媒体监督、媒体治理与高管薪酬

发布时间：2018-03-22 04:07

本文选题：高管薪酬　切入点：媒体监督　出处：《经济研究》2012年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：针对我国上市公司高管薪酬中"天价薪酬"与"零薪酬"等薪酬乱象并存的背景,本文实证研究发现,媒体在其中发挥了一定的监督职能。然而,进一步的研究发现,唯有在政府及行政主管部门介入的条件下,媒体监督职能的发挥才能促使高管薪酬趋于合理。本文认为,当媒体之外监督机制或声誉机制并不能充分发挥作用时,媒体监督职能的发挥并不能必然地转化为媒体的治理功能。在我国资本市场特殊的制度背景下,媒体借助政府这个"路径",最易形成治理功能。
[Abstract]:In view of the background that "sky-price compensation" and "zero compensation" exist in the executive compensation of listed companies in China, this paper finds that the media play a certain supervisory role in it. It is only under the intervention of government and administrative departments that the function of media supervision can make the executive pay more reasonable. This paper argues that when the supervision mechanism or reputation mechanism outside the media can not fully play its role, The function of media supervision can not be transformed into the governance function of media. Under the special system background of capital market in China, the media can easily form the governance function with the help of the government's "path".
【作者单位】：北京大学光华管理学院;云南财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目编号:71002110);国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目编号:70972076) 教育部博士点基金项目(项目编号:20090172120038)
【分类号】：G206;F272.92;F832.51

【共引文献】