泛海控股大股东股权质押对公司价值的影响

发布时间：2018-04-14 20:48

本文选题：泛海控股 + 大股东　；参考：《石河子大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：由公司所有者和管理层利益不一致导致的代理问题一直是公司治理的焦点。然而,在公司股权集中的情况下,大股东与中小股东之间的第二类代理问题引起越来越多学者的关注。控制权和现金流权的分离是引发大股东与中小股东之间重大利益冲突的主要原因,大股东通过违规担保、挪用资金等方式掏空上市公司。股权质押式融资因为其质押标的股权流动性强、易于处置和管控风险,为银行所接受,也成为近些年广大上市公司股东青睐的融资方式。作为出质人的大股东在质押股权后,除了可以融得资金,仍能维持自己的大股东地位,于是股权质押成为控股股东为私人或者民营企业的上市公司偏好的融资手段。在这种情况下,大股东股权质押会对公司价值产生何种影响成为学者关注的一个话题。本文希望通过研究,有助于深化对股权质押的研究、为投资者辨别大股东股权质押行为是支持还是侵占公司利益以及为监管机构规范股权质押行为提供一些参考意见。本文结合具体上市公司泛海控股来研究大股东股权质押行为对公司价值的影响。首先对国内外文献进行梳理,大部分学者基于大股东与小股东的利益冲突,认为大股东股权质押会加剧两权分离,引发更为严重的代理问题,从而损害公司价值。但部分学者得出了相反的结论,认为民营企业大股东股权质押反而会使大股东有强烈动机改善上市公司业绩;或者从不同的角度研究股权质押对公司绩效的影响是正相关的。其次,阐述本文的理论基础是代理理论,即在我国上市公司中,股权集中的情况极为普遍,第二类代理问题较为突出,然后论述股权质押的概念、大股东股权质押的风险和动机,并解释了两权分离等概念。再次,对本文的案例公司泛海控股进行介绍,分析案例公司的实际控制人的两权分离程度在质押前后的变化和上市公司的经营状况;使用EVA模型和托宾Q值,对2011年至2015年间泛海控股的公司价值进行评价,分析股权质押对公司价值的影响,并使用事件研究法分析股权质押行为在短期内对股价的影响;运用Z计分模型分析股权质押对公司财务的影响。在前述分析的基础上,总结本文的研究结论,认为泛海控股大股东对上市公司股权长期、频繁的高比例质押行为,导致泛海控股公司的控制权和所有权分离程度加剧,从而在一定程度上能够加大公司的财务风险。而且,从长期来看,大股东高比例、频繁的股权质押行为对上市公司价值产生了负面的影响。但是,由于我国资本市场的特殊性,股权质押事件在短期并没有对股价产生显著影响。最后提出建议,上市公司披露的大股东股权质押信息应当尽可能详实,投资者和大股东应当注意股权质押带来的风险,监管机构应该尽快出台专门法规规范股权质押行为。
[Abstract]:The agency problem caused by the inconsistent interests of the owner and the management has always been the focus of corporate governance.However, in the case of corporate equity concentration, the second kind of agency problem between large shareholders and minority shareholders has attracted more and more scholars' attention.The separation of the right of control and the right of cash flow is the main cause of the major conflict of interest between the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder. The majority shareholder empties the listed company through illegal guarantee and misappropriation of funds.Equity pledge financing is accepted by banks because of its strong liquidity of pledge, easy to deal with and control risks, and it has become a preferred financing method for shareholders of listed companies in recent years.As a pledge shareholder, the majority shareholder can maintain his position as a major shareholder in addition to raising funds, so the pledge becomes a preferred financing method for the listed companies of private or private enterprises.In this case, the impact of major shareholder equity pledge on the value of the company has become a topic of concern to scholars.This paper hopes to help deepen the research on equity pledge and provide some reference for investors to distinguish between supporting or encroaching on the interests of the company and for regulators to regulate the behavior of equity pledge.This paper studies the influence of the stock pledge behavior of large shareholders on the value of the listed company.First of all, the literature at home and abroad is combed, most scholars based on the conflict of interest between large shareholders and minority shareholders, think that the pledge of large shareholders equity will aggravate the separation of the two rights, lead to a more serious agency problem, thereby damaging the value of the company.However, some scholars have come to the contrary conclusion that the large shareholders of private enterprises will have strong motivation to improve the performance of listed companies; or it is positive correlation to study the impact of equity pledge on corporate performance from different angles.Secondly, the theoretical basis of this paper is agency theory, that is, in our listed companies, the situation of equity concentration is very common, the second kind of agency problem is more prominent, and then discusses the concept of equity pledge.The risk and motivation of major shareholder equity pledge, and explain the concept of separation of two rights.Thirdly, the paper introduces the case company Pan Hai holding, analyzes the change of the degree of separation between the two rights of the actual controller of the case company before and after the pledge and the operating situation of the listed company; using the EVA model and Tobin Q value,The paper evaluates the company value of Panhai holding from 2011 to 2015, analyzes the influence of equity pledge on company value, and analyzes the impact of equity pledge on stock price in the short term by the method of event study.Z-score model is used to analyze the influence of equity pledge on corporate finance.On the basis of the above analysis, the conclusion of this paper is summarized, and it is concluded that the Pan-Hai controlling shareholder's long-term and frequent high proportion pledge behavior to the listed company leads to the intensification of the degree of separation of control and ownership of the pan-sea holding company.Thus, to a certain extent, the company can increase the financial risk.Moreover, in the long run, the high proportion of large shareholders and frequent stock pledge have a negative impact on the value of listed companies.However, because of the particularity of China's capital market, equity pledge has no significant effect on stock price in the short term.Finally, it is suggested that the information of major shareholders' equity pledge should be as detailed as possible, investors and major shareholders should pay attention to the risks brought by equity pledge, and regulators should introduce special regulations to regulate the behavior of equity pledge as soon as possible.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F299.233.42

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