服务合作生产契约模型研究

发布时间：2018-06-24 16:15

本文选题：服务合作生产 + 契约模型　；参考：《大连理工大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：近年来,以知识交互为主要特征的现代服务业无论是在美国等发达国家,还是在中国、印度等发展中国家,都得到了快速增长。但服务业的高效率并不容易实现。客户企业不仅限于购买和消费服务,而且还是服务提供商的业务伙伴。服务系统是一个价值共同创造和过程共同生产的系统。客户合作是服务设计中一个关键的考虑因素,合作关系对服务质量和服务绩效具有很大的影响。因此,研究服务提供商与客户企业的合作生产契约问题具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文以单服务提供商和单客户企业为代表,以博弈论为主要分析工具,运用信息经济学和产业经济学的方法,重点探讨在不同类型的服务合作生产环境中,在双方相对重要性、双方的相对知识粘性、双方合作程度等因素的影响下的服务契约选择问题。通过建立不同服务环境下的合作生产契约模型,为客户参与服务合作生产的契约决策提供依据。论文的主要研究内容如下： (1)服务合作生产的本质与机理。通过国内外相关文献综述：从概念上界定了客户参与服务合作生产的涵义；阐述了服务合作生产过程基于知识转移的本质特征,分析了在知识转移过程中知识粘性的存在及影响；回顾了相关契约理论,讨论了服务合作生产契约的研究现状。从而,提出了本文的研究问题、确立了本文的研究对象、选定了本文的研究视角和研究方法,并为本文模型的建立奠定了相应的概念及理论基础。 (2)服务合作生产关系的分类及特征。在回顾了企业合作关系内涵的基础之上,基于服务合作生产的知识转移特征,提出了根据参与方的合作程度与参与方在合作关系中的控制地位两个维度进行服务合作生产关系分类的方式,包括：客户主导的咨询式服务合作生产关系、提供商主导的销售式服务合作生产关系、和双方协商的联盟式服务合作生产关系。并从合作程度、知识转移、组织控制等方面分别分析了三类基本服务关系的不同特征表现,为本文规范模型的建立提供参数设定的依据。 (3)服务合作生产Nash非合作博弈控制权分配模型。服务合作生产的不完全契约治理需要首先确定剩余控制权结构。在考虑单方理性的情况下,首先给定合作生产程度,根据服务合作生产过程基于知识转移的本质特征,引入知识粘性概念,构建了Nash非合作博弈控制权分配模型,得出了非合作博弈情况下不考虑合作程度的影响时,参与方的相对重要性、参与方的相对知识粘性共同影响剩余控制权分配的结论。然后,通过改进Xue-Field的服务合作生产Nash非合作动态博弈控制权分配模型,考察了合作程度变化对控制权结构的影响。结论表明,合作程度增加会使由参与方相对重要性、参与方相对知识粘性决定的最优控制权分配的条件得到放松,合作程度对合作关系具有正影响。因此,在非合作博弈情况下,参与方的相对重要性、参与方的相对知识粘性、双方的合作程度共同影响剩余控制权的分配。 (4)服务合作生产Nash合作博弈控制权分配模型。在考虑团队理性的情况下,首先给定合作生产程度,根据服务合作生产过程的知识转移特征,引入知识粘性的概念,构建了Nash合作博弈控制权分配模型,得出了合作博弈情况下不考虑合作程度的影响时,参与方的相对重要性、参与方的相对知识粘性影响剩余控制权分配的结论。然后,在模型中改变合作程度的大小,以考察其对控制权分配的影响。结论表明,足够大的合作生产程度会使参与方相对重要性和相对知识粘性决定的控制权结构发生转移。因此,在合作博弈情况下,参与方的相对重要性、参与方的相对知识粘性、双方合作程度共同影响剩余控制权的分配。 (5)不同服务合作生产关系下的契约支付模型。在总结了不同服务合作生产关系控制权分配特征的基础之上,建立了相应的委托——代理模型,研究了不同服务环境下客户企业对提供商的最优契约支付问题。结论表明,在客户主导的咨询式服务合作生产关系中,客户对提供商的最优支付为基于提供商努力成本补偿的低激励强度契约；在提供商主导的销售式服务合作生产关系中,客户对提供商的最优支付为基于提供商努力结果进行支付的高激励强度契约；在双方协商的联盟式服务合作生产关系中,基于提供商和客户将联合拥有剩余控制权的分析,建立了双边道德风险模型,论证了客户对提供商的最优支付为基于双方绩效的收益共享、风险共担的激励型契约。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the modern service industry, which is mainly characterized by knowledge interaction, has been growing rapidly in both developed countries such as the United States, or in China, India and other developing countries. However, the efficiency of service industry is not easy to be realized. The system is a system of common production of value co creation and process. Customer cooperation is a key consideration in service design. Cooperation relationship has a great influence on the quality of service and service performance. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the cooperative production contract between service providers and customer enterprises.
This paper, taking the single service provider and single customer enterprise as the representative, uses the game theory as the main analysis tool, uses the methods of information economics and industrial economics to discuss the services under the influence of the relative importance of both sides, the relative knowledge stickiness of both sides and the degree of cooperation between the two parties in the different types of service cooperative production environment. Contract selection problem. Through the establishment of a cooperative production contract model under different service environment, it provides the basis for the customer to participate in the contract decision of the service cooperation production. The main contents of this paper are as follows:
(1) the essence and mechanism of service cooperative production.
Through the literature review at home and abroad, the meaning of customer participation in the cooperative production is defined from the conceptual boundary, and the essential characteristics of the cooperative production process based on knowledge transfer are expounded, the existence and influence of knowledge stickiness in the process of knowledge transfer are analyzed, and the related contract theory is reviewed, and the research on the cooperative production contract is discussed. In this way, we put forward the research problem of this paper, established the research object of this article, selected the research perspective and research method of this article, and laid the corresponding concept and theoretical foundation for the establishment of this model.
(2) the classification and characteristics of service cooperative production relations.
On the basis of reviewing the connotation of enterprise cooperation relationship, based on the knowledge transfer characteristics of service cooperative production, this paper puts forward two ways to classify service cooperative production relations according to the degree of cooperation of the participants and the control status of the participants in the cooperative relationship, including the cooperative production relationship of customer LED consulting service. The supplier led sales service cooperative production relationship and the Alliance Service cooperative production relationship negotiated with both sides, and analyzed the different characteristics of the three basic service relations from the aspects of cooperation degree, knowledge transfer and organization control, and provided the basis for setting up parameters for the establishment of this standard model.
(3) the cooperative game allocation model of Nash in cooperative cooperative production.
The incomplete contract governance of service cooperative production must first determine the residual control structure. Under the case of unilateral rationality, first given the degree of cooperative production, according to the essential characteristics of knowledge transfer based on the cooperative production process of service, the concept of knowledge stickiness is introduced, and the Nash non cooperative game control right allocation model is constructed. In the case of cooperative game, the relative importance of the participants and the relative knowledge stickiness of the participants are not considered when the degree of cooperation is affected, and the relative knowledge stickiness of the participant influences the allocation of residual control. Then, the control right structure is investigated by improving the Xue-Field's service cooperation to produce Nash non cooperative dynamic game control allocation model. The conclusion shows that the increasing cooperation degree will make the participants relative importance, the optimal control allocation of the participants' relative knowledge stickiness is relaxed and the degree of cooperation has a positive influence on the cooperative relationship. Therefore, in the case of non cooperative game, the relative importance of the participants and the relative knowledge stickiness of the participants are both sides. The degree of cooperation affects the allocation of residual control rights.
(4) the cooperative game allocation model for cooperative Nash production.
Considering team rationality, first given the degree of cooperative production, according to the knowledge transfer characteristics of the cooperative production process, and introducing the concept of knowledge stickiness, the Nash cooperative game control allocation model is constructed, and the relative importance of the participants and the participants in the cooperative game are obtained without considering the influence of cooperation. The conclusion is that the extent of the degree of cooperation is changed in the model in order to examine the influence on the allocation of control rights in the model. The conclusion shows that the large enough cooperative production degree will transfer the control structure of the relative importance and relative knowledge stickiness of the participants. Therefore, the cooperative game situation is in the case of cooperative game. The relative importance of participants, the relative knowledge stickiness of participants, and the degree of cooperation between two parties affect the allocation of residual control rights together.
(5) contract payment model under the cooperative production relationship of different services.
On the basis of summarizing the distribution characteristics of the control rights of different service cooperative production relations, a corresponding principal-agent model is established, and the problem of the optimal contract payment for the supplier under the different service environment is studied. The conclusion shows that the customer is optimal to the provider in the customer led consultative service cooperative production relationship. Payment is a low incentive intensity contract based on the provider's effort cost compensation; in the supplier led sales service cooperative production relationship, the customer's optimal payment to the provider is a high incentive strength contract based on the result of the provider's effort; in the alliance based cooperative production relationship negotiated by both parties, the provider is based on the provider With the analysis of the remaining control rights, a bilateral moral hazard model is established, which demonstrates that the customer's optimal payment to the provider is an incentive contract based on the benefit sharing of both parties' performance and the risk sharing.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F719

【参考文献】