投资者情绪、管理者过度自信与并购绩效实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-21 00:18

本文选题：投资者情绪 + 管理者过度自信　；参考：《天津大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权分置改革的实施,推动上市公司并购向市场化转变,在我国掀起了新一轮的并购高潮。但在大量的并购活动中,“并购公司股东损益之谜”现象频频出现。传统金融理论假设市场有效、投资者和管理者完全理性,对并购异象缺乏解释能力。因此,本文基于行为公司金融学的研究视角,将管理者过度自信、投资者情绪与传统的公司并购动机理论相结合,系统地研究了我国上市公司并购决策的动机,分析了投资者情绪、管理者过度自信和公司治理对并购绩效的影响及其影响路径,力图全面科学地解释“并购公司股东损益之谜”。本文的研究成果为我国上市公司改善公司治理机制、建立科学的投资决策机制以及保护并购活动中股东合法利益提供了实证支持。本文主要包括以下两个部分:1、管理者过度自信、公司治理与并购绩效实证研究。从公司自身并购动机出发,本文抛弃了“理性经济人”假设,在委托代理理论和自由现金流假说等传统并购动因理论的基础上,引入“管理者过度自信假说”,综合检验了各并购动因对并购绩效的影响及公司治理的抑制效应。研究发现,过度自信显著负向影响企业并购绩效,而不同公司治理机制不仅可以通过有效缓解代理问题直接提高并购绩效,还可以在一定程度上通过对管理者过度自信的抑制,间接地抑制减值型并购。2、投资者情绪、管理者过度自信与并购绩效实证研究。从市场非有效性(外部驱动)角度,本文实证检验了投资者情绪导致的市场错误定价对企业并购活动的影响,并把投资者非理性与管理者非理性结合起来,考察投资者情绪对并购绩效的影响及其影响路径。研究结果表明:投资者情绪导致的误定价是引发企业并购活动的诱因之一,股票市场驱动并购理论在我国具有一定的适用性;投资者情绪对企业并购绩效具有“恶化效应”,且存在过度自信的中介效应渠道。
[Abstract]:The implementation of the reform of split share structure promotes the transformation of M & A of listed companies to marketization, and sets off a new wave of M & A in our country. However, in a large number of M & A activities, the phenomenon of "the riddle of shareholders' profit and loss of M & A companies" frequently appears. The traditional financial theory assumes that the market is effective, the investors and managers are rational, and they lack the ability to explain the merger and acquisition anomalies. Therefore, based on the perspective of behavioral corporate finance, this paper combines manager overconfidence, investor sentiment and traditional corporate M & A motivation theory to systematically study the motivation of M & A decision of listed companies in China. This paper analyzes the influence of investor sentiment, manager overconfidence and corporate governance on M & A performance, and tries to explain scientifically the riddle of shareholders' profit and loss in M & A companies. The research results of this paper provide empirical support for China's listed companies to improve the corporate governance mechanism, establish a scientific investment decision-making mechanism and protect the legitimate interests of shareholders in mergers and acquisitions. This paper mainly includes the following two parts: 1, manager overconfidence, corporate governance and M & A performance empirical study. Based on the motivation of M & A, this paper abandons the hypothesis of "rational economic man" and introduces the hypothesis of "manager overconfidence" on the basis of traditional M & A motivation theory such as principal-agent theory and free cash flow hypothesis. The influence of M & A motivation on M & A performance and the restraining effect of corporate governance are comprehensively tested. It is found that overconfidence has a significant negative effect on corporate M & A performance, and different corporate governance mechanisms can not only improve M A performance directly by effectively alleviating agency problems, but also restrain managers' overconfidence to some extent. An empirical study on indirect inhibition of impairment M & A. 2, investor sentiment, manager overconfidence and M & A performance. From the perspective of market non-validity (external drive), this paper empirically examines the impact of market mispricing caused by investor sentiment on M & A activities, and combines investor irrationality with manager irrationality. To investigate the impact of investor sentiment on M & A performance and its impact path. The results show that the mispricing caused by investor sentiment is one of the inducements of M & A activities, the stock market driven M & A theory has certain applicability in China, and investor sentiment has a "deterioration effect" on corporate M & A performance. And there are over-confident intermediary effect channels.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.91;F271;F832.51

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