基于公众评价的公共服务外包合作机制研究

发布时间：2019-03-06 12:50

【摘要】：随着现阶段我国“服务型政府”的逐步推进，公共服务外包作为一种新的公共服务市场化模式越来越受到各级政府的青睐，并日益成为众多公共服务市场化模式中最重要的一种。然而，我国公共服务外包蓬勃发展的同时，诸多问题也日益凸显。由于公共服务外包市场体制不完善，在公共服务外包的交易过程中因接包方企业占有私有信息使得公共服务外包面临着严峻的道德风险问题，最终导致公共服务外包的失败。公共服务外包中道德风险的存在将导致公共服务外包面临诸多风险。通过建立科学合理的公共服务外包合作机制可以降低公共服务外包的道德风险，促使接包方企业提升公共服务外包产品质量，并促成政府和接包方企业双方的长期合作关系。针对公共服务外包信息不对称的特性，本文剖析了其产生的原因以及可能引发的后果，并通过构建公共服务外包质量控制模型和合作关系稳定性激励模型来规避信息不对称产生的种种风险问题。本文将公众评价引入到质量控制模型中，，通过在公共服务外包正式契约中设定惩罚因子，构建了能促使接包方企业提升外包产品质量的激励模型，有效激励政府投入更多的监督成本，接包方企业投入更多的生产成本，进而达到提升公共服务外包产品质量的目的，对政府如何在正式契约的设计中实现对接包方企业产品质量的控制具有指导意义；此外，本文在构建合作关系稳定性激励模型时，将贴现因子作为考察交易双方长期合作意愿的有效信号，得出了影响交易双方长期合作意愿的相关影响因素，为政府和接包方企业建立长期稳定的合作关系提供了科学方法。本文立足于发包方政府的视角，基于对公共服务外包特性的考察构建两个模型，为公共服务外包交易双方构建了科学的合作机制，为公共服务外包的治理提供了科学依据。
[Abstract]:With the gradual promotion of "service-oriented government" in our country at present, public service outsourcing, as a new market-oriented mode of public service, is more and more favored by governments at all levels. And increasingly become many public services market-oriented model of the most important. However, with the vigorous development of public service outsourcing in China, many problems are becoming more and more prominent. Because the market system of public service outsourcing is not perfect, the public service outsourcing is faced with serious moral hazard problem because the contractor owns private information in the transaction process of public service outsourcing, and finally leads to the failure of public service outsourcing. The existence of moral hazard in public service outsourcing will lead to many risks in public service outsourcing. Through the establishment of scientific and reasonable public service outsourcing cooperation mechanism, the moral hazard of public service outsourcing can be reduced, the contractor enterprises can improve the quality of public service outsourcing products, and the long-term cooperative relationship between the government and the contractor enterprises can be promoted. In view of the asymmetric characteristics of public service outsourcing information, this paper analyzes its causes and possible consequences. By constructing the quality control model of public service outsourcing and the incentive model of cooperative relationship stability, we can avoid all kinds of risk problems caused by information asymmetry. In this paper, the public evaluation is introduced into the quality control model. By setting the penalty factor in the formal contract of public service outsourcing, the incentive model which can promote the contractor enterprise to improve the quality of outsourced products is constructed. In order to improve the quality of public service outsourcing products, the government is effectively encouraged to invest more supervision costs, and the contractor enterprises invest more production costs to achieve the goal of improving the quality of public service outsourcing products. It is of guiding significance for the government to realize the product quality control in the design of formal contract. In addition, when constructing the stable incentive model of cooperative relationship, the discounted factor is used as an effective signal to investigate the long-term cooperative intention of the two parties, and the relevant factors affecting the long-term cooperative intention of the two parties are obtained. It provides a scientific method for the government and contractor enterprises to establish a long-term and stable cooperative relationship. Based on the perspective of the government of the issuer, this paper constructs two models based on the investigation of the characteristics of public service outsourcing, which constructs a scientific cooperative mechanism for the two sides of the public service outsourcing transaction, and provides a scientific basis for the governance of the public service outsourcing.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F719

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