不完全契约下服务外包风险及其治理机制研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 04:09

本文选题：服务外包　切入点：不完全契约　出处：《河北经贸大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着全球产业的重新调整,第三产业即服务业的蓬勃发展在世界经济的结构和布局中发挥越来越重要的作用。发达国家开始将越来越多、越来越复杂的服务业功能转向其他地方,于是出现了一个新的产业——服务外包。当看到这种新兴行业所带来的发展机遇后,各个企业便开始争先恐后的进入服务外包行业。然而我们在收获服务外包所带来的收益的同时,也必须面对随之而来的挑战。服务外包的委托-代理双方通过契约来规定双方的权利和义务,但双方的有限理性,外界环境的不确定性,信息的不对称性等因素都会使得契约具有不完全性。不完全的服务外包契约容易使发包方面临着敲竹杠、机会主义等风险。因此,在不完全契约的背景下,研究服务外包风险以及治理机制具有一定的现实意义。本文遵循理论--建模--实证的思维及论述过程。首先,在委托代理理论、交易成本理论和不完全契约理论的理论支持下,分析了契约不完全的成因以及由此导致的契约风险。其次,针对契约风险,本文参考了以往学者研究所涉及的诸多治理机制,分别以基于正式契约治理机制(完备契约机制、激励惩罚机制、监控机制)和基于关系契约治理机制(信息共享机制、沟通机制、信任机制、声誉机制)为基础提出相关的研究假设,并构建了双态综合治理机制模型。最后,本文根据国内外相关的成熟量表设计了初始调查问卷,在此基础上通过对小样本题项的净化处理,形成了比较合理的调查问卷。针对问卷调研获得的数据信息进行逐步回归分析,以验证模型中的假设,并对实证检验结果进行分析和论证,在此基础上提出了可供企业防范和治理契约风险的建议。本文的实证结果显示,双边综合治理机制对契约风险的治理效果要高于正式契约或关系契约治理机制其中的任何单一治理形式的治理效果。其中,完备契约、激励惩罚、监控和沟通与契约风险存在着显著地负相关关系；信息共享和信任与契约风险存在负相关关系,但是不显著的；声誉与契约风险未得到与理论假设一致的结果,即不存在显著负相关关系。
[Abstract]:With the readjustment of the global industry, the vigorous development of the tertiary industry, that is, the service industry, is playing an increasingly important role in the structure and layout of the world economy.Developed countries began to shift more and more complex service functions to other places, and a new industry-service outsourcing emerged.After seeing the development opportunity brought by this new industry, each enterprise begins to rush into the service outsourcing industry.However, as we reap the benefits of outsourcing, we must also face the challenges that come with it.The principal-agent of service outsourcing stipulates the rights and obligations of both parties through contract, but the limited rationality of both parties, the uncertainty of external environment and the asymmetry of information make the contract incomplete.Incomplete service outsourcing contracts are likely to expose the contracting parties to risks such as ripping off, opportunism and so on.Therefore, under the background of incomplete contract, it is of practical significance to study the risk and governance mechanism of service outsourcing.This paper follows the thinking and argumentation process of theory-modeling-demonstration.Firstly, with the support of principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory and incomplete contract theory, this paper analyzes the causes of incomplete contract and the contractual risks caused by it.Secondly, in view of contract risk, this paper refers to many governance mechanisms involved in previous scholars' research, respectively, based on formal contract governance mechanism (complete contract mechanism, incentive and punishment mechanism).Based on the monitoring mechanism and the relational contract governance mechanism (information sharing mechanism, communication mechanism, trust mechanism, reputation mechanism), this paper puts forward the relevant research hypotheses, and constructs a two-state comprehensive governance mechanism model.Finally, this paper designs the initial questionnaire according to the domestic and foreign mature scale, and on this basis, through the purification of small sample items, a more reasonable questionnaire is formed.On the basis of stepwise regression analysis of the data information obtained by questionnaire investigation, the hypothesis in the model is verified, and the empirical test results are analyzed and demonstrated. On the basis of this, some suggestions are put forward for enterprises to prevent and manage contractual risks.The empirical results show that the governance effect of bilateral comprehensive governance mechanism on contract risk is higher than that of any single governance form of formal contract or relational contract governance mechanism.Among them, complete contract, incentive punishment, monitoring and communication have significant negative correlation with contract risk, information sharing and trust have negative correlation with contract risk, but not significant.The results of reputation and contract risk are not consistent with theoretical hypothesis, that is, there is no significant negative correlation between reputation and contract risk.
【学位授予单位】：河北经贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F719;F224

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