我国地方官员隐性激励的扭曲与重构——基于政治内部劳动力市场的分析

发布时间：2018-03-18 15:05

本文选题：政治内部劳动力市场　切入点：隐性激励　出处：《产经评论》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：经典的晋升锦标赛理论存在诸多疑问,由此引发地方官员晋升激励的多维探讨,隐性激励是地方官员激励研究的关注点之一。中国转型时期的政治内部劳动力市场具有独特性质,能利用长期雇佣、内部晋升、等级制工资和声誉等对地方官员产生隐性激励,但是政治内部劳动力市场的扭曲也产生了地方官员隐性激励弱化、失效、扭曲和缺位等变异现象。优化地方官员的激励系统必须重构官员隐性激励系统,通过建立退出机制、重建政绩考核体系、改革工资制度和行政体制等具体措施完善政治内部劳动力市场。
[Abstract]:There are many questions in the classical theory of promotion tournament, which leads to the multi-dimensional discussion of the promotion motivation of local officials. Implicit incentive is one of the focus of local official incentive research. The internal political labor market in the period of transition in China has a unique nature. It can make use of long-term employment, internal promotion, rank salary and reputation to produce implicit incentive to local officials, such as long-term employment, internal promotion, rank salary and reputation, etc. However, the distortion of the internal labor market in politics also leads to the phenomenon of local officials' implicit incentive weakening, invalidation, distortion and absence, etc. To optimize the incentive system of local officials, we must reconstruct the implicit incentive system of officials, and establish the exit mechanism. We should rebuild the performance appraisal system, reform the wage system and administrative system, and perfect the internal political labor market.
【作者单位】：海南大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“政府行为作用下的我国制造业集聚空间演化与集聚效率研究”(批准号:41361029,项目主持人:李世杰)、“跨国公司在华RPM策略实施动因、垄断势力纵向传导及规制路径研究”(批准号:71473066,项目主持人:李世杰)
【分类号】：D630.3;F249.2

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