基于企业社会责任的供应链企业质量信号传递博弈

发布时间：2018-02-23 13:27

本文关键词： 企业社会责任产品质量信号博弈供应链　出处：《中国管理科学》2017年07期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：针对"供应链企业如何间接地通过企业社会责任(CSR)策略实现质量信息共享"这一问题,考虑一条由一个供应商、一个零售商和消费者构成供应链(其中上游供应商的产品质量信息是其私人信息),建立了供应商基于CSR这一间接信息传递方式的上游质量信号传递博弈模型,完整地刻画了不实施CSR模型下的混同均衡和实施CSR模型下的分离均衡,并利用"直观标准"选出了唯一的分离,以考察CSR在传递供应商质量信息中的角色及实施CSR信号手段的盈利性条件。结果表明在一定技术条件下,1)充分高的CSR水平能够在分离均衡意义上准确传递供应商质量信息;2)最低临界CSR水平所对应的均衡是唯一满足"直观标准"的分离均衡;3)最低临界CSR水平随着低质量供应商的CSR边际成本增加而减小,但独立于高质量供应商CSR边际成本;4)当且仅当两类供应商CSR边际成本差异充分小时,通过CSR手段来共享质量信息对高质量供应商是有利可图的。该结果一方面揭示了企业CSR行为的信号传递动机,另一方面也为企业选择直接或间接信息共享方式提供了决策参考。
[Abstract]:In view of the problem of "how to indirectly achieve quality information sharing through CSR strategy in supply chain enterprises", we consider a supplier, A retailer and a consumer constitute a supply chain (in which the upstream supplier's product quality information is its private information), a game model of upstream quality signal transmission based on CSR is established. The mixed equilibrium without the CSR model and the separation equilibrium under the CSR model are described completely, and the unique separation is selected by using the "intuitive standard". In order to investigate the role of CSR in transmitting supplier quality information and the profitability condition of implementing CSR signal means, the results show that under certain technical conditions, sufficient high CSR level can accurately transfer suppliers in the sense of separation and equilibrium. Quality information 2) the equilibrium corresponding to the lowest critical CSR level is the only separation equilibrium that meets the "visual standard". The lowest critical CSR level decreases with the increase of the marginal cost of CSR of the low quality supplier. But independent of the CSR marginal cost of high quality suppliers (4) if and only if the marginal cost differences between the two types of suppliers are sufficiently small, It is profitable for high quality suppliers to share quality information by means of CSR. On the one hand, the result reveals the signaling motivation of enterprise's CSR behavior, on the other hand, it provides a decision reference for enterprises to choose direct or indirect information sharing mode.
【作者单位】：电子科技大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272129,71561008,71461005,71162017) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-11-0064) 四川青年科技基金资助项目(2013JQ0031) 电子科技大学百人计划
【分类号】：F224.32;F274

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