基于激励奖金的外包企业与服务企业博弈研究

发布时间：2019-03-28 13:07

【摘要】：随着企业间竞争的加剧、产品技术创新以及全球化的加速发展,在企业内部资源有限的情况下,企业可以选择将次要的或非核心的业务外包给市场上的其他组织,最大限度地整合利用外部的专业资源,充分发挥和提高企业的核心竞争能力。但是企业将内部业务外包出去之后,企业将不能很好地了解和观测业务外包服务企业的某些行为,在这种情况下,业务外包服务企业可能会利用这种信息的不对称采取有利于自身利益而不利于外包企业利益的一些行为,给外包企业造成损失。所以业务外包企业如何激励外包服务企业保证双方合作的成功,达到双赢具有重要的研究意义。目前对业务外包企业激励外包服务企业的研究,多是针对某一具体的外包业务,例如人力资源管理外包、研发外包、物流外包等建立博弈模型,分析是否需要激励；或是对影响激励的因素的研究。缺乏对具体激励手段,如激励奖金的研究,基于此本文引入激励奖金,构建业务外包企业与外包服务企业之间的长期合作的重复博弈模型与进化博弈模型,计算得出激励奖金的取值范围,并分析其影响因素。本论文的主要工作和成果如下：基于显性激励因素激励奖金与隐性激励因素声誉,建立完全理性条件下的重复博弈模型,分析激励奖金的影响因素及其取值范围。研究结果表明,声誉对业务外包服务企业存在激励作用,且激励奖金的影响因素包括业务外包服务企业努力时获得高产出的概率,不努力时获得高产出的概率,贴现系数以及其在声誉的掩盖下选择不努力而没有被外包企业发现的概率四个因素,同时计算得处了业务外包企业为激励外包服务企业所提供的激励奖金的具体范围。最后运用分析结果对Y企业的培训业务外包进行实例分析,对影响Y企业的培训外包的因素进行了探讨并计算出不同因素影响下的激励奖金的极值。基于激励奖金建立有限理性的条件下的进化博弈模型,分析业务外包企业与外包服务企业在长期博弈过程中的两者的策略选择及稳定性。研究结果表明,有限理性条件下,业务外包企业与外包服务企业在长期多次合作过程中学习和调整策略的结果是业务外包企业会采取较低的激励奖金,而外包服务企业会选择不努力个作。并运用分析结果,对M公司的物流业务外包进行实例研究,分析了有限理性下的M公司与物流业务外包服务企业A公司在长期合作中学习和调整策略的结果。
[Abstract]:With the intensification of competition between enterprises, the rapid development of product technology innovation and globalization, enterprises can choose to outsource secondary or non-core business to other organizations in the market with limited internal resources. Maximize the integration and utilization of external professional resources, give full play to and improve the core competitiveness of enterprises. However, after the enterprise outsourced the internal business, the enterprise would not be able to understand and observe the behavior of the outsourcing service enterprise very well. In this case, the enterprise will not be able to understand and observe the behavior of the outsourcing service enterprise. Outsourcing service enterprises may take advantage of this information asymmetry to take some actions that are beneficial to their own interests but not beneficial to the interests of outsourcing enterprises, which will cause losses to outsourcing enterprises. Therefore, how to encourage outsourcing service enterprises to ensure the success of cooperation and achieve win-win is of great significance. At present, the research on incentive outsourcing service enterprises of outsourcing enterprises mainly aims at a specific outsourcing business, such as human resource management outsourcing, R & D outsourcing, logistics outsourcing and so on, to establish a game model to analyze whether incentive is needed or not. Or the study of the factors that affect the motivation. Based on the lack of research on specific incentive measures such as incentive bonus, this paper introduces incentive bonus to construct the repetitive game model and evolutionary game model of long-term cooperation between outsourcing enterprises and outsourcing service enterprises. The value range of incentive bonus is calculated and its influencing factors are analyzed. The main work and achievements of this paper are as follows: based on the reputations of explicit incentive factors and implicit motivational factors, a repeated game model is established under the condition of complete rationality, and the influencing factors of incentive bonuses and their range of values are analyzed. The results show that reputation has an incentive effect on outsourcing service enterprises, and the influencing factors of incentive bonus include the probability of obtaining high output when the outsourcing service enterprise strives, and the probability of obtaining high output when no effort is made. Under the cover of reputation, the discount coefficient and the probability that they choose not to work hard but are not found by outsourcing enterprises are four factors. At the same time, the specific scope of incentive bonus offered by outsourcing enterprises to encourage outsourcing service enterprises is calculated. Finally, the analysis results are used to analyze the training outsourcing of Y enterprise, and the factors that affect the training outsourcing of Y enterprise are discussed, and the extreme value of incentive bonus under the influence of different factors is calculated. Based on incentive bonus, the evolutionary game model under the condition of limited rationality is established, and the strategic choice and stability of outsourcing enterprises and outsourcing service enterprises in the long-term game process are analyzed. The results show that under the condition of limited rationality, outsourcing enterprises and outsourcing service enterprises learn and adjust strategies in the process of long-term cooperation, and the result is that outsourcing enterprises will adopt lower incentive bonuses. And outsourcing service enterprises will choose not to work hard. Based on the analysis results, this paper makes a case study on logistics outsourcing of M Company, and analyzes the results of learning and adjusting strategies in the long-term cooperation between M Company and Logistics Outsourcing Service Enterprise A under the limited rationality.
【学位授予单位】：西安工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F719;F224.32

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