前景理论视角下促进健康保险可持续发展的政策激励路径研究

发布时间：2018-09-04 18:23

【摘要】：相对于我国社会医疗保险在各种激励政策和财政补贴积极引导下,在十多年时间内快速实现了全民覆盖,商业健康保险仍然处于相对滞后的水平,不仅保险密度和保险深度普遍偏低,而且地区之间的差距也非常明显。在经典经济学最大期望效用理论下,健康保险的最优保单评价的基础是边际收益和边际损失不变,风险概率也严格遵循精算估计分布,这些假设往往难以解释健康保险投保目的多样化和逆向选择等非理性决策问题。行为经济学前景理论提出的概率主观加权和损失厌恶效应,从人的有限理性角度阐述了健康保险选择效力不足的形成机制,为健康保险政策激励需求和切入点提供了较好的理论依据,政策制定者应该在健康保险理论基础上,综合考虑主观概率加权规律和损失厌恶效应的影响,有针对性地采取激励政策和非理性纠偏措施,以促进消费者更为有效的健康保险选择效力。
[Abstract]:Compared with China's social medical insurance, under the active guidance of various incentive policies and financial subsidies, it has rapidly achieved universal coverage in more than a decade, and commercial health insurance is still in a relatively backward level. Not only the insurance density and depth of insurance are generally low, but also the gap between regions is very obvious. Under the classical economics theory of maximum expected utility, the optimal policy evaluation of health insurance is based on the constant marginal income and marginal loss, and the risk probability strictly follows the actuarial estimation distribution. These assumptions are often difficult to explain the irrational decision problems such as diversification of health insurance objectives and adverse selection. The probability subjective weighting and loss aversion effect put forward by the prospect theory of behavioral economics, from the point of view of human's limited rationality, expounds the forming mechanism of the insufficient effectiveness of health insurance choice. It provides a good theoretical basis for the incentive demand and entry point of health insurance policy. On the basis of health insurance theory, the policy makers should consider the influence of subjective probability weighting law and loss aversion effect on the basis of health insurance theory. In order to promote consumers' more effective health insurance choice, incentive policies and irrational corrective measures should be adopted.
【作者单位】：南京审计学院金融学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(11YJCZH186) 全国统计科学研究计划项目(2013LY041)的资助
【分类号】：F842.684

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