非对称信息下PPP模式的逆向选择与道德风险防范研究

发布时间：2018-09-05 19:16

【摘要】：公共基础设施是经济发展的奠基石,立足国内实践,借鉴国际成功经验,减轻政府财政压力,推广运用政府和社会资本合作模式(PPP)是国家进行经济改革的重大任务。然而,PPP模式具有全寿命周期长、投资额大、合约关系复杂等特点,社会资本作为PPP项目的投标人以及项目公司的组建者,其能力高低对PPP模式的顺利实施至关重要,而由于政府对社会资本掌握的信息不全,导致政府在招标阶段未筛选出优秀的社会资本,从而出现合约签订前的逆向选择与合约签订后的道德风险问题。鉴于此,基于政府角度,对非对称信息下PPP模式的逆向选择与道德风险问题进行研究具有重要的理论意义和实用价值。本文主要研究内容如下:(1)通过对国内外PPP模式相关文献的阅读,引入信息不对称理论,运用定量与定性分析相结合的方法,综合分析合约签订前的逆向选择问题与合约签订后的道德风险问题。(2)在PPP模式招标阶段,分析了逆向选择问题产生的原因、危害及措施。结合综合评分法与价值工程评价方法,提出以社会资本可提供的公共服务质量与全寿命周期成本累计现值的比值作为信号的信息传递模型,运用帕累托分离均衡理论,分析该信号可作为政府筛选出合适社会资本的依据。其次,为保证社会资本提供信息的真实性,提出基于自报成本目标值的激励模型以及基于需求风险的动态补偿模型,两种模型的建立增加了合约完整性,提高了信息传递模型有效甄别优秀社会资本的准确度。(3)在PPP模式合约的执行阶段,分析了道德风险问题产生的原因、危害及措施。通过对PPP模式收益的分析,建立道德风险分析模型求得PPP项目总收益最大时项目公司的最优努力水平,并通过MATLAB分析各变量对最优努力水平的影响程度。同时运用演化博弈理论建立了政府与项目公司激励努力的收益矩阵,并给出不同收益条件下系统的均衡稳定策略,研究结果可为政府如何激励项目公司付出高努力水平提供指导。(4)最后,通过算例分析了模型的可操作性,对政府防范信息不对称导致的逆向选择与道德风险问题具有一定的参考价值。
[Abstract]:Public infrastructure is the cornerstone of economic development. It is an important task for the country to carry out economic reform based on domestic practice, draw lessons from international successful experience, reduce the pressure of government finance, and popularize the mode of cooperation between government and social capital, (PPP). However, the model has the characteristics of long life cycle, large investment, complicated contract relationship, etc. As the bidder of PPP project and the organizer of project company, the ability of social capital is very important to the smooth implementation of PPP model. Due to the incomplete information of the government on the social capital, the government does not screen out the excellent social capital in the bidding stage, which leads to the problem of moral hazard before the contract is signed and after the contract is signed. In view of this, it is of great theoretical significance and practical value to study the adverse selection and moral hazard of PPP model under asymmetric information from the angle of government. The main contents of this paper are as follows: (1) through the reading of domestic and foreign PPP model related literature, the information asymmetry theory is introduced, and the method of combining quantitative and qualitative analysis is used. This paper comprehensively analyzes the adverse selection problem before the contract signing and the moral hazard problem after the contract signing. (2) in the bidding stage of PPP mode, the causes, harm and measures of the reverse selection problem are analyzed. Combined with the comprehensive scoring method and the value engineering evaluation method, this paper puts forward a information transmission model based on the ratio of the public service quality and the cumulative present value of the whole life cycle cost, which can be provided by social capital, and applies the Pareto separation equilibrium theory. The analysis of the signal can be used as the basis for the government to screen out the appropriate social capital. Secondly, in order to ensure the authenticity of the information provided by social capital, the incentive model based on the target value of self-reported cost and the dynamic compensation model based on demand risk are proposed. The establishment of the two models increases the integrity of the contract. It improves the accuracy of the information transfer model in effectively discriminating excellent social capital. (3) in the implementation stage of PPP model contract, the causes, harm and measures of moral hazard are analyzed. By analyzing the income of PPP model, the moral hazard analysis model is established to obtain the optimal effort level of the project company when the total income of the PPP project is the largest, and the influence of each variable on the optimal effort level is analyzed by MATLAB. At the same time, by using the evolutionary game theory, the paper establishes the income matrix of the government and the project company, and gives the equilibrium and stability strategy of the system under different income conditions. The results of the study can provide guidance for the government to encourage the project companies to pay a high level of effort. (4) finally, the feasibility of the model is analyzed through an example. It has certain reference value for government to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information.
【学位授予单位】：西安建筑科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F283

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