客户参与影响创新不确定下的研发外包合同

发布时间：2018-06-16 01:34

本文选题：研发外包 + 客户参与　；参考：《系统管理学报》2013年03期

【摘要】：研发具有创新不确定的特点,客户参与外包的研发项目能使服务商进一步明确研发目的、降低创新的不确定性,但传统的研发外包合同忽略了客户参与对创新不确定的影响。考虑客户参与对创新不确定的影响下,建立了客户参与下的委托代理模型,分析了客户参与和收益共享合同参数的内在逻辑关系,并通过模型求解进一步分析了外生变量对最优收益共享激励系数及客户最优参与度的影响。研究表明:随着客户参与度的增加,与之匹配的收益共享激励系数也应增加;服务商风险厌恶度与客户最优参与度之间并非单调关系;客户最优参与度和最优收益共享系数都与双方成本系数负相关,与产出系数正相关。
[Abstract]:R & D is characterized by uncertainty of innovation. Customer participation in R & D projects can further clarify the purpose of R & D and reduce the uncertainty of innovation, but the traditional contract of R & D outsourcing ignores the impact of customer participation on innovation uncertainty. Considering the influence of customer participation on innovation uncertainty, the principal-agent model with customer participation is established, and the inherent logical relationship between customer participation and profit sharing contract parameters is analyzed. The influence of exogenous variables on the incentive coefficient of optimal income sharing and the optimal participation of customers is further analyzed by solving the model. The results show that: with the increase of customer participation, the matching incentive coefficient of income sharing should also increase, and the relationship between risk aversion of service providers and customer optimal participation is not monotonous. The optimal participation of customers and the sharing coefficient of optimal returns are both negatively correlated with the cost coefficient of both parties and positively correlated with the output coefficient.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272086,70871128) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-10-0884)
【分类号】：F224;F273.1;F719

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