基于系统动力学的流动人口医保关系转接问题博弈分析

发布时间：2018-06-17 01:57

本文选题：博弈论 + 系统动力学　；参考：《中国卫生事业管理》2017年07期

【摘要】：目的:对流动人口医保转接问题进行定性定量研究,为完善医保转接政策提供参考。方法:基于博弈论思想,对流动人口、企业、政府三者的利益争夺展开博弈分析。在此基础上,结合系统动力学原理,构建政府与企业博弈的系统动力学模型,并展开相关预测分析。结果:流动人口作为弱势集团,其医保权益的实现由企业和政府博弈结果所决定;不转接医保的企业数量与对企业罚款额度成反比,与政府查处费用和企业医保转接成本成正比。结论:政府作为实现流动人口与企业博弈均衡的关键点,必须加强对违法企业查处力度,提高行政办事效率,努力降低监督检查费用,减轻企业转接医保关系的经济负担,勇于承担应尽之责。
[Abstract]:Objective: to provide a reference for the improvement of medical insurance transfer policy by qualitatively and quantitatively studying the problem of medical insurance transfer among floating population. Methods: based on the idea of game theory, the paper analyzes the interests of floating population, enterprises and government. On this basis, combined with the theory of system dynamics, the system dynamics model of government and enterprise game is constructed, and the related prediction analysis is carried out. Results: as a weak group, the realization of health insurance rights and interests of floating population is determined by the result of game between enterprise and government, and the number of enterprises that do not switch to health insurance is inversely proportional to the amount of fines imposed on enterprises. And the cost of government investigation and enterprise health insurance transfer costs in direct proportion. Conclusion: as the key point to realize the game equilibrium between floating population and enterprises, the government must strengthen the investigation and punishment of illegal enterprises, improve the efficiency of administrative work, reduce the cost of supervision and inspection, and lighten the economic burden of the relationship between enterprise and medical insurance. Have the courage to take the responsibility you deserve.
【作者单位】：滨州医学院公共卫生与管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目“中国城镇化进程中医疗保险转移接续问题研究”(编号:14YJAZH032) 2016年山东省自然科学基金计划“基于系统动力学的医疗费用制衡模型构建与实证研究”(编号:ZR2016GL02)
【分类号】：F224.32;F842.684;R197.1

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