, the selection of manufacturing enterprises such way better. Further, the basic models are expanded to four situations, which are price endogenous, uncertain demand, uncertain energy consumption and energy saving indirect benefits. The influence of these four situations on the optimal energy saving decision of manufacturing enterprises is analyzed. The results show that: (2) endogenous price and demand uncertainty on the optimal energy saving manufacturing enterprise decision is not affected; (3) when the actual energy savings is uncertain, manufacturing enterprises into the guarantee third energy saving - energy saving, and the basic model is different, if the energy service companies and manufacturing investment cost coefficient ratio is relatively small, manufacturing enterprises by selecting energy efficiency
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F206;F424

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