供应链金融背景下银行授信决策研究

发布时间：2018-06-13 23:02

本文选题：供应链金融 + 供应商　；参考：《华南理工大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：在供应链中，许多上游企业（供应商）往往是比较弱势的中小企业，为了能与作为下游企业（核心企业）达成长期的交易，供应商经常选择赊销方式销售其商品给核心企业，这使得供应商资金大量被核心企业所占用，现金流成为供应商发展的瓶颈。同时加之，这些供应商成立时间短，企业积累不足，往往缺乏银行授信能够接受的抵押物，即硬信息，无法从银行获得贷款，这样不仅影响供应链的稳定性和竞争力，而且影响供应商无法进一步扩大生产。因此，供应商在供应链中仍将处于弱势地位，只能采用赊销交易其商品……。也就是说，这些企业陷入了赊销—无现金—无抵押物—无法贷款—发展不起来—赊销的恶性循环中。由此，本文研究如何在既定的信息约束和资产约束条件下，通过金融创新，建立既能保证银行收益又能帮助中小企业进一步发展的金融创新模式，以解决中小企业融资难的问题，保证供应链的有效运行。目前，管理学界对供应链金融的相关研究已经开展得相当丰富，但本文还希望在以下五个方面有所拓展和创新：第一，如何构建博弈模型，分析供应链背景下核心企业参与担保后，银行对供应商的授信行为？第二，核心企业能力、供应商能力和供应链治理水平等供应链的特征与银行授信决策之间存在关联？如何实证这个关联？第三，在核心企业能力、供应商能力和供应链治理水平与银行对供应商授信水平的关系之间，，是否存在着某个不能被直接观察到的，但可以依据银行授信行为的先决条件（如信息透明度）及最终行为结果（包括授信额度、时间和信任度）本身能推断出来的中介因素，即中介变量，这一中介变量是否就是银行对供应商的认知？第四，核心企业介入供应商融资的程度，是否是一个调节变量？它如何调节核心企业能力、供应商能力和供应链治理水平与银行对供应商认知之间关系的强弱？如何调节银行对供应商认知与银行授信水平之间关系的强弱？如何调节核心企业能力、供应商能力和供应链治理水平与银行授信水平之间关系的强弱？第五，银行授信模式，包括银行授信过程中对信息需求从软到硬的各种模式，即银行授信从难到易的各种模式，是否是一个调节变量？它如何调节银行对供应商认知与银行授信水平之间关系的强弱？为解决上述问题，本论文构建了核心企业参与担保下银行授信的博弈模型，并以此博弈模型为基础，搭建了供应链特征与银行授信决策之间关联的理论模型框架，通过问卷调查获得基础数据，采用多元回归分层线性模型、Bootstrap方法、Aiken和Wes（t1991）调节效应图以及路径分析等方法对该理论框架进行实证验证。并得到如下实证研究结论：（1）核心企业能力通过银行对供应商认知间接对银行授信额度、授信时间和授信信任度产生显著的正向影响；供应链治理水平通过银行对供应商认知间接对银行授信额度、授信时间和授信信任度产生显著的正向影响；供应商能力通过银行对供应商认知间接对银行授信额度、授信时间和授信信任度产生显著的正向影响。（2）核心企业参与供应商融资模式通过银行对供应商的认知间接对银行授信额度、授信时间和授信信任度产生显著的正向影响；（3）核心企业参与供应商融资模式强化了核心企业能力对银行关于供应商认知的正向影响，进而强化了核心企业能力对银行授信额度、授信时间和授信信任度的间接效应。（4）银行对供应商的认知对银行授信额度、授信时间和授信信任度有显著的正向影响。（5）银行授信的模式通过银行对供应商的认知间接对银行授信额度、授信时间和授信信任度产生显著的正向影响。上述结论对中小企业的发展、金融体制创新和供应链管理理论具有重要的理论和实践意义。
[Abstract]:In the supply chain , many upstream enterprises ( suppliers ) are often relatively weak small and medium - sized enterprises . In order to deal with long - term transactions with downstream enterprises ( core enterprises ) , suppliers often choose to sell their commodities to the core enterprises in a credit way , which makes the cash flow of the suppliers to be taken as the bottleneck of the development of suppliers . At the same time , the suppliers can not obtain loans from the banks , which not only affect the stability and competitiveness of the supply chain , but also influence the supplier ' s inability to further expand production . Therefore , suppliers will still be in a weak position in the supply chain , and they can only be traded on credit . In other words , these enterprises fall into the vicious circle of credit - non - cash - no collateral - unable to lend - development is not up - credit sales . Therefore , this paper studies how to establish a financial innovation model which can guarantee the further development of SMEs through financial innovation under the established information constraints and asset constraints , so as to solve the problem of financing difficulty of small and medium - sized enterprises , and ensure the effective operation of supply chain .

At present , the research on supply chain finance has been quite rich in the management circle , but this paper also hopes to expand and innovate in the following five aspects :

First , how to build a game model , analyze the credit behavior of the bank to the supplier after the core enterprise participates in the guarantee under the background of the supply chain ?

Second , there is an association between the characteristics of supply chain such as core enterprise ability , supplier capacity and supply chain management level and bank credit decision - making . How to demonstrate this correlation ?

Thirdly , whether there is a relationship between the ability of the core enterprise , the ability of the supplier and the relationship between the supply chain management level and the bank ' s credit level to the supplier , there is an intermediary factor which cannot be directly observed , but can be inferred from the precondition of the bank credit behavior ( such as information transparency ) and the result of the final behavior ( including credit line , time and trust ) , that is , the intermediate variable , whether the intermediary variable is the bank ' s perception of the supplier ?

Fourth , whether the core enterprise is involved in the supplier financing is a regulation variable ? How does it adjust the core enterprise ability , the supplier ' s ability and the supply chain management level and the bank ' s weak relationship with the supplier ' s cognition ? How to adjust the bank ' s weak relationship between the supplier ' s cognition and the bank credit level ? How to adjust the relationship between the core enterprise ability , the supplier capacity and the supply chain management level and the bank credit level ?

The fifth , the bank credit model , including the bank credit process to the information demand from the soft to the hard various modes , that is , the bank credit from the difficult to easy various modes , is it a regulation variable ? How does it adjust the bank ' s strength to the relationship between the supplier ' s perception and the bank credit level ?

In order to solve the above - mentioned problems , this paper constructs a game model of bank credit under the participation of core enterprises , based on the game model , sets up the theoretical model frame associated with the supply chain characteristics and the bank credit decision - making , obtains basic data through questionnaire , uses multiple regression layered linear model , bootstrap method , Aiken and Wes ( t1991 ) adjustment effect map and path analysis , etc . , and obtains the following empirical research conclusion :

( 1 ) The ability of the core enterprise to indirectly influence the credit line , the credit hours and the trust degree of the bank through the bank to the supplier ' s cognition ;
The supply chain management level has a significant positive impact on the bank ' s credit line , the credit hours and the trust degree through the bank ' s perception of the supplier .
Supplier ' s ability to indirectly influence the bank ' s credit line , credit hours and credit trust through the bank ' s perception of the supplier .

( 2 ) The core enterprise ' s participation in the supplier ' s financing model has a significant positive impact on the bank ' s credit line , the credit hours and the trust degree through the bank ' s perception of the supplier .

( 3 ) The core enterprise ' s participation in the supplier financing model strengthened the positive influence of the core enterprise ability on the supplier ' s cognition , and then strengthened the indirect effect of the core enterprise ability on the bank credit line , the credit time and the trust degree .

( 4 ) The bank ' s perception of suppliers has significant positive impact on bank credit line , credit time and credit trust .

( 5 ) The bank credit model has a significant positive impact on the bank ' s credit line , the credit hours and the trust degree through the bank ' s perception of the supplier .

These conclusions have important theoretical and practical significance for the development of small and medium - sized enterprises , financial system innovation and supply chain management theory .
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.2;F275;F276.3

【参考文献】