基于博弈视角的我国财政透明度提升路径与策略研究

发布时间：2018-05-02 13:16

本文选题：财政透明度 + 公众监督　；参考：《管理评论》2017年09期

【摘要】：在财政透明度推动过程中,公众和政府官员形成了动态的利益博弈关系。在分别构建无奖惩条件下、实施惩罚机制下和奖惩并存机制的财政透明度博弈模型的基础上,研究表明:(1)当提高财政透明度是政府官员和公众的一种自发行为时,财政透明度不会达到社会满意的程度;(2)强有力的惩罚是保证官员认真履行提高财政透明度责任的首要条件;(3)公众监督是促进官员提升财政透明度不可或缺的条件。因此,现阶段,需要在完善法律体系、严格财政透明度考核指标、培育社会组织、推动参与式预算和鼓励公众参与等方面进行制度创新。
[Abstract]:In the process of promoting fiscal transparency, the public and government officials form a dynamic interest game relationship. On the basis of constructing the game model of fiscal transparency under the condition of no reward and punishment, under the implementation of punishment mechanism and the mechanism of reward and punishment, the research shows that when improving financial transparency is a kind of spontaneous behavior of government officials and the public, Financial transparency will not reach the level of social satisfaction) strong punishment is the most important condition to ensure that officials seriously carry out the duty to improve fiscal transparency. 3) Public supervision is an indispensable condition for promoting officials to enhance fiscal transparency. Therefore, at the present stage, it is necessary to improve the legal system, strictly check the index of financial transparency, cultivate social organizations, promote participatory budgeting and encourage public participation and other aspects of institutional innovation.
【作者单位】：山东财经大学财政税务学院;山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71501111) 中国法学会部级法学研究课题(CLS(2016)D34) 山东省自然科学基金(ZR2014JL046) 山东省软科学重点项目(2016RZB01049) 山东财经大学优秀青年人才支持计划资助
【分类号】：F224.32;F812

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