逆周期监管背景下我国上市保险公司高管薪酬激励机制及影响因素实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-20 15:18

本文选题：保险公司 + 高管薪酬激励机制　；参考：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：制定并实施科学、合理、有效的薪酬激励制度,能够有效降低代理成本,是实现公司高级管理者有效激励与约束的重要手段,也是公司能够实现长期发展并逐步壮大的主要因素之一。近几年以来,公司高管薪酬逐渐受到公众的关注,尤其是金融领域的高管薪酬吸引了无数人的眼球。虽然现阶段针对高管薪酬的研究已有很多,但是在学术界对高管薪酬的关注热度始终没有降低,这一方面说明高管薪酬激励机制对于公司的发展具有极其重要的意义,一方面也说明现有的研究仍不完善,尚未完全解决好现实中出现的问题,需要结合实际进行改进和补充。高管薪酬激励机制的发展与完善,与所处的经济发展环境分不开,也与监管背景密不可分。高管薪酬激励机制的设计不但要依据公司发展实际,受到公司发展战略、公司治理结构、经营绩效等因素的影响,而且要与当前的经济形势相适应,受到行业发展、社会环境、监管背景等因素的影响。高管薪酬激励机制的研究一直是学术界的研究热点,多数研究是从微观入手,公司角度研究某种要素对高管薪酬激励机制的影响,很少分析宏观背景、监管措施对高管薪酬的影响。2009年金融危机促使国际社会重新审视诸多监管问题,并提出建立、实施有效的宏观审慎监管,而宏观审慎监管一个重要组成部分就是建立适当逆周期监管机制。本文力图将高管薪酬激励机制设计与宏观背景相联系,分析在逆周期监管约束背景下高管薪酬激励机制设计的影响因素。论文以我国上市保险公司为研究对象,从理论上对逆周期监管理论、薪酬激励理论进行归纳和概括,奠定论文的理论基础；其次对国外高管薪酬激励经验进行分析总结,并阐述我国现阶段保险公司高管薪酬激励机制的现状和问题,分析影响保险公司高管薪酬的一般因素及高管薪酬激励机制存在的顺周期性对高管薪酬的影响。通过运用科学的数理统计方法加以检验,探究逆周期监管背景下,上市保险公司高管薪酬激励机制的影响因素,为进一步完善上市保险公司薪酬激励机制提供参考建议。全文的章节安排如下：第一章绪论,首先对论文的研究背景、研究意义及研究方法、研究思路等进行介绍,其次分别对高管薪酬影响因素的文献、逆周期监管的相关文献、保险业逆周期监管与高管薪酬相关的文献进行归纳、总结。第二章对论文中涉及到的有关高管、薪酬、逆周期监管等概念进行阐述,介绍逆周期监管理论及高管薪酬激励相关理论,并对其中的具体内容做详细介绍。为什么会提出逆周期监管?什么是逆周期监管?逆周期监管的目标及手段有哪些?薪酬激励的基础理论是什么?这些都是在本章所要回答的问题。第三章主要介绍保险公司高管薪酬激励制度现状。首先对国外公司高管薪酬的激励制度进行总结,阐述国外公司高管薪酬激励机制的构成,对国外高管薪酬水平进行比较分析,同时也介绍国外政府部门对高管薪酬的调节作用。其次针对我国上市保险公司高管薪酬激励制度现状进行分析。介绍我国保险公司高管薪酬激励机制的构成,通过分析上市保险公司年报中披露的数据,得出目前上市保险公司高管薪酬激励机制所呈现出的问题。第四章分为三部分,第一部分主要对影响保险公司高管薪酬的一般因素进行分析。第二部分是结合保险行业的特点,分析保险行业高管薪酬的特点。第三部分是对保险公司高管薪酬存在顺周期效应进行分析。第五章主要包括三部分的内容。第一部分是介绍逆周期监管对保险公司高管薪酬产生的影响。第二部分则是对逆周期监管背景下上市保险公司高管薪酬影响因素的统计性描述,其中从三个维度进行分析：(1)保费收入对高管薪酬影响的统计性描述。(2)保险公司投资收益率对高管薪酬影响的统计性描述。(3)保险公司资产负债率对高管薪酬影响的统计性描述。第三个部分是进行多元线性回归分析,用以证明在第二部分中逆周期监管背景下关于高管薪酬影响因素的相应结论。第六章主要是给出在逆周期监管背景下,完善上市保险公司高管薪酬激励机制的个人建议。建议上市保险公司在逆周期监管背景下,逐步调整薪酬结构,加强高管与公司长期绩效的关联,引入薪酬延付机制,发展多元化的薪酬结构模式,同时要进一步完善公司治理结构,对于监管部门,要进一步完善法律法规,加强上市保险公司的信息披露制度,加强监管力量。第七章是对全文进行总结,并阐述研究局限和未来研究方向。本文的创新之处在于： (1)本文以保险行业薪酬激励机制为研究对象,弥补了国内对于行业薪酬研究偏少的不足。将薪酬激励机制与宏观背景相联系,研究逆周期监管背景对于保险公司高管薪酬激励机制的影响。 (2)本文在具体指标的选取上有所创新。在总结前人研究的基础上,综合的分析了影响高管薪酬的一般影响因素,从保险行业存在的顺周期效应着手,分析保险公司薪酬激励机制设计中有可能产生顺周期效应的因素,在理论上为研究逆周期监管背景下保险公司高管薪酬激励机制影响因素提供了参考价值。研究局限和未来研究方向： (1)实证分析中高管薪酬的影响因素主要选择了有可能造成顺周期效应的因素,并没有考虑影响高管薪酬激励机制的一般影响因素,如公司规模、发展战略、公司治理结构等,也没有考虑高管人员的个人因素,例如学历,年龄等因素,这些因素可能对高管薪酬也具有影响作用,使研究结果有一定的局限,在今后的研究中可以拓宽变量指标的选择。 (2)本文研究的薪酬只是现金报酬,由于我国股权激励的水平还比较低,本文没有考虑高管人员持股和股票期权等长期激励方式的影响。随着以后我国加大对高管的股权激励,不断完善薪酬结构,可以将其纳入模型。 (3)数据选择方面具有局限性,由于上市保险公司只有中国人寿、中国平安、中国太保、新华保险4家,且新华保险在2011年才上市,实证研究中存在样本数量偏少的局限。
[Abstract]:Making and implementing a scientific, reasonable and effective salary incentive system can effectively reduce the agency cost. It is an important means to realize the effective incentive and constraint of the senior managers. It is also one of the main factors that the company can achieve long-term development and gradually grow. In recent years, the executive pay of the company has been paid more and more attention by the public, especially in the past few years. Executive pay in the financial field has attracted numerous people. Although there are a lot of research on executive compensation at the present stage, the concern about executive pay has not been reduced in the academic world. This shows that the executive compensation incentive mechanism is of great significance to the development of the company, on the one hand, it also explains the existing research. The research is still not perfect and has not yet completely solved the problems in reality. It needs to be improved and supplemented in combination with reality.
The development and perfection of executive compensation incentive mechanism can not be separated from the environment of economic development and closely related to the regulatory background. The design of executive compensation incentive mechanism should not only be influenced by the development strategy of the company, the corporate governance structure, the management performance and so on, but also should be adapted to the current economic situation. The influence of industry development, social environment, supervision background and other factors. The research of executive compensation incentive mechanism has always been the research hot spot in the academic circle. Most of the research is from the micro point of view, the company angle studies the influence of some elements on the executive compensation incentive mechanism, rarely analyzes the macro view background, the effect of regulatory measures on executive compensation.2009 years The financial crisis has prompted the international community to reexamine a number of regulatory issues, and put forward the establishment of effective macro prudential supervision, and an important part of the macro prudential regulation is the establishment of a proper reverse cycle regulatory mechanism. This paper tries to link the design of executive compensation incentive mechanism with the macro background and analyze the constraints on the back cycle regulation. The influencing factors of executive compensation incentive mechanism design.
The thesis takes China listed insurance companies as the research object, summarizes and summarizes the theory of reverse cycle supervision and compensation incentive theory, and lays the theoretical foundation for the thesis. Secondly, it analyzes and summarizes the experience of executive compensation incentive in foreign countries, and expounds the current situation and problems of the salary incentive mechanism of the senior executives in our country. The general factors that affect the executive compensation of the insurance company and the effect of the CIS cyclical on the executive compensation in the executive compensation incentive mechanism. Through the use of scientific mathematical statistics to examine and explore the influencing factors of the salary incentive mechanism of the listed insurance companies under the background of the reverse cycle supervision, to further improve the salary of the listed insurance companies. The full text is arranged as follows:
The first chapter is introduction, first of all, the paper introduces the research background, research significance and research methods, research ideas and so on. Secondly, the literature on the influencing factors of executive compensation, the related literature of reverse cycle supervision, the literature of the inverse cycle supervision of insurance industry and executive compensation are summarized and summarized.
The second chapter expounds the concepts related to senior executives, compensation and reverse cycle supervision, and introduces the theory of reverse cycle supervision and the related theories of executive compensation incentive, and gives a detailed introduction to the specific contents of them. Why do they propose reverse cycle regulation? What is the reverse cycle supervision? What are the goals and means of the reverse cycle supervision? What are the basic theories of reward motivation? These are the questions to be answered in this chapter.
The third chapter mainly introduces the current situation of the executive compensation incentive system of the insurance company. First, it summarizes the incentive system of the executive compensation of foreign companies, expounds the composition of the compensation incentive mechanism of foreign company executives, compares and analyses the salary level of foreign executives, and also introduces the regulation effect of foreign government departments on executive compensation. The present situation of the executive compensation incentive system of the listed insurance companies in China is analyzed. The composition of the incentive mechanism of the executive compensation of the insurance companies in China is introduced. Through the analysis of the data disclosed in the annual reports of the listed insurance companies, the problems present in the incentive mechanism of the executive compensation of the listed insurance companies are obtained.
The fourth chapter is divided into three parts. The first part mainly analyzes the general factors that affect the compensation of the insurance company executives. The second part is the characteristics of the insurance industry. The third part is the analysis of the CIS cycle effect of the executive compensation in the insurance company.
The fifth chapter mainly includes the content of three parts. The first part is the introduction of the impact of reverse cycle regulation on the executive compensation of the insurance company. The second part is a statistical description of the factors affecting the executive compensation of the listed insurance companies under the background of the reverse cycle supervision, which is analyzed from three dimensions: (1) the impact of premium income on executive compensation Statistical description of (2) the statistical description of the impact of the insurance company's investment return on executive compensation. (3) the statistical description of the impact of the insurance company's asset liability ratio on executive compensation. The third part is the multiple linear regression analysis to prove the factors affecting the executive compensation in the second part of the reverse cycle supervision. It should be concluded.
The sixth chapter is the personal suggestion to improve the salary incentive mechanism of the listed insurance company executives under the backdrop of reverse cycle supervision. It is suggested that the listed insurance companies adjust the salary structure gradually, strengthen the relationship between the senior executives and the company's long-term performance, introduce pay delay mechanism and develop a diversified salary structure mode. At the same time, we should further improve the corporate governance structure. For the regulatory department, we should further improve the laws and regulations, strengthen the information disclosure system of the listed insurance companies and strengthen the regulatory force.
The seventh chapter is the summary of the full text, and describes the research limitations and future research directions.
The innovation of this article lies in:
(1) this paper takes the salary incentive mechanism of the insurance industry as the research object, and makes up for the shortage of domestic compensation research in the industry. It links the salary incentive mechanism with the macro background to study the influence of the reverse cycle supervision background on the compensation incentive mechanism of the insurance company executives.
(2) this article is innovative in the selection of specific indicators. On the basis of summarizing the previous research, the general factors affecting the executive compensation are analyzed comprehensively. From the CIS cycle effect of the insurance industry, this paper analyzes the factors that may produce the CIS cycle effect in the design of the compensation incentive mechanism of the insurance company and studies the inverse theory in theory. Under the background of supervision, it provides reference value for insurance company executive compensation incentive mechanism.
Research limitations and future research directions:
(1) in the empirical analysis, the influencing factors of executive compensation mainly choose the factors that may cause the CIS cycle effect, and do not consider the general factors affecting the executive compensation incentive mechanism, such as the size of the company, the development strategy, the corporate governance structure and so on, and do not consider the personal factors of the executives, such as education, age and other factors. It may also have an impact on executive pay, which limits the research results and broadens the choice of variable indicators in future research.
(2) the salary of this study is only cash reward. Because of the low level of equity incentive in China, this paper does not consider the influence of long term incentive methods, such as executive stock ownership and stock option. With the increase of equity incentive in our country and the continuous improvement of the salary structure, it can be incorporated into the model.
(3) the selection of data has limitations, because the listed insurance companies only have China life, China's safety, China's Tai Bao and Xinhua Insurance 4, and Xinhua insurance is not listed in 2011. There is a limited number of samples in the empirical study.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F842.3

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