我国房地产上市公司负债结构对过度投资的影响研究
发布时间:2018-01-27 06:49
本文关键词: 房地产上市公司 负债结构 过度投资 负债相机治理 预算软约束 出处:《集美大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:房地产业作为我国经济发展的支柱产业,房地产投资的合理性对我国经济的健康发展至关重要。现今房价高涨的情况让房地产投资愈加火热,然而空置率的相应增长说明房地产业存在过度投资的风险。需要大量资金投入的房地产企业主要依靠负债融资,不同的负债结构会对房地产企业的投资行为产生不同的影响。从理论上分析,负债能够抑制过度投资,而负债发挥治理作用的重要前提是负债对企业有足够硬的约束力,即一旦企业到期发生债务违约,则债权人将有足够的能力和意愿对债务人实施相应的惩罚。这一前提如果无法成立,负债将失去抑制企业过度投资的能力。在现实中,国有房企的经营效率低于非国有房企,这可能是因为在我国的经济制度和资本市场还不够完善的背景下,作为与政府联系较紧密的国有房企特别容易受到政府的干预和救助,从而出现预算软约束的情况,弱化负债相机治理作用。考虑到我国房地产业的行业特点及实证数据的可得性,本文将经营规模和房地产市场占有率都较大的我国房地产上市公司作为研究对象,并以其2009-2015年的经验数据为研究样本,借鉴Richardson(2006)模型研究我国房地产上市公司的过度投资现象,证明我国房地产上市公司存在过度投资。其次,将存在过度投资的样本值分为国有组与非国有组来对比分析我国房地产上市公司负债结构对过度投资的影响。实证结果显示:(1)从负债来源来说,相较于非国有房地产上市公司,国有房地产上市公司的银行借款对过度投资的抑制作用较小,而商业信用对国有与非国有房地产上市公司的过度投资都有显著的抑制作用;(2)从负债期限来说,短期负债对国有与非国有房地产上市公司过度投资都有显著抑制作用,而长期负债仅对非国有房地产上市公司过度投资产生明显的抑制作用,对国有房地产上市公司过度投资的抑制作用并不明显。最后,基于以上的研究提出相应的政策建议:深化改革,减少政府干预,提高银行借款治理效用;完善法律法规,保证商业信用治理效用;合理调整长短期负债比例,提高负债治理效用,以此来充分发挥负债的相机治理作用以缓解房地产业过度投资的情况。
[Abstract]:As the pillar industry of our country's economic development, the rationality of real estate investment is very important to the healthy development of our economy. However, the corresponding increase of vacancy rate shows that the real estate industry has the risk of overinvestment. The real estate enterprises that need a lot of capital investment mainly rely on debt financing. Different debt structure will have different influence on the investment behavior of real estate enterprises. Theoretically, debt can restrain overinvestment. The important premise of the governance of debt is that the debt has enough hard binding force on the enterprise, that is, once the enterprise matures, the debt defaults. The creditor will have sufficient ability and will to punish the debtor accordingly. If this premise is not established, the debt will lose the ability to restrain the enterprise from overinvestment. The operating efficiency of state-owned housing enterprises is lower than that of non-state-owned housing enterprises, which may be due to the imperfect economic system and capital market in China. As a state-owned housing enterprise closely linked with the government, it is particularly vulnerable to government intervention and rescue, resulting in soft budget constraints. Weakening the role of debt camera governance. Considering the industry characteristics of China's real estate industry and the availability of empirical data. In this paper, the real estate listed companies which have a large scale of operation and market share of real estate are taken as the research object, and the empirical data from 2009-2015 are taken as the research samples. Using Richardson's 2006) model to study the phenomenon of overinvestment of listed real estate companies in China, it proves that there is overinvestment in listed companies of real estate in our country. Secondly. The sample value of overinvestment is divided into state-owned group and non-state-owned group to compare and analyze the impact of debt structure on overinvestment of listed real estate companies in China. The empirical results show that: 1) from the source of debt. Compared with the non-state-owned real estate listed companies, the bank loans of the state-owned real estate listed companies have less restraining effect on over-investment. The commercial credit has a significant restraining effect on the overinvestment of state-owned and non-state-owned real estate listed companies. (2) in terms of the term of debt, short-term debt has a significant effect on the overinvestment of state-owned and non-state-owned real estate listed companies. The long-term debt only on the non-state-owned real estate listed companies overinvestment inhibition effect, the state-owned real estate listed companies overinvestment inhibition effect is not obvious. Finally. Based on the above research, the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward: deepen the reform, reduce government intervention, and improve the governance effectiveness of bank loans; Improve laws and regulations to ensure the effectiveness of commercial credit governance; Adjust the ratio of long-term and short-term debt reasonably, improve the utility of debt governance, so as to give full play to the camera governance role of debt in order to alleviate the situation of overinvestment in real estate industry.
【学位授予单位】:集美大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F299.233.42
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