融资性担保机构担保风险分析

发布时间：2018-05-22 07:30

本文选题：担保机构 + 融资性担保　；参考：《商业研究》2012年09期

【摘要】：在回顾相关担保理论的基础上,本文以融资担保机构的直接利益相关者(银行和中小企业)为研究视角,通过建模分析了融资担保机构与银行之间的比例担保,中小企业提供的反担保,以及融资担保机构对中小企业调查监控力度的强弱对其担保风险的影响。研究结果表明:当中小企业提供足够的反担保品并且该反担保品价值大于担保责任余额时,加大对企业的调查力度以及增加担保机构的承保比例,有助于缓解信息不对称带来的逆向选择和道德风险问题;当中小企业提供的反担保品价值不足以抵偿贷款金额本息和时,加大对受保企业的调查力度以及提高承保比例只会加剧企业的逆向选择和道德风险。
[Abstract]:On the basis of reviewing the relevant guarantee theory, this paper analyzes the proportional guarantee between the financing guarantee institution and the bank from the perspective of the direct stakeholders of the financing guarantee institution (banks and small and medium-sized enterprises). The counterguarantee provided by small and medium-sized enterprises and the influence of the intensity of supervision and investigation by financing guarantee institutions on the guarantee risk. The results show that when small and medium-sized enterprises provide enough countercollateral and the value of the countercollateral is greater than the balance of the guarantee liability, the investigation of the enterprise and the insurance coverage ratio of the guarantee organization should be increased. To help mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems caused by asymmetric information; when the value of countercollateral provided by small and medium-sized enterprises is not sufficient to meet the principal and interest of the loan amount, Increasing the investigation of the insured enterprises and increasing the coverage ratio will only aggravate the adverse selection and moral hazard of the enterprises.
【作者单位】：陕西师范大学国际商学院;
【基金】：陕西师范大学人文社会科学研究基金项目《中小企业信用担保机构风险评价与管理系统研究》,项目编号:10SZD05
【分类号】：F832.4

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