非正式制度对农户道德风险行为影响的实证分析——基于389户农户的调查

发布时间：2018-03-04 21:21

本文选题：农户道德风险　切入点：非正式制度　出处：《农林经济管理学报》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：农户道德风险行为的发生严重影响农产品质量安全,如何防范农户道德风险行为是当前研究的焦点。借助半参数Logistic回归模型,以389户农户调查数据为样本,重点研究非正式制度对农户道德风险行为的影响。结果表明,非正式制度负向影响农户道德风险行为。其中,"村规民约制定情况"变量的边际效应为-0.133,说明所在村庄制定了村规民约的农户,其道德风险行为发生的可能性越低;"道德观念约束力"变量的边际效应为-0.161,说明在开展农业生产活动中,认为道德观念约束力越强的农户,道德风险行为发生的可能性越低。从充分发挥村规民约作用、增强农户道德观念和加大政府规制力度等方面提出政策建议。
[Abstract]:The occurrence of farmers' moral hazard behavior seriously affects the quality and safety of agricultural products. How to prevent farmers' moral hazard behavior is the focus of current research. With the help of semi-parametric Logistic regression model, the survey data of 389-household households are taken as samples. The effect of informal institution on the behavior of farmers' moral hazard is studied. Among them, the marginal effect of the variable of "village rules and regulations" is -0.133, which shows that the farmers in the village have formulated the rules of the village, and the informal institution has negative influence on the behavior of the farmers' moral hazard. The lower the possibility of moral hazard behavior is, the lower the marginal effect of the "moral binding" variable is -0.161, which indicates that in the agricultural production activities, the farmer who thinks that the moral concept is more binding, The lower the possibility of moral hazard behavior is, the more policy suggestions are put forward from the following aspects: to give full play to the role of village rules and regulations, to strengthen farmers' moral concept and to strengthen government regulation and regulation.
【作者单位】：江西财经大学鄱阳湖生态经济研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71263018、71663025) 中国博士后科学基金(2013T60236、2012M510700) 江西省社会科学规划基金(13GL06) 江西省现代农业及其优势产业可持续发展的决策支持协调创新中心课题(XDNYA1507) 江西省研究生创新项目(YC2015-B060)
【分类号】：F224;F322

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