地方政府党政主要领导更替对城市建设用地扩张的影响

发布时间：2018-03-24 15:42

本文选题：官员更替　切入点：城市建设用地扩张　出处：《南京大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：自上世纪80年代改革开放以来,我国快速的工业化和城市化进程加快城乡人口迁移和城市空间扩张,在现行的土地制度与财税制度下所形成的土地财政问题越发突出。我国政府作为国有土地所有者、土地资产经营者以及土地市场管理者,在土地制度、土地规划审批以及土地市场宏观调控等方面起到主导作用,地方政府领导作为地方经济和行政管理的最高负责人,领导更替情况关系到当地政治经济发展稳定性、土地政策以及城市发展战略规划的连续性。本文主要研究地方政府党政主要领导更替对城市建设用地扩张的影响,对于探究中国特色政府治理模式下城市土地资源配置行为机理以及有序推进城乡土地节约集约利用具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文采用1993-2014年中国30个省、直辖市和自治区(不包括重庆市、港澳台地区)、29个省会城市以及江苏省13个地级市的相关统计数据,构建不同层面、不同情形和不同区域的多维度面板回归模型,并纳入空间效应进行空间回归分析,基于邻接空间权重矩阵和经济空间权重矩阵构建空间动态面板模型,实证检验了地方政府领导更替对城市建设用地扩张的作用途径和影响程度。研究结果显示:(1)从理论层面来看,地方政府在辖区土地资源配置和土地调控发挥主导作用,政府领导更替引起的施政过程波动势必会让城市建设用地扩张随之变化,主要源于施政意图、财政激励和晋升激励三个方面的综合影响:一是地方政府领导的更替产生施政意图的变化,形成新的城市发展方向和土地规划调整,带来新一轮城市空间增长。二是分税制改革后中央政府与地方政府之间的财政分权对地方政府领导形成财政激励作用,使其不断提高经济性财政支出的比重用于城市建设规模的扩大,并且土地出让收入成为地方政府预算外财政收入的重要组成部分,地方政府财政收支过程中对土地资源的依赖性成为城市建设用地扩张的内在需求。三是以相对经济绩效为主要政绩指标的中国官员考核体系,经济水平的增长带来城市基础建设投入的加大,形成支撑城市建设用地持续扩张的经济基础。(2)地方政府领导的更替对城市建设用地扩张的影响,表现为任期内扩张城市建设用地的趋势具有由强转弱的周期性规律。地方政府领导更替因素对城市建设用地的影响呈现为短期波动,而不具有长期趋势,反映地方政府对土地资源配置多是出于"政治理性人"的短期行为。在省级层面,省委书记和省长更替具有离任前1-2年间减缓所在省内城市建设用地的扩张,而在上任后1-2年加速城市建设用地的扩张。在市级层面表现为市委书记上任初期推动城市建设用地的加速扩张。(3)不同层级政府的党委书记和行政首长同一年更替时,对城市建设用地扩张的影响更加明显。在省级政府和省会城市政府的不同领导更换情形中,党政领导同一年更替对城市建设用地扩张的影响比只有一位领导更替情形更加显著,反映不同领导更替情形的地方政治环境稳定性和政策连续性对地方政府土地资源配置行为产生不同程度的影响。(4)当地方政府行政级别由省级转变为市级,政府领导更替对辖区内城市建设用地扩张的影响表现为市委书记的影响更为显著。省级政府的省委书记和省长更替以及任期长短对辖区内城市建设用地扩张的影响差异不大,省会城市政府和以江苏省为例地级市政府的市委书记更替对辖区城市建设用地扩张的影响明显大于市长更替的影响。(5)地方政府领导上任初期扩张城市建设用地的动机在较发达城市地区更为强烈。在江苏省地级市层面,经济较为发达的苏南和苏中地区城市建设用地扩张明显受到地方政府领导更替的影响,经济较为落后的苏北地区则不存在领导更替对城市建设用地的影响。同时,地级市之间存在基于经济发展水平的正向城市建设用地扩张空间效应,城市扩张的空间依赖性受到地级市之间地理距离和经济水平的综合影响。基于上述内容,论文最后就如何处理领导更替对城市土地资源配置的正面和负面影响,从政绩评价体制、领导任期稳定、土地制度环境和政府职能转变等四个方面的提出相关政策建议。
[Abstract]:Since the last century since the 80s reform and opening up, China's industrialization and urbanization accelerate the city fast urban and rural population migration and city spatial expansion, the financial problems of land formed in the land system and the tax system under the current increasingly prominent. Our government as the owner of state-owned land, land asset managers and managers in the land market, land system land, planning approval and land market macro-control plays a leading role, the leadership of the local government as the highest person in charge of local economic and administrative management, leadership change related to the local economic development and political stability, land policy and the continuous development of strategic planning of the city. This paper mainly studies the main influence of local party and government leadership change land the expansion of city construction, to explore the governance model China characteristics under the city land resource disposition behavior And in order to promote the urban and rural land has important theoretical and practical significance. This paper uses the intensive use of 1993-2014 years China 30 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions (not including Chongqing, Hong Kong and Macao), related the capital city of the 29 and 13 prefecture level city in Jiangsu province the construction data, different levels, different the situation in different regions of the panel and the multi-dimensional regression model, and incorporated into the space effect of spatial regression analysis, spatial adjacency weight matrix and spatial weight matrix to construct the spatial dynamic panel model based on the empirical test of the local government leadership change mechanism of land expansion of city construction and the influence degree. Research results show that: (1) from the view of theory, the local government plays a leading role in the area of the allocation of land resources and land regulation, government administration leadership change caused by the fluctuation will make the city construction Land use change, mainly due to the policy intentions, financial incentives and promotion incentive effects of three aspects: one is the local government leaders of change change policy intentions, the formation of new city development and land planning and adjustment, has brought a new round of city space growth. The two is the central after the reform of tax system the government and the local government fiscal decentralization fiscal incentives for local government leaders, to continuously improve the economy of the financial expenditure for the expansion of the scale of city construction, and land transfer income has become an important part of the local government budget revenue, the internal demand of the city construction land expansion depends on land resources become the local government budget process. The three is China officials evaluation system relative to the economic performance as the main performance indicators of the level of economic growth to the city To increase infrastructure investment, the formation of the economic base to support the continued expansion of city construction land. (2) affect the expansion of local government leaders of change of city construction land, has the periodicity from strong to weak trend of city construction land expansion for the presidency. The local government leadership change factors on city construction land showed the influence of short-term fluctuations, but not a long-term trend, reflecting the local government on the allocation of land resources is out of "short-term political rational man". At the provincial level, the provincial Party Secretary and governor has replaced outgoing 1-2 years before the province where the slow city construction land expansion, while in office 1-2 years of accelerating city construction land expansion. In the municipal level as party secretary took office early promoting city construction accelerated expansion. (3) the different levels of government and the party secretary of the administrative head of the same In the event of a change of land expansion of city construction is more obvious. In different situations of provincial government and the provincial leadership to replace the city government, party and government leaders in the same year the replacement effect of land expansion of city construction is only a leadership change more significantly, reflecting the different situations of the local political leadership change environmental stability and the continuity of the policy of land resources allocation behavior of local government have different effects. (4) when the local government administrative level by the provincial government to the municipal leadership change affecting land expansion of city construction area is affected more significantly. The party secretary of the provincial government's expansion of provincial party secretary and governor replacement and the tenure of city construction land area has little difference, the capital city of Jiangsu Province as an example to the government and the municipal government of municipal Party committee secretary of the city area change The influence of construction land expansion is significantly greater than the effect. The mayor turnover (5) local government leaders early expansion of city construction land motivation in the more developed area is more intense in the city. The city of Jiangsu province level, city construction area of South of Jiangsu and the Soviet Union in the developed land expansion is significantly affected by the influence of local government leadership change the backward economy in Jiangsu Province, there is no leadership change the impact of city construction. At the same time, the prefecture level city between the positive effect of expansion space of city construction land based on the level of economic development, urban expansion spatial dependence affected by the prefecture level city between geographic distance and economic level. Based on the above the content, finally, on how to deal with the leadership change of city land resources allocation of positive and negative influences from the performance evaluation system, the leading term stable land system Put forward relevant policy proposals in four aspects, such as degree environment and the transformation of government functions.

【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630;F299.23

【参考文献】