PPP项目多维信息招投标中的直接机制研究
发布时间：2018-09-08 16:26
【摘要】：基于显示原理以及机制设计的思想,运用广义质量生产函数模型,针对PPP项目招标建立了关于PPP项目特许经营权期与广义质量的二维信息招标直接机制模型,在保证投标人真实显示自己综合管理能力的条件下最大化参与双方的福利。通过模型求解,得到了该招标机制的最优分配以及最低质量的设定条件,并得出在该机制下能实现社会福利最优。并鉴于机制设计的复杂性,给出了该机制的实施规则。最后通过算例,证明了该直接机制的有效性,对PPP项目招标提供了理论上的指导。
[Abstract]:Based on the principle of display and the idea of mechanism design, the direct mechanism model of two-dimensional information bidding for PPP project is established based on the generalized quality production function model and the franchise period and generalized quality of PPP project. Maximize the benefits of both parties under the condition that the bidder truly demonstrates his or her comprehensive management ability. By solving the model, the optimal allocation of the bidding mechanism and the setting conditions of the lowest quality are obtained, and the optimal social welfare can be realized under this mechanism. In view of the complexity of the mechanism design, the implementation rules of the mechanism are given. Finally, the effectiveness of the direct mechanism is proved by an example, which provides theoretical guidance for PPP project bidding.
【作者单位】： 武汉大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目资助(71231007)
【分类号】：F283
，
本文编号：2231060
[Abstract]:Based on the principle of display and the idea of mechanism design, the direct mechanism model of two-dimensional information bidding for PPP project is established based on the generalized quality production function model and the franchise period and generalized quality of PPP project. Maximize the benefits of both parties under the condition that the bidder truly demonstrates his or her comprehensive management ability. By solving the model, the optimal allocation of the bidding mechanism and the setting conditions of the lowest quality are obtained, and the optimal social welfare can be realized under this mechanism. In view of the complexity of the mechanism design, the implementation rules of the mechanism are given. Finally, the effectiveness of the direct mechanism is proved by an example, which provides theoretical guidance for PPP project bidding.
【作者单位】： 武汉大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目资助(71231007)
【分类号】：F283
，
本文编号：2231060
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