巨灾保险市场的均衡影响因素分析——基于演化博弈模型的研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 08:27

本文选题：巨灾保险　切入点：演化博弈　出处：《中国经济问题》2016年02期

【摘要】：本文通过建立消费者和保险公司以及政府三者之间的演化博弈模型,进行动态系统稳定性分析来寻找巨灾保险市场均衡,并进一步通过比较静态分析来研究巨灾保险市场均衡的影响因素。结果发现,消费者巨灾保险投保意愿与消费者通过投保得到巨灾保障以外的正外部性、不投保情况下所需多付出的防灾减灾成本正相关,与消费者不能顺利投保发生的额外成本负相关;保险公司经营巨灾保险意愿与保险公司不经营巨灾保险而失去的潜在消费者带来的收益、巨灾保险品牌植入效应带来的正外部性、巨灾保险基金的预期收益正相关,与不投保巨灾保险的消费者获得的正溢出效应负相关;政府减少灾后救助、增加对消费者的保费补贴以及灾后承担更多保险赔偿责任,对达成巨灾保险市场均衡有着正向激励作用。
[Abstract]:By establishing an evolutionary game model between consumers, insurance companies and the government, this paper analyzes the dynamic system stability to find the equilibrium of catastrophe insurance market.And through the comparative static analysis to study the catastrophe insurance market equilibrium factors.The results show that the willingness of consumers to insure catastrophe insurance is positively related to the cost of disaster prevention and mitigation that consumers need to pay if they are not insured.Negatively related to the additional costs that consumers cannot insure smoothly; the willingness of insurance companies to operate catastrophe insurance is associated with the benefits of potential consumers who are lost by insurance companies that do not operate catastrophe insurance,The positive externalities brought by catastrophe insurance brand implantation effect, the expected income of catastrophe insurance fund are positively correlated with the positive spillover effect obtained by consumers who do not insure catastrophe insurance, and the government reduces post-disaster relief.Increasing the premium subsidy to consumers and taking on more insurance liability after the disaster has a positive incentive to reach the equilibrium of catastrophe insurance market.
【作者单位】：南京大学商学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金(12BJY150) 江苏省高校优势学科建设工程项目(PAPD)的资助
【分类号】：F842.64

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