食品安全社会共治的演化博弈分析
发布时间:2018-06-25 03:45
本文选题:食品安全 + 社会共治 ; 参考:《中国调味品》2017年06期
【摘要】:食品安全事件舆论燃点低,影响社会和谐发展。针对我国食品安全监管状况,运用博弈论的方法对食品生产者和销售企业进行博弈分析,发现双方的策略选择主要依据政府监管的策略选择。因此,进一步对食品供给者与政府进行博弈分析。研究表明:现行的食品安全监管体制,监管成本高而效果不佳,通过食品安全社会共治可以有效解决:加大政府激励力度,提高食品行业集体声誉;在政府主导下,引导各方主体共同参与食品安全治理,既可以降低地方政府监管成本,又能提高食品安全治理效率和效果。
[Abstract]:The food safety incidents have low public opinion, which affects the harmonious development of the society. In view of the state of food safety supervision in China, the game theory is used to analyze the food producers and sales enterprises, and the strategy selection of both sides is mainly based on the strategy choice of government supervision. Analysis shows that the current food safety supervision system has high supervision cost and poor effect. It can be effectively solved through the social governance of food safety: increasing the government incentive and improving the collective reputation of the food industry; guiding the parties to participate in the food safety management under the leadership of the government, which can not only reduce the cost of local government supervision, but also reduce the cost of local government supervision. It can improve the efficiency and effect of food safety management.
【作者单位】: 哈尔滨商业大学管理学院;
【基金】:教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(16YJA790067) 黑龙江省经济社会发展重点研究课题(JD2015014)
【分类号】:F203
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