国有商业银行产权与治理结构创新研究

发布时间：2018-06-05 13:50

本文选题：国有商业银行 + 产权结构　；参考：《南开大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：金融体系作为现代市场经济的核心，其稳定与否直接影响着国家的经济安全和社会稳定，这也是金融安全的真谛所在。鉴于金融体系在国家经济安全中的重要性以及金融危机给世界各国经济所带来的严重威胁，中国政府决定全面推进金融体制改革。而国有商业银行作为我国金融体系的最重要组成部分，无疑成为金融体制改革中的关键环节。四大国有商业银行自成立以来，在促进国民经济发展、保持宏观经济稳定以及维护社会稳定等方面都作出了巨大贡献。但由于历史及现实的原因，四大国有商业银行在产权与治理结构等方面仍存在一些问题，如果它们不进行结构和机制创新，将影响金融体系的安全与稳定，进而对国家金融安全和经济安全产生威胁。因此，有必要深入探究国有商业银行产权和治理结构中存在的问题，进行产权与治理结构创新，从根本上促进四大国有商业银行稳健经营和可持续发展，维护国家金融稳定和经济安全。论文以国有商业银行产权与治理结构改革遗留和产生的问题为切入点，以马克思主义经济学的基本原理为指导，在批判、借鉴西方产权与公司治理理论的基础上，研究了国有商业银行产权结构中的国有股与非国有股、国有商业银行的内部治理结构以及产权与治理结构的综合绩效评估标准，分析了产权与治理结构现存问题的成因，提出了解决这些问题的思路和举措。在研究过程中，论文综合运用了马克思主义历史与逻辑相统一的方法、规范分析与实证研究相结合法、归纳分析法、文献研究法等多种研究方法，遵循“提出问题--分析问题--解决问题”的研究思路，主要取得了以下研究成果：论文以国有商业银行股权多元化改革为研究对象，指出由生产力与生产关系矛盾运动规律所决定，，国有商业银行股权多元化改革必须保证国家绝对控股，股权多元化改革的关键不是国家应不应放弃绝对控股地位，而是如何确定国家绝对控股前提下的国有股最佳控股方式和比重，通过这种方式和比重既能保证国家控制金融命脉，又能充分调动非国有股东的积极性，以最大限度地发挥国有股东与非国有股东的协同效应。针对这一问题，笔者在比较分析四种国有股产权持有主体设计方案的基础上，提出了以下观点：应组建专门的国有商业银行国有资本运营公司来代表国家行使绝对控股权（赋予其管资本权、管人权、管事权，落实国有股东权利），并采用“财政部--国有商业银行国有资本运营公司--国有商业银行”的三层管理模式来实现政企分开、政资分开、所有权与经营权分开；提出国有股比重应不低于51%，以最大程度的发挥其控制力和影响力。论文以国有商业银行引进非国有股所产生的问题为研究对象，指出国有商业银行引进非国有股有其客观必要性，通过引进非国有股可以坚持和完善我国基本经济制度、充实国有商业银行的资本充足率、提升国有商业银行的综合创新能力和国际化水平、促进我国金融业监管水平的提高，但引进非国有股所产生的金融安全问题和战略投资者蜕变为财务投资者问题也不容忽视。引进非国有股所产生问题的根本原因在于私有资本的逐利本性，主要原因在于引资对象的偏失，因而解决问题的关键在于引进合格的非国有股东，并施以有效管控。针对这一问题，笔者在对中国银行的战略引资行为进行案例分析和反思的基础上，明确了非国有股东的引进类型、选择标准以及引进方式，提出了引进非国有股的配套措施。论文以国有商业银行内部治理存在的问题为研究对象，指出国有商业银行公司治理现存问题是公司治理机制不完善导致的，因而解决问题的关键在于构建出科学高效的决策机制、公平合理的激励机制、强有力的监督机制。针对国有商业银行公司治理的现存问题，论文提出了以下解决思路和措施：第一，设计了以类别表决制与民主集中制相结合为主的国有商业银行决策机制，该机制采取累积投票制来选举国有商业银行决策主体，以保证非控股股东获得一定比例的决策层席位，使其有机会和途径表达他们的利益诉求，对于特定情形下国有商业银行日常经营性决策采用类别表决法和“董事会--决策监督委员会--监事会”三级决议异议处理方法，以提高国有商银行决策的科学性和决策效率。第二，设计了以差异化薪酬为核心的国有商业银行高管薪酬激励机制，该机制以公平与效率相结合原则为指导，在对银行高管进行分类的基础上，构建了国有商业银行激励考核标准和薪酬激励手段，以提高激励机制的公平合理性。第三，设计了以监事会为核心的国有商业银行监控机制，该机制在重新界定内部治理权利结构的基础上，构建了以监事会为核心的监控机制，以保障所有者所有权与控制权相统一，进而防范和解决内部人控制问题。论文以国有商业银行产权与治理结构绩效评估标准为研究对象，指出现有的商业银行产权与治理结构绩效评估标准不能客观的反映国有商业银行产权与治理结构的绩效水平，因而有必要设计一套涵盖宏观绩效、中观绩效和微观绩效三个层次的综合绩效评估体系。针对这一问题，笔者在吸收、借鉴国内外主要商业银行产权与治理结构绩效评估体系的基础上，设计了国有商业银行产权与治理结构综合绩效评估标准，该标准突出了宏观绩效考核和中观绩效考核，以全面的反映国有商业银行产权与治理结构的真实绩效水平。
[Abstract]:As the core of the modern market economy, the financial system has a direct impact on the economic security and social stability of the country. This is the true meaning of the financial security. In view of the importance of the financial system in the national economic security and the serious threat to the economies of the world, the Chinese government has decided to promote it in an all-round way. As the most important part of our financial system, the state-owned commercial banks have undoubtedly become the key link in the reform of the financial system. Since the establishment of the four state-owned commercial banks, they have made great contributions to promoting the development of the national economy, maintaining the stability of the macro-economy and maintaining the stability of the society. The four major state-owned commercial banks still have some problems in property rights and governance structure. If they do not carry out the structure and mechanism innovation, they will affect the security and stability of the financial system, and then threaten the national financial security and economic security. The problems existing in the governance structure and the innovation of property rights and governance structure will fundamentally promote the steady operation and sustainable development of the four state-owned commercial banks, and maintain the national financial stability and economic security.
On the basis of the theory of western property rights and corporate governance, the thesis takes the basic principles of Marx's economics as the guide, and studies the internal and non-state-owned shares of state-owned commercial banks, and the internal commercial banks in the property rights structure of state-owned commercial banks. The comprehensive performance evaluation standard of the Ministry governing structure and the property right and the governance structure, analyses the causes of the existing problems of the property right and the governance structure, and puts forward the ideas and measures to solve these problems. In the course of the study, the paper uses the method of unification of Marx's history and logic, the normative analysis and the empirical research. Many research methods, such as inductive analysis, literature research and so on, follow the research ideas of "putting forward questions - analyzing problems - solving problems", and the following research results are obtained.
The paper takes the reform of the ownership diversification of the state-owned commercial banks as the research object, and points out that the ownership diversification reform of the state-owned commercial banks must guarantee the absolute holding of the state. The key to the reform of the ownership diversification is not that the country should not abandon the absolute holding position, but how to determine the state's overwhelming majority. The best way and proportion of the state-owned shares under the precondition of holding can not only guarantee the state to control the financial lifeline, but also fully mobilize the enthusiasm of the non state-owned shareholders, so as to maximize the synergy between the state-owned and non-state shareholders. In this case, the author compares and analyzes four kinds of property rights of state-owned shares. On the basis of holding the main design scheme, the following views are put forward: a special state-owned commercial bank state capital operation company should be set up to represent the state to exercise the absolute controlling power (giving it the right to manage capital, managing human rights, managing the right to carry out the rights of the state-owned shareholders), and adopting the "Ministry of Finance - state owned commercial bank state capital operation company - state - state - state" The three layer management mode of commercial banks can separate the government from the enterprises, separate the government and capital, and separate the ownership from the management. The proportion of the state-owned shares should not be less than 51%, so as to exert its control and influence to the greatest extent.
The paper takes the problems arising from the introduction of non state owned shares by state-owned commercial banks, and points out that the introduction of non-state owned shares by state-owned commercial banks has its objective necessity. Through the introduction of non-state-owned shares, the basic economic system can be adhered to and perfected in China, the rate of capital filling of state-owned commercial banks can be enriched and the comprehensive innovation of state-owned commercial banks can be promoted. The level of force and internationalization promotes the improvement of the level of financial supervision in China. However, the financial security problems arising from the introduction of non state owned shares and the transformation of strategic investors into financial investors can not be ignored. The fundamental reason for the problems arising from the introduction of non state owned shares lies in the nature of profit seeking of private capital, mainly due to the bias of the target. The key to solve the problem lies in the introduction of qualified non state shareholders and effective control. On this issue, on the basis of the case analysis and Reflection on the strategic investment behavior of the Bank of China, the author clarifies the types of non state shareholders, the selection criteria and the way of introduction, and puts forward the introduction of non state owned shares. Set measures.
The paper takes the problems existing in the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks as the research object, points out that the existing problems of the corporate governance of the state-owned commercial banks are caused by the imperfect corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the key to solving the problem lies in the construction of a scientific and efficient decision-making mechanism, a fair and reasonable incentive mechanism and a strong supervision mechanism. The following solutions and measures are put forward in the paper. First, the decision mechanism of the state-owned commercial banks is designed by the combination of category voting system and democratic centralism. The mechanism adopts the cumulative voting system to elect the decision-makers of the state-owned commercial banks, so as to ensure a certain proportion of the non controlling shareholders. The policy layer seats make them have the opportunity and way to express their interest demands, and adopt the class voting method and the "board of directors - the supervisory committee - the board of supervisors" three resolution dissenting methods for the daily operational decision of the state-owned commercial banks to improve the scientific and decision-making efficiency of the state-owned commercial banks' decision. Second, Taking the differential compensation as the core, the incentive mechanism of executive compensation of the state-owned commercial banks is taken as the core. The mechanism is guided by the principle of combining fairness and efficiency. On the basis of the classification of the bank executives, the incentive assessment standard and salary incentive means are constructed to raise the fairness and rationality of the high incentive mechanism. Third, the design is designed. The supervisory mechanism of the state-owned commercial banks, which is the core of the board of supervisors, is based on the redefinition of the structure of the internal governance rights. The monitoring mechanism is built on the core of the board of supervisors to ensure the unity of ownership and control, and then to prevent and solve the problem of insider control.
This paper studies the performance evaluation standards of property rights and governance structures of state-owned commercial banks, and points out that the existing performance evaluation standards of commercial banks' property rights and governance structures can not objectively reflect the performance level of property rights and governance structures of state-owned commercial banks. Therefore, it is necessary to design a set of macro performance, medium performance and micro performance. On the basis of absorbing, drawing on the performance evaluation system of property rights and governance structure of major commercial banks both at home and abroad, the author designs a comprehensive performance evaluation standard for property rights and governance structure of state-owned commercial banks. The standard shows the macro performance assessment and the medium performance assessment, which is based on the overall performance evaluation system. It reflects the real performance level of state-owned commercial banks' property rights and governance structure.
【学位授予单位】：南开大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.33;F271

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