亚洲基础设施供给中的中日博弈研究

发布时间：2018-05-17 18:19

本文选题：中国 + 日本　；参考：《东北师范大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：基础设施作为保障社会生产生活最基本的条件,在一国或一个区域中都占有举足轻重的地位。近几十年来,亚洲地区的基础设施建设大为改善,但仍然面临着供给不足的问题。中国和日本作为亚洲地区的两个经济大国,纷纷采取行动加入到亚洲基础设施供给的队伍当中。进入21世纪以来,中国对亚洲基础设施的供给规模得到了迅速的发展,而日本也制定了“基础设施出口”战略来推动对亚洲基础设施的供给。因此,中日两国在亚洲基础设施供给的问题上不可避免地存在着博弈关系。为了准确、全面地分析中日两国在亚洲基础设施供给中的博弈问题,本文从亚洲基础设施建设的总体概况出发,通过数据分析了亚洲基础设施当前的建设水平与投资缺口。并通过对中日资金供给能力的比较、技术供给能力的比较,分析了两国的博弈基础。在数据分析的基础上,通过研究中日对亚洲基础设施供给的实际案例,来进一步说明两国之间的博弈关系。结果表明,中日两国在对亚洲基础设施进行供给时,分别存在着竞争优势,中国的国民储蓄率和外汇储备都要高于日本,可以为基础设施的供给进行更多的投资,而日本的基础设施建设对环境的负荷要小一些,耐用性也更强一些。接着本文分析了中日对亚洲基础设施供给博弈的成本收益情况。首先对成本和收益进行赋值,并通过膺鸽博弈模型和教科书博弈模型分别分析了供给亚洲基础设施时,中日两国将会付出的成本,以及可能得到的收益。结果表明,在鹰鸽博弈中,由于基础设施存在正的外部性,即使两国的经营利润很低,但两国都会选择“供给”的策略;在教科书博弈中,中日两国为使自己在博弈中处于优势,提高中标的机率,而不断增加本国的筹码,最终使中标国付出了更高的成本。最后分析了中日两国在亚洲基础设施供给中进行合作的可行途径,即通过进行重复博弈、订立基于互信的契约承诺、建立双边或多边的法律机制三种途径。本文所说的合作更多的是指在合作下竞争,即通过合作来加强自身的实力,从而实现中日两国在供给亚洲基础设施时进行协同、有序、多赢的良性竞争。
[Abstract]:Infrastructure, as the most basic condition to ensure social production and life, plays an important role in a country or a region. Infrastructure in Asia has improved considerably in recent decades, but it still faces a shortage of supplies. China and Japan, two of the region's biggest economies, have moved to join Asia's infrastructure supply. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China's supply of infrastructure to Asia has developed rapidly, and Japan has formulated the "infrastructure export" strategy to promote the supply of Asian infrastructure. As a result, there is an inevitable game between China and Japan over the supply of infrastructure in Asia. In order to accurately and comprehensively analyze the game between China and Japan in the supply of infrastructure in Asia, this paper starts from the general situation of infrastructure construction in Asia and analyzes the current construction level and investment gap of infrastructure in Asia through data. Through the comparison of Chinese and Japanese capital supply capacity and technology supply ability, the game basis of the two countries is analyzed. On the basis of data analysis, this paper further illustrates the game relationship between China and Japan by studying the actual case of infrastructure supply between China and Japan in Asia. The results show that China and Japan have competitive advantages in providing infrastructure in Asia. China's national savings rate and foreign exchange reserves are both higher than those of Japan, and more investment can be made in infrastructure supply. Japan's infrastructure is less onerous and more durable. Then this paper analyzes the cost-benefit of the game of infrastructure supply between China and Japan in Asia. First of all, the cost and benefit are assigned, and the cost and the possible income of China and Japan are analyzed by the game model of pigeon and the model of textbook game respectively. The results show that, due to the existence of positive externalities in infrastructure, both countries choose the "supply" strategy even though their operating profits are very low. In order to make China and Japan play an advantage in the game and improve the probability of winning the bid, China and Japan increase their own chips and finally make the winning country pay a higher cost. Finally, the paper analyzes the feasible ways for China and Japan to cooperate in the supply of infrastructure in Asia, that is, through repeated games, making contractual commitments based on mutual trust, and establishing bilateral or multilateral legal mechanisms. The cooperation referred to in this paper is more about competition under cooperation, that is, strengthening one's own strength through cooperation, so as to realize the benign competition of cooperation, order and multi-win between China and Japan in the supply of infrastructure in Asia.
【学位授予单位】：东北师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F283;F224.32

【参考文献】