专家服务市场的欺诈、信任与效率——基于社会偏好和空谈博弈的视角

发布时间：2018-03-28 08:54

本文选题：专家服务市场　切入点：信任品　出处：《经济研究》2017年03期

【摘要】：本文从空谈博弈和专家的社会偏好角度来分析价格外生给定的专家服务市场的低效率现象。区别于已有文献,本文认为如果市场中的部分专家存在诚信行为,他们将与逐利专家形成高信号(如患者病情较重)区间混同、低信号(如患者病情较轻)区间分离的均衡,同时导致欺骗、服务失当以及信任缺失等一系列现象。逐利专家会以概率分布的方式模仿诚实专家的行为,向消费者随机发送均值高于其真实需求的信号。同时,低于某个阈值的信号会获得消费者完全的信任,而消费者对高于此阈值的信号的信任度会随着信号的上升而下降,所以逐利专家的信号策略本质上是在获取信任与绝对收益之间的权衡。在均衡中低需求消费者获得过多的服务(如小病大治),而高需求消费者获得的服务不足(如大病小治)。最后,本文发现引入无搜索成本的竞争可以解决以上市场效率低下的问题。
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the inefficient phenomenon of expert service market with exogenous price from the point of view of empty talk game and experts' social preference. Different from the existing literature, this paper holds that if some experts in the market have good faith behavior, They will be mixed with profit-driven experts to form a high-signal (such as a severe patient's condition) interval, low signal (such as the patient's milder condition) interval separation balance, while leading to deception, The profit-driven experts will imitate the behavior of honest experts in a probabilistic manner and send signals to consumers whose average value is higher than their real needs at random. At the same time, A signal below a certain threshold is fully trusted by the consumer, and the consumer's confidence in a signal above that threshold decreases as the signal rises. Therefore, the signaling strategy of profit-driven experts is essentially a trade-off between obtaining trust and absolute returns. Such as serious illness and small treatment. Finally, This paper finds that the introduction of search-free competition can solve the problem of market inefficiency.
【作者单位】：西南财经大学经济与管理研究院;西南财经大学经济学院;北京师范大学、香港浸会大学联合国际学院工商管理学部;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71331004) 教育部人文社科规划基金项目(16XJA790004)和青年项目(14YJC630137) 西南财经大学重大基础理论研究项目(JBK161117)的资助
【分类号】：F224.32;F713.3

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