乡村治理中利益诉求主体博弈策略分析与对策研究

发布时间：2018-10-22 07:44

【摘要】：农业乃国民之本,农村乃国家之重,迄今为止仍然有接近一半的农民生活在农村,这一部分人生活的好坏直接影响当今中国的长治久安和稳定发展。因此,如何让这部分人在农村生活好、发展好成为了事关全局的问题。乡村得到更好的治理不仅仅是农民生存和发展的问题,也是政府取信于民、加强政权基层建设的关键,能够在一定程度上更好地体现国家的民主与法制。在乡村治理的实际过程中,党中央制定的各种政策却不能够真正地有效落实在乡村治理的实处,特别是随着乡村改革的深入,种种政策的实施受到来自乡村中各个利益双方的排斥,使得政策的实施程度和实施效果大打折扣。各个既得利益者为维护现有的利益成果而不愿意打破现有的利益模式,排斥国家力量的进入,使得乡村治理的改革不能够顺利进行,进而不利于乡村得到更好的治理。本文立足于博弈论的角度分析了乡村治理的四个利益诉求主体——乡镇政府、“村两委”、精英村民和普通村民及其各自的博弈策略,挖掘出四方博弈中最为主要的博弈是政府和村民,村民内部两种博弈。利用博弈论中的经典模型“智猪博弈”和“囚徒困境”分别分析政府和村民博弈过程,村民内部博弈的过程,发现其博弈过程采取的策略不能够达到最终均衡,探索博弈不均衡背后的深层次原因,针对问题产生的原因,提出了相应的构建利益均衡机制的对策。具体来说,在“智猪博弈”模型下,挖掘了村民内部博弈的原因主要有以下四点:1.村民自治制度不够完善;2.村民内部利益表达渠道不够畅通;3.村民内部的利益诉求矛盾突出;4.普通村民的乡村治理参与力度不强。针对以上四点村民内部各方博弈的原因,笔者提出以下五点对策期望在村民内部建立利益协调机制,使得村民内部达成均衡:1.尊重普通村民的利益诉求,完善村民自治制度,2.重视普通村民和精英村民的政治参与,3.重视村民特别是精英村民的利益诉求,4.形成村民内部利益协调机制,5.努力培育乡村社会组织来平衡村民内部利益。另外,在“囚徒困境”模型,挖掘政府和村民博弈的主要原因有以下三点:1.乡村社会经济发展水平较低;2.乡村治理中政府和村民地位不对等;3.不合理的财政制度。面对这些主要原因本文提出从以下两个方面来在政府和村民之间建立利益协调机制,促进政府和村民协调发展:一方面可以通过提升乡村经济水平,努力缩小利益各方的利益差距,另一方面要建立利益补偿机制,特别要重视村民的利益补偿。同时,本文以x镇Y村为应用对象,采用已有的理论成果来具体分析X镇Y村中的实际情况,探讨其利益诉求主体的博弈策略关系,提出博弈均衡对策,希望能够一定程度上解决各个利益诉求主体利益不均衡的情况,建立利益协调机制,促进国家政策能够顺利在乡村进行实施,促进乡村治理向好的方向发展。
[Abstract]:Agriculture is the foundation of the nation and the countryside is the important part of the country. Up to now, nearly half of the peasants still live in the countryside. The quality of the life of this part of the people has a direct impact on the long-term stability and stable development of today's China. Therefore, how to make this part of people live well in rural areas, development has become a matter of overall concern. Better rural governance is not only a problem for farmers to survive and develop, but also a key for the government to win the trust of the people and strengthen the grass-roots construction of political power, and to a certain extent, it can better reflect the democracy and legal system of the country. In the actual process of rural governance, all kinds of policies formulated by the CPC Central Committee cannot really be effectively implemented in the actual situation of rural governance, especially with the deepening of rural reform. The implementation of various policies is rejected by both sides of the rural interest, which makes the implementation degree and effect of the policy greatly reduced. In order to maintain the existing benefits, all vested interests are unwilling to break the existing interest model, reject the entry of the national power, make the reform of rural governance can not be carried out smoothly, which is not conducive to the better governance of the countryside. Based on the game theory, this paper analyzes the four main bodies of rural governance: township government, "village two committees", elite villagers and ordinary villagers, and their respective game strategies. Find out that the most important game is the government and villagers, villagers inside the two games. This paper analyzes the game process between the government and the villagers by using the classical models of the game theory, "the intelligent pig game" and "the prisoner's dilemma", and finds out that the strategy adopted in the game process can not reach the final equilibrium. This paper probes into the deep reasons behind the game imbalance, and puts forward the corresponding countermeasures to construct the mechanism of interest balance in view of the causes of the problems. Specifically, under the model of "intelligent pig game", the main reasons of the villagers' internal game are as follows: 1. Villager autonomy system is not perfect; 2. Villagers' internal interest expression channels are not smooth; 3. The contradiction of the villagers' interest demands is prominent; 4. Ordinary villagers' participation in rural governance is not strong. In view of the above four reasons of the game among the villagers, the author puts forward the following five countermeasures, hoping to establish a coordination mechanism of interests within the villagers, so as to achieve a balance among the villagers: 1. Respect the interests of ordinary villagers, improve the system of villager autonomy, 2. Attach importance to the political participation of ordinary villagers and elite villagers, 3. Attach importance to the interests of villagers, especially elite villagers, 4. Formation of the villagers' internal interest coordination mechanism, 5. Strive to cultivate rural social organizations to balance the interests of villagers. In addition, in the "prisoner's dilemma" model, the main reasons for digging out the game between the government and villagers are as follows: 1. Rural social and economic development level is low; 2. In rural governance, the status of government and villagers is not equal; 3. An unreasonable financial system In the face of these main reasons, this paper puts forward the following two aspects to establish the interest coordination mechanism between the government and the villagers to promote the coordinated development of the government and the villagers: on the one hand, we can improve the level of rural economy. On the other hand, it is necessary to establish an interest compensation mechanism, especially to pay attention to the villagers' interest compensation. At the same time, this paper takes Y Village of X Town as the application object, uses the existing theoretical results to analyze the actual situation in Y Village of X Town, probes into the game strategy relation of the main body of interest demand, and puts forward the game equilibrium countermeasure. It is hoped that to a certain extent, the interests of the main body of interests can be solved, the interest coordination mechanism should be established, the national policy can be carried out smoothly in the countryside, and the rural governance can be promoted to a good direction.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D422.6;F224.32

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