WEEE第三方逆向物流激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-18 13:38

本文选题：废弃电子电气设备(WEEE)　切入点：激励机制　出处：《华北电力大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着信息社会的发展以及世界范围内对电子电气设备(EEE)持续不断的消费,社会正面临着处理日益增加的废弃电子电气设备(WEEE)的挑战。面对近1.6亿台废弃电子电气设备,基于生产商延伸责任制(EPR)的规制、政策、回收系统已经被广泛实施,第三方逆向物流可能是目前满足生产商延伸责任制(EPR)目标的最有效的方式。尽管WEEE具有巨大的潜在价值,但对于WEEE逆向物流的较低的参与度问题也不容回避。因此解决这一问题的重要方法是如何设计更好的激励契约机制,使得更多专业的第三方物流企业能参与到WEEE逆向物流中。为了改进WEEE逆向物流的较低的参与度问题,本文应基于第三方物流存在不对称信息时,为第三方物流设计激励契约机制,以便改进WEEE的回收率,也能同时改进WEEE逆向物流的效率。此外,制造商生产电子电气设备时也能进一步实现循环经济。以第三方物流为核心,首先为其构建上游激励机制模型,运用两部制契约,分别得到对称信息模型、单边不对称信息模型及双边不对称信息模型,解决了第三方物流如何从WEEE中间商及个人回收者回收WEEE,通过数值算例进而得到二者的回收比例由双方的不对称信息程度共同决定的结论;其次构建了下游激励机制模型,运用批发价格契约,以对称信息下的多委托人单一代理人模型激励机制作为基础模型,即第三方逆向物流的回收利用率是公共知识。基于此提出不对称信息下的双委托人单一代理人模型作为过渡与铺垫,此时第三方逆向物流的回收利用率是私人信息,进而得到了多委托人单一代理人模型,解决了WEEE第三方逆向物流同时面对多个制造商委托人时能得到的契约激励机制,以某WEEE第三方逆向物流作为实际算例,得到结论,尽管随着制造商数量的增加,购买数量降低,但第三方代理人的收益从长远看趋于一个稳定值。最终本文解决了WEEE第三方物流在整个逆向物流中的激励机制问题。
[Abstract]:With the development of information society and the incessant consumption of electronic and electrical equipment in the world, the society is facing the challenge of dealing with the increasing waste electronic and electrical equipment. Based on the extended producer responsibility system, the regulation, policy and recovery system have been widely implemented. The third party reverse logistics is probably the most effective way to meet the goal of the producer extended responsibility system. However, the problem of low participation in WEEE reverse logistics cannot be avoided. Therefore, the important way to solve this problem is to design a better incentive contract mechanism. In order to improve the low participation of WEEE reverse logistics, this paper should be based on the existence of asymmetric information in the third party logistics. In order to improve the recovery rate of WEEE and the efficiency of reverse logistics of WEEE, the incentive contract mechanism can be designed for TPL. In addition, the manufacturer can further realize circular economy when producing electronic and electrical equipment, with TPL as the core. Firstly, the upstream incentive mechanism model is constructed, and the symmetric information model, the unilateral asymmetric information model and the bilateral asymmetric information model are obtained by using the two-part contract. It solves the problem of how TPL reclaims WEEE from WEEE middlemen and individual recyclers, and then obtains the conclusion that the proportion of WEEE is determined by the degree of asymmetric information between the two parties through numerical examples. Secondly, the downstream incentive mechanism model is constructed. By using wholesale price contract, the incentive mechanism of multi-principal and single-agent model under symmetrical information is taken as the basic model. That is, the recovery utilization ratio of the third party reverse logistics is public knowledge. Based on this, the double principal single agent model under the asymmetric information is put forward as the transition and paving, and the recovery utilization ratio of the third party reverse logistics is private information. Then, the model of multi-agent and single-agent is obtained, which solves the contract incentive mechanism of WEEE third-party reverse logistics when facing multiple manufacturer principals simultaneously. Taking a WEEE third-party reverse logistics as an example, the conclusion is drawn. Although the number of manufacturers increases and the amount of purchase decreases, the income of third-party agents tends to be stable in the long run. Finally, this paper solves the incentive mechanism of WEEE third-party logistics in the whole reverse logistics.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.6;F259.23

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