不同环节下中国社会保险基金监管的博弈研究

发布时间：2018-06-11 22:41

本文选题：社会保险基金 + 利益相关者　；参考：《辽宁大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：过去十年是中国社会保险事业迅速发展的十年，十年间中国社会保险制度得到了进一步地完善，社会保险基金的管理水平和运营状况也不断地得以提高，这些都为中国社会保险基金的进一步管理奠定了坚实的基础。然而，在中国社会保险基金管理和服务水平不断提高的情况下，社会保险基金管理与运营中还存在三个较为突出的问题：一是用人单位拖缴、欠缴、少缴、不缴社会保险费用等违法现象；二是在社会保险经办机构内部的实际操作过程中因财务风险、道德风险及内部控制能力不足等原因造成的基金挤占、挪用等违法行为；三是在社会保险基金给付环节因信息不对称等原因，冒领社会保险基金行为时有发生。以上三种违法行为的存在，，均使社会保险基金在管理和服务过程中因上述违法行为而导致受损。本文的理论基础为博弈论、委托-代理理论和成本-收益理论等，在此基础上主要运用完全信息下静态博弈和动态博弈模型，对社会保险基金管理过程中存在的上述三种违法行为进行研究，以试图找出影响社会保险基金管理中的经济性和社会性变量因素，为下一步实现社会保险基金的有效、有序监督和管理提供理论依据。本文除绪论外，主要分为五章，具体内容安排如下：第一章介绍了相关概念及理论基础。本章节着重对研究中需要使用的几个重要概念进行了内涵和外延的界定，同时对博弈论、委托-代理理论、成本-收益理论等相关基础理论进行了论述。第二章对中国社会保险基金征缴环节的监管进行了分析。本章节首先明确了征缴环节的相关利益主体，并利用博弈方法构建静态博弈模型，着重对该环节下不同利益主体的策略及其相关经济变量进行分析。第三章对中国社会保险基金运营环节的监管进行了分析。本章节首先明确了运营环节的相关利益主体，利用博弈方法构建动静态博弈模型，着重对该环节下不同利益主体的策略及其相关经济变量进行分析。第四章则对中国社会保险基金给付环节的监管进行了分析。本章节在明确给付环节的相关利益主体基础上，利用博弈方法构建静态博弈模型，并对该环节下不同利益主体的策略及其相关经济变量进行分析。第五章结论与政策建议。基于上述不同环节下博弈研究的结果得出社会保险基金在监管实践中应坚持适度性、成本-收益最大化等原则，并就加强和完善中国社会保险基金在不同环节下的监管提出相关建议。
[Abstract]:The past decade has witnessed the rapid development of China's social insurance industry. In the past ten years, China's social insurance system has been further improved, and the level of management and operation of the social insurance fund has been continuously improved. All these have laid a solid foundation for the further management of China's social insurance fund. However, with the continuous improvement of the management and service level of the social insurance fund in China, there are three outstanding problems in the management and operation of the social insurance fund: first, the employer delays, fails to pay, and underpays. Non-payment of social insurance fees and other illegal phenomena; second, in the actual operation process of social insurance agencies, due to financial risks, moral risks and inadequate internal control capacity and other reasons such as fund embezzlement, misappropriation and other illegal acts; Third, in the social insurance fund payment link due to asymmetric information and other reasons, social insurance funds to risk the occurrence of behavior. The existence of the above three kinds of illegal acts all cause damage to the social insurance fund in the course of management and service. The theoretical basis of this paper is game theory, principal-agent theory and cost-income theory, etc. On this basis, we mainly use static game and dynamic game model under complete information to study the above three illegal behaviors in the process of social insurance fund management. In order to find out the economic and social variables that affect the management of social insurance fund, and to provide the theoretical basis for realizing the effective, orderly supervision and management of the social insurance fund in the next step, this paper is divided into five chapters except the introduction. The content is arranged as follows: the first chapter introduces the related concepts and theoretical basis. This chapter focuses on the definition and extension of several important concepts used in the research. At the same time, it discusses some basic theories such as game theory, principal-agent theory, cost-benefit theory and so on. The second chapter analyzes the supervision of social insurance fund collection in China. This chapter firstly defines the relevant stakeholders in the collection process, and constructs a static game model by using the game method, focusing on the analysis of the strategies of different stakeholders and their related economic variables in this link. The third chapter analyzes the supervision of social insurance fund operation in China. In this chapter, firstly, the relevant stakeholders of the operation link are defined, and the dynamic and static game model is constructed by using the game method, and the strategies of different stakeholders and their related economic variables are analyzed. The fourth chapter analyzes the supervision of social insurance fund payment in China. On the basis of defining the relevant stakeholders of the payment link, this chapter constructs a static game model by using the game method, and analyzes the strategies of the different stakeholders and their related economic variables under this link. Chapter V conclusions and policy recommendations. Based on the results of the game study under the above different links, it is concluded that the social insurance fund should adhere to the principles of moderation, cost-benefit maximization and so on. And to strengthen and improve China's social insurance fund in different links of supervision and put forward relevant suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F842.61;F224.32

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