贵州省政策性农业保险开展中的农户行为研究
发布时间：2018-12-16 06:54
【摘要】：贵州省农业的基础性地位突出，而脆弱的喀斯特生态环境导致自然灾害多发，严重阻碍农业的正常生产，农民较低的收入水平及及薄弱的风险防范意识使得其抵御农业生产风险能力不足，不利于保障粮食生产安全及维护社会稳定。由此，贵州的农业生产迫切需要有效的风险调控手段来保障其可持续发展。政策性农业保险是一种政府提供保费补贴以减轻农民保费支付负担的农业生产风险调控工具，理论上有利于农业资源的有效配置，促进农业经济的增长。贵州省从2007年开始试点政策性农业保险，在摸索的过程中取得一定成绩，但仍然存在诸多问题。本文主要从农户政策性农业保险需求行为影响因素和农户在政策性农业保险开展中与其他主体的博弈行为两方面入手，在准公共产品理论、福利经济学理论和行为经济学理论基础上，使用计量实证分析方法以及博弈模型研究方法对贵州省政策性农业保险中的农户行为进行分析和研究。针对农户政策性农业保险有效需求不足的困境，本文利用贵州省金沙县357户农户调查数据，对农业保险农户需求影响因素作直观的描述性分析，并运用Logistic分析法建立回归模型，对影响农民需求行为进而导致农民政策性农业保险有效需求不足的主要原因进行实证分析，得出结论：是否知道国家有补贴、遭受灾害的次数、主要从事的农业生产活动和农业保险对生产生活的重要性4个指标是左右农户政策性农业保险需求决策的决定性因素；对农业保险的了解程度这个指标则对政策性农业保险的需求有一定的影响。通过构造博弈模型发现只有实行政策性农业保险，且保费补贴的数量使得农户投保预期收益大于预期成本时，农户才会选择购买政策性农业保险。贵州省政策性农业保险的保费补贴水平并没有达到广泛铺开承保分散风险的预期目的，只有在政策性农业保险保费补贴与政府其他补贴款项相挂钩的情况下，政府补贴水平提升到足够使农户投保预期收益大于预期成本，广大农户才积极地选择购买政策性农业保险。通过对贵州省政策性农业保险中的农户行为进行系统分析，，文章最后有针对性地提出了促进贵州省政策性农业保险开展的对策。
[Abstract]:The basic position of agriculture in Guizhou Province is prominent, and the fragile karst ecological environment leads to frequent natural disasters, which seriously hinders the normal production of agriculture. Farmers' low income level and weak awareness of risk prevention make their ability to resist the risks of agricultural production insufficient, which is not conducive to ensuring the safety of grain production and maintaining social stability. Therefore, Guizhou's agricultural production urgently needs effective means of risk control to ensure its sustainable development. Policy-oriented agricultural insurance is a kind of agricultural production risk control tool which is provided by the government to provide premium subsidy to reduce the burden of farmers' premium payment. It is beneficial to the effective allocation of agricultural resources and to the growth of agricultural economy theoretically. Guizhou Province has been experimenting with policy-oriented agricultural insurance since 2007, and has made some achievements in the process of exploration, but there are still many problems. This paper mainly starts with the influencing factors of farmers' demand behavior of policy-oriented agricultural insurance and the game behavior between farmers and other subjects in the development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance, and puts forward the theory of quasi-public products. Based on the theory of welfare economics and behavioral economics, this paper analyzes and studies the behavior of farmers in policy agricultural insurance in Guizhou province by using econometric empirical analysis and game model. In view of the dilemma of insufficient effective demand for agricultural insurance by farmers, this paper makes an intuitive descriptive analysis of the influencing factors of agricultural insurance farmers' demand by using the survey data of 357 households in Jinsha County, Guizhou Province, and establishes a regression model by using Logistic analysis method. This paper makes an empirical analysis on the main reasons that affect the behavior of farmers' demand and then leads to the insufficient effective demand for farmers' policy-oriented agricultural insurance, and draws a conclusion: do you know whether the state has subsidies and the number of disasters, The main agricultural production activities and the importance of agricultural insurance to production and life are the decisive factors of farmers' policy-oriented agricultural insurance demand decision-making. The degree of understanding of agricultural insurance has a certain impact on the demand of policy agricultural insurance. By constructing the game model, it is found that only when the policy agricultural insurance is carried out and the amount of premium subsidy makes the expected income of the insured farmers greater than the expected cost, the farmers will choose to purchase policy agricultural insurance. The insurance premium subsidy level of policy agricultural insurance in Guizhou Province has not achieved the expected purpose of widely spreading the coverage of dispersed risks, only if the premium subsidy of policy agricultural insurance is linked to other government subsidies, When the level of government subsidy is raised enough to ensure that the expected income of farmers' insurance is greater than the expected cost, the majority of farmers actively choose to purchase policy-oriented agricultural insurance. Based on the systematic analysis of the behavior of farmers in the policy agricultural insurance of Guizhou province, the paper puts forward the countermeasures to promote the policy agricultural insurance in Guizhou province.
【学位授予单位】：贵州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F842.66
本文编号：2381961
[Abstract]:The basic position of agriculture in Guizhou Province is prominent, and the fragile karst ecological environment leads to frequent natural disasters, which seriously hinders the normal production of agriculture. Farmers' low income level and weak awareness of risk prevention make their ability to resist the risks of agricultural production insufficient, which is not conducive to ensuring the safety of grain production and maintaining social stability. Therefore, Guizhou's agricultural production urgently needs effective means of risk control to ensure its sustainable development. Policy-oriented agricultural insurance is a kind of agricultural production risk control tool which is provided by the government to provide premium subsidy to reduce the burden of farmers' premium payment. It is beneficial to the effective allocation of agricultural resources and to the growth of agricultural economy theoretically. Guizhou Province has been experimenting with policy-oriented agricultural insurance since 2007, and has made some achievements in the process of exploration, but there are still many problems. This paper mainly starts with the influencing factors of farmers' demand behavior of policy-oriented agricultural insurance and the game behavior between farmers and other subjects in the development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance, and puts forward the theory of quasi-public products. Based on the theory of welfare economics and behavioral economics, this paper analyzes and studies the behavior of farmers in policy agricultural insurance in Guizhou province by using econometric empirical analysis and game model. In view of the dilemma of insufficient effective demand for agricultural insurance by farmers, this paper makes an intuitive descriptive analysis of the influencing factors of agricultural insurance farmers' demand by using the survey data of 357 households in Jinsha County, Guizhou Province, and establishes a regression model by using Logistic analysis method. This paper makes an empirical analysis on the main reasons that affect the behavior of farmers' demand and then leads to the insufficient effective demand for farmers' policy-oriented agricultural insurance, and draws a conclusion: do you know whether the state has subsidies and the number of disasters, The main agricultural production activities and the importance of agricultural insurance to production and life are the decisive factors of farmers' policy-oriented agricultural insurance demand decision-making. The degree of understanding of agricultural insurance has a certain impact on the demand of policy agricultural insurance. By constructing the game model, it is found that only when the policy agricultural insurance is carried out and the amount of premium subsidy makes the expected income of the insured farmers greater than the expected cost, the farmers will choose to purchase policy agricultural insurance. The insurance premium subsidy level of policy agricultural insurance in Guizhou Province has not achieved the expected purpose of widely spreading the coverage of dispersed risks, only if the premium subsidy of policy agricultural insurance is linked to other government subsidies, When the level of government subsidy is raised enough to ensure that the expected income of farmers' insurance is greater than the expected cost, the majority of farmers actively choose to purchase policy-oriented agricultural insurance. Based on the systematic analysis of the behavior of farmers in the policy agricultural insurance of Guizhou province, the paper puts forward the countermeasures to promote the policy agricultural insurance in Guizhou province.
【学位授予单位】：贵州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F842.66
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