科技保险溢出效应研究

发布时间：2018-03-31 09:20

本文选题：溢出效应　切入点：科技保险　出处：《江西财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：科技创新是国家科技发展战略的重要组成部分。改革开放30年，我国一直在发展科技实力，虽然取得了一定的成绩，但与发达国家相比仍存在较大差距。科技创新是缩小与发达国家差距的唯一途径，国家也高度重视科技创新的战略意义，以建设创新型国家作为面对未来的国家战略目标。但在发展科技的过程中，科技风险无法避免，而科技风险又具有巨大的破坏性，科技创新的企业难以承担科技创新失败的后果，科技风险制约了企业的科技创新。科技保险在科技创新中的价值显得尤为重要，因此，加强科技保险研究具有现实意义。科技保险是一种准公共物品，这种性质决定了它具有一定的公益性。如果将科技保险按市场机制来配置，会产生市场失灵的现象。市场失灵使科技保险产生需求和供给不足，逆向选择和道德风险等问题。同时在科技保险发展过程中，也存在一些现实问题：对科技保险的认识不够；险种范围狭窄；政府的支持力度不够等。科技保险因为其溢出效应，在市场机制配置下，高科技企业均衡消费量小于社会均衡消费量，将产生需求不足的现象。同理，保险公司均衡供给量小于社会均衡供给量，将产生供给不足的现象。科技保险的需求和供给不足，会导致科技保险资源不能合理配置。在市场失灵的情况下，，需要政府对科技保险市场进行干预。作为科技保险的主导者，政府在科技保险建立、组织、宣传、监管等环节要承担很多的责任，平衡各方的利益，激励其他参与主体的积极性，控制保险的市场环节以及承担优惠政策的职责。在政府参与下，科技保险在各主体之间产生溢出效应流动的现象。本文针对溢出效应的流动性进行深入分析，用博弈论工具对三个主体进行博弈以判断溢出效应分配的合理性。博弈结论发现，政府和保险公司博弈，科技保险价值的溢出效应流向保险公司，保险公司在静态博弈中获得了溢出效应。采用动态博弈时却产生了溢出效应的转移，保险公司获得的溢出效应转移到了高科技企业，高科技企业获得了全部的溢出效应，而保险公司却没有获得任何溢出效应。溢出效应分配是不均衡的，导致保险公司没有相应的动力开展科技保险业务。博弈结果给科技保险市场提供了完善科技保险市场的建议，即给予保险公司一定额度的溢出效应。本文对博弈结论作了进一步的分析，推导出一个均衡的科技保费价格（保费价格的推导是本文的一个创新点）。科技保险市场作为一个不成熟的市场，保费价格的厘定至关重要，保费价格不合理会产生逆向选择。一方面，科技创新风险较大的高科技企业对科技保险的需求强烈；另一方面，具有良好风险控制的、有一定规模的高科技企业，他们自己本身能够承担科技风险的损失，但因为保险价格的不合理，使得这部分企业却选择不投保，退出科技保险市场。保费的价格制定方法是统计历年科技创新风险发生事故概率，根据大数定理而厘定的一个价格。但是科技风险因素复杂，发生概率难以确定。同时，科技保险运行时间短，不满足大数定理的条件，这样制定的保费价格不能保证其准确性。笔者根据均衡条件推导出了一个保费价格，希望对实践部门具有参考作用。为了确定保费价格的准确性，对2007年科技保险试点地区数据进行实证分析，实证分析结果显示，该保费价格与实际情况相符，可以作为对保费价格厘定的参考。科技保险与农业保险都是准公共物品，农业保险的发展经验对科技保险有重要的参考价值。笔者建议：提升政府对科技保险的重视程度，加大对保险公司的补贴力度，加大科技保险税收优惠比例，加强宣传提高科技保险意识以及辅之于其他相关配套措施，定能发挥科技保险的作用，促进我国产业结构朝着高科技产业方向发展，实现科技强国梦。
[Abstract]:Science and technology innovation is an important part of the national science and technology development strategy . In 30 years of reform and opening - up , China has been developing scientific and technological strength , although some achievements have been achieved , but compared with the developed countries , there is still a big gap . Science and technology innovation is the only way to narrow the gap between science and technology .

Science and technology insurance is a kind of quasi - public goods . This property determines that it has certain public welfare . If the science and technology insurance is arranged according to the market mechanism , the phenomenon of market failure can be generated . In the process of the development of science and technology insurance , there are some real problems in the development of science and technology insurance : insufficient understanding of science and technology insurance ;
narrow range of dangerous species ;
Under the condition of market failure , the balance supply amount of high - tech enterprises is less than that of social equilibrium consumption , which will produce insufficient demand . In the event of market failure , the government should intervene in science and technology insurance market . As the leading person of science and technology insurance , the government should take many responsibilities in the establishment , organization , propaganda and supervision of science and technology insurance .

The game results show that the spillover effect of the government and insurance companies and the value of science and technology insurance flows to the insurance company . The insurance company obtains the spillover effect in the static game . The spillover effect is transferred to the high - tech enterprise by the dynamic game , and the insurance company has not obtained any spillover effect . The game result gives the insurance company a certain amount of spillover effect . The game result gives the insurance company a certain amount of spillover effect .

As an immature market , science and technology insurance market is very important to determine the price of premium , and the price of premium is unreasonable . On the one hand , high - tech enterprises with big risks of technological innovation have strong demand for science and technology insurance ;
On the other hand , there is a certain scale of high - tech enterprises with good risk control . They themselves can bear the loss of science and technology risk , but because of the unreasonable insurance price , this part of the enterprise chooses not to insure and withdraw from the technology insurance market .

Scientific and technological insurance and agricultural insurance are quasi - public goods , and the development experience of agricultural insurance has important reference value to science and technology insurance .

【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F842.6;F224

【参考文献】