信息不对称下民营银行市场准入监管的博弈研究

发布时间：2018-05-14 17:16

本文选题：民营银行 + 民营企业　；参考：《财会月刊》2017年15期

【摘要】：鉴于民营企业与监管部门的信息不对称,运用信号博弈理论,建立了民营企业与监管部门间不完全信息动态博弈模型,通过探讨民营企业向监管部门传递信号的内在机理,分析博弈模型的均衡条件,发现主要有民营企业的监管成本、监管部门对不诚信企业的惩罚、社会信誉损失、预计经济损失等影响民营企业的进入选择。
[Abstract]:In view of the information asymmetry between private enterprises and regulatory authorities, a dynamic game model of incomplete information between private enterprises and regulatory authorities is established by using signal game theory, and the internal mechanism of signal transmission from private enterprises to regulatory authorities is discussed. By analyzing the equilibrium conditions of the game model, it is found that the supervision cost of the private enterprise, the punishment of the supervision department to the dishonest enterprise, the loss of social reputation and the expected economic loss affect the entry choice of the private enterprise.
【作者单位】：上海大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目(项目编号:71431004) 上海市教委科研创新项目(项目编号:13YS015)
【分类号】：F832.33;F224.32

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