我国董事责任保险发展问题研究

发布时间：2018-06-29 01:28

本文选题：董事责任保险 + 博弈论　；参考：《广西大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：中国要建立信息透明、管理规范、风险分散的有效资本市场,应该借助更多的公司治理手段来解决当前普遍存在的信息不对称与道德风险问题。因此,关于董事责任保险如何使用也一直在探索中。随着指导意见《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》在2001年8月的颁布,此意见中详细规定“上市公司可以建立必要的独立董事责任保险制度,以降低独立董事正常履行职责可能引致的风险。”董事(高管)责任保险属于责任保险的一个新兴险种,它诞生于美国1929年的经济危机之后。用于补偿公司高管与董事因为经营失败导致公司股东权益受损,遭受股东起诉而依法应负的赔偿。董事责任保险在转移公司及董事风险及保护众多股东利益方面具有其独特的优势,第三方受害者可以凭此保险获得应有的权益,这对于我国经济社会的稳定发展和形成良好的社会秩序非常有益,因此大力发展董事责任保险意义重大。本文所论述的董事责任保险以细微的主体行为方面为主题,因为此险种牵涉到众多的利益相关者,加之公司所有权和经营权的分离,使其涉及严重的委托代理问题,因此迫切需要研究董事责任保险的购买对董事行为有何变化,国内对这方面研究的不足为本论文提供了足够的研究空间。论文主要内容是以董事责任保险对董事行为和决策模型的影响作为切入点,首先梳理出近年来国内外的研究成果,同时结合我国近几年发展董事责任保险的实际情况,通过采用博弈方法研究董事责任保险的购买对董事行为的影响,从微观层面详细的分析了董事责任保险主体行为的细微变化,进而探讨董事责任保险与董事行为之间的相互关系。最后在结合国外先进国家的发展经验作为宏观的理论指导,研究结果对完善董事责任保险发展、实现责任保险理论创新具有参考作用。
[Abstract]:In order to establish an effective capital market with transparent information, standardized management and dispersed risks, China should resort to more corporate governance measures to solve the problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard. Therefore, how to use the director's liability insurance has been in the exploration. With the promulgation of the guidance on the Establishment of an Independent Director system in a listed Company in August 2001, the opinion specifies that "A listed company may establish the necessary independent director liability insurance system," In order to reduce the risk that independent directors may incur in the normal performance of their duties. " Director (executive) liability insurance is a new type of liability insurance, which was born after the 1929 economic crisis in the United States. It is used to compensate the executives and directors of the company for the loss of shareholders' rights and interests caused by the failure of operation and the compensation due to shareholders' lawsuits. Director liability insurance has its unique advantages in transferring the risks of the company and its directors and protecting the interests of many shareholders. Third party victims can obtain their due rights and interests by virtue of this insurance. This is very beneficial to the steady development of our country's economy and society and the formation of good social order, so it is of great significance to develop the director's liability insurance vigorously. The director's liability insurance discussed in this paper focuses on fine subject behavior, because it involves many stakeholders and the separation of company ownership and management right, which makes it involved in the serious principal-agent problem. Therefore, there is an urgent need to study how the purchase of directors' liability insurance changes the director's behavior. The lack of domestic research on this aspect provides sufficient research space for this paper. The main content of this paper is to take the influence of director liability insurance on directors' behavior and decision-making model as the starting point. First of all, it combs out the domestic and foreign research achievements in recent years, and combines the actual situation of developing director's liability insurance in recent years in our country. By using the game theory to study the influence of directors' liability insurance purchase on directors' behavior, this paper analyzes the minor changes of directors' liability insurance subjects' behavior from the micro level. Then the relationship between directors' liability insurance and directors' behavior is discussed. Finally, combining the development experience of foreign advanced countries as the macro theoretical guidance, the research results have a reference role in perfecting the development of directors' liability insurance and realizing the innovation of liability insurance theory.
【学位授予单位】：广西大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F842.69;F271

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