PPP项目政府担保对项目效率影响研究

发布时间：2018-12-30 19:57

【摘要】：PPP项目贷款契约的不完全性会导致项目公司在费用风险发生时和银行进行再谈判,此时再谈判的结果及项目融资的有限追索权属性一方面可能诱发项目公司在事前选择危险项目策略(资产替代),另一方面,则可能出现项目公司无法获得银行追加贷款从而导致项目提前中止的情形。针对以政府付费为回报机制的PPP项目,运用不完全契约理论构建贷款契约模型,分析无政府担保情形下再谈判对资产替代和项目提前中止的影响机制,进而分析政府担保对事前(项目公司和银行再谈判前)和事后(项目公司和银行再谈判后)项目效率的影响,最后讨论同时引入政府担保和契约保证金制度的效果。研究结果表明:在无政府担保情形下,通过竞争招标不能同时抑制资产替代和项目中止问题;政府担保虽然能够避免事后项目中止实现事后效率,但无法抑制事前资产替代问题;同时引入政府担保和契约保证金制度可以保证同时实现PPP项目的事前和事后社会效率,并且能够提高政府的财务效率。研究结果为政府决策提供了理论支持,以期为实践中的PPP项目实施提供指导意义。
[Abstract]:The incomplete nature of the PPP project loan contract will lead the project company to renegotiate with the bank at the time of the expense risk. On the one hand, the result of renegotiation and the limited recourse attribute of project financing may induce the project company to choose dangerous project strategy (asset substitution) in advance, on the other hand, The project company may not be able to obtain additional bank loans, leading to early suspension of the project. Aiming at the PPP project with government payment as the return mechanism, this paper uses incomplete contract theory to construct the loan contract model, and analyzes the influence mechanism of renegotiation on asset substitution and project termination in the case of anarchic guarantee. Then it analyzes the effect of government guarantee on the efficiency of the project before and after the renegotiation between the project company and the bank, and finally discusses the effect of introducing the system of government guarantee and contract guarantee at the same time. The results show that in the case of anarchic guarantee, competitive bidding can not restrain the problem of asset substitution and project suspension at the same time; Although the government guarantee can avoid the ex post project suspension to realize the ex post efficiency, but can not restrain the ex ante asset substitution problem; At the same time, the introduction of government guarantee and contract guarantee system can ensure the social efficiency of PPP project both before and after, and can improve the financial efficiency of the government. The results provide theoretical support for government decision-making and provide guidance for the implementation of PPP projects in practice.
【作者单位】：大连理工大学建设管理系;大连理工大学管理与经济学部;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372084,71672017)
【分类号】：F283

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