知识产权权属分配视角下企业研发外包的激励机制设计
发布时间：2019-01-03 13:15
【摘要】：以外包商为参考点,针对研发外包中承包商同时存在信息泄露和隐藏努力程度的两类道德风险问题,运用委托代理理论,建立了考虑知识产权权属分配模式的研发外包激励机制。研究表明,在允许知识产权许可的情况下,将知识产权所有权授权给承包商,不但会增加外包商的期望收益,还可以有效激励承包商最优努力水平,同时避免其信息泄露问题。
[Abstract]:Outside the contractor as the reference point, aiming at the two kinds of moral hazard problem that the contractor simultaneously exists the information leakage and the concealment effort degree in the R & D outsourcing, the principal-agent theory is used. The incentive mechanism of R & D outsourcing based on intellectual property right distribution model is established. The research shows that under the condition of allowing intellectual property to license, authorizing the ownership of intellectual property to the contractor will not only increase the expected income of the outsourcer, but also effectively stimulate the contractor's optimal level of effort, while avoiding the problem of information disclosure.
【作者单位】： 福州大学八方物流学院;
【基金】：福建省社科重点项目(2010A013)
【分类号】：F273.1;F719
[Abstract]:Outside the contractor as the reference point, aiming at the two kinds of moral hazard problem that the contractor simultaneously exists the information leakage and the concealment effort degree in the R & D outsourcing, the principal-agent theory is used. The incentive mechanism of R & D outsourcing based on intellectual property right distribution model is established. The research shows that under the condition of allowing intellectual property to license, authorizing the ownership of intellectual property to the contractor will not only increase the expected income of the outsourcer, but also effectively stimulate the contractor's optimal level of effort, while avoiding the problem of information disclosure.
【作者单位】： 福州大学八方物流学院;
【基金】：福建省社科重点项目(2010A013)
【分类号】：F273.1;F719
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前8条
1 朱新财;银路;肖凡平;;基于委托代理机制的研发外包边界[J];系统工程;2009年03期
2 吴勇;陈通;;信息泄漏情形下企业研发决策行为[J];系统工程;2011年04期
3 费方h，
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