基于空间演化博弈的国有企业经理行为研究

发布时间：2018-06-08 13:33

本文选题：国有企业 + 经理人　；参考：《铁道工程学报》2017年06期

【摘要】：研究目的:现代企业制度是以所有权和经营权分离为基础的,由于所有人监督体制不完善,国有企业利益往往会受到代理人(国有企业经理)违规行为的威胁。本文将Agent和囚徒困境的重复博弈相结合,构建基于空间演化博弈的国有企业经理人行为演化模型,研究国有企业经理人的违规行为演化机理。通过模拟仿真激励措施、违章处罚、纪律检查对国有企业经理人行为的影响,发现如何监督、如何激励、如何惩罚国有企业经理人行为,以达到控制国有企业经理人违规行为的目的。研究结论:(1)国有企业经理人出现违规行为除当前激励措施单一之外,在很大程度上是自身原因造成的;当激励高时,经理人对激励不敏感,不会因为激励的提高而对其自身行为产生显著变化;(2)和纪检的严格性相比,国有企业经理人的行为更容易受到收入水平的影响,对国有企业经理人的处罚要根据当前的收入水平设置;(3)国有企业经理人的平均收入、守规努力工作的收入和国有企业经理人的违规行为比例呈负相关;经理人违规行为比例与违规失败收入具有负相关关系;(4)本研究结论对于控制国有企业经理人的违规行为具有一定的借鉴和指导意义。
[Abstract]:Research purpose: the modern enterprise system is based on the separation of ownership and management right. Due to the imperfect supervision system of owner, the interests of state-owned enterprises are often threatened by the illegal behavior of agents (managers of state-owned enterprises). This paper combines Agent with the repeated game of Prisoner's Dilemma, constructs the evolution model of the managers' behavior based on the spatial evolution game, and studies the evolution mechanism of the managers' illegal behavior in the state-owned enterprises. Through the simulation of incentive measures, punishment for violation of regulations, discipline inspection on the behavior of state-owned enterprise managers, found out how to supervise, how to motivate, how to punish the behavior of managers of state-owned enterprises, In order to control the managers of state-owned enterprises in violation of the purpose. Conclusion: (1) in addition to the single current incentive measures, the behavior of managers in state-owned enterprises is largely caused by their own reasons, and when incentives are high, managers are insensitive to incentives. There will be no significant changes in their own behavior as a result of higher incentives). Compared with discipline inspection rigour, the behavior of managers in state-owned enterprises is more susceptible to the influence of income levels. According to the current income level, the average income of managers in state-owned enterprises should be set up. The income of working hard according to the rules is negatively correlated with the proportion of illegal behaviors of managers in state-owned enterprises. There is a negative correlation between the proportion of managers' illegal behavior and the failure income) the conclusion of this study has certain reference and guidance significance for controlling the managers' illegal behavior in state-owned enterprises.
【作者单位】：北京交通大学;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71273023)
【分类号】：F224.32;F272.91;F276.1

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