FIDIC合同条件下工程索赔的博弈模型

发布时间：2018-04-09 17:55

本文选题：工程索赔　切入点：FIDIC合同　出处：《运筹与管理》2017年07期

【摘要】：索赔是工程项目各参与主体共同关注的焦点,索赔决策直接影响业主方和承包方的利益。研究通过分析工程索赔的特性,结合FIDIC合同条件下的索赔条款,提出索赔的博弈基础;分析博弈论和贝叶斯法则与索赔决策之间的契合程度,构建工程索赔的基本博弈模型;基于工程索赔的四种情境,构建完全信息有限多轮博弈模型、资金时间价值对博弈模型的影响、不完全信息有限多轮博弈模型和非完全对立的不完全信息有限多轮博弈模型并求解"纳什均衡",模拟工程参与方做出索赔决策的路径,寻求相应情形下承包方和业主方的最优策略,提出工程参与方优化索赔策略的建议。
[Abstract]:The claim for compensation is the focus of the project participants, and the claim decision directly affects the interests of the owner and contractor.By analyzing the characteristics of engineering claims and combining the terms of claim under FIDIC contract, the paper puts forward the game basis of claims, analyzes the degree of match between game theory and Bayesian law and claims decision, and constructs the basic game model of engineering claims.Based on the four scenarios of engineering claims, the finite multi-round game model with complete information is constructed, and the influence of the time value of funds on the game model is discussed.Incomplete information finite multi-round game model and incomplete information finite multi-round game model and incomplete information finite multi-round game model are solved to simulate the path of project participants to make claim decision.The optimal strategy of contractor and owner is sought, and the proposal of optimizing claim strategy for project participants is put forward.
【作者单位】：同济大学经济与管理学院;宾夕法尼亚州立大学;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(青年面上连续资助)项目经济增长与生态改善的三个“效应”和“脱钩”模式研究(71373007) 上海市教委科研创新重点项目基于GIS的能源消耗脱钩指数时空分异研究(14ZZ036)
【分类号】：F224.32;TU723

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