基于博弈模型探索政府对企业治污财政补贴的优化

发布时间：2018-07-31 16:31

【摘要】：以企业环境污染防治努力水平为外生变量,设计政府对企业最优财政补贴,并建立政府、企业为参与人的完全信息博弈模型,得出财政补贴实施过程中企业选择正向努力和获得正向收益的现实充分条件,并分析了企业污染防治努力水平与政府补贴等因素的关系,给出了企业与政府的最大化期望效用。研究表明:政府补贴政策能较好促进企业正向努力水平;企业努力水平提高意味着企业环境效益提高,环境效益的提高又可以促进企业社会效益和经济效益的提高;政府的社会效益提高促进了政府的经济效益。所以,政府应通过科学的规划设计,将补贴激励政策精准落实到激励企业治污防污的行业中,同时加快政治体制改革,发挥高效的政府职能,促使政府、企业的社会效益不断增加的同时提高经济效率。
[Abstract]:Taking the level of enterprise environmental pollution prevention and control efforts as exogenous variable, this paper designs the government's optimal financial subsidy to enterprises, and establishes a complete information game model of government and enterprise as participants. The realistic sufficient conditions for enterprises to choose positive efforts and obtain positive returns in the implementation of financial subsidies are obtained, and the relationship between the level of enterprise pollution prevention efforts and government subsidies is analyzed, and the maximum expected utility between enterprises and governments is given. The research shows that the government subsidy policy can promote the positive level of enterprise effort, the improvement of enterprise effort level means the improvement of enterprise environmental benefit, and the improvement of environmental benefit can promote the improvement of enterprise social and economic benefits. The social benefits of the government have been improved and the economic benefits of the government have been promoted. Therefore, the government should, through scientific planning and design, accurately implement the subsidy incentive policy in industries that encourage enterprises to control pollution and prevent pollution. At the same time, it should speed up the reform of the political system, give play to an efficient government function, and promote the government. The social benefits of enterprises continue to increase while improving economic efficiency.
【作者单位】：河南科技大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“政府社会协同提高农田水利供给绩效的制度建设研究”(13BJY100)
【分类号】：F224.32;F812.45;X322

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