自由现金流的代理成本效应检验:基于在职消费视角

发布时间：2018-07-09 20:37

本文选题：自由现金流 + 在职消费　；参考：《经济管理》2012年11期

【摘要】：自由现金流是企业生产经营活动产生的,在满足净现值大于零的项目所需资金后的现金流。现代企业所有权和经营权分离,经理人往往从自身利益最大化角度出发进行企业的经营管理活动,从而出现了委托代理问题,产生了高昂的代理成本。自由现金流的存在增加了经理人员可自由支配的现金,可能会加剧委托代理问题。本文从在职消费的视角,检验自由现金流的代理成本效应。选取2007～2010年沪市上市公司数据,实证检验我国上市公司尤其是国有上市公司自由现金流量和在职消费程度的关系,并考察在职消费与企业绩效的相关性。为完善公司治理结构、合理约束代理人行为提供政策建议。
[Abstract]:Free cash flow is the cash flow generated by the enterprise's production and operation activities, and the cash flow after satisfying the project with net present value greater than zero. With the separation of modern enterprise ownership and management right, managers often carry out business management activities from the angle of maximizing their own interests, which leads to the principal-agent problem and high agency cost. The existence of free cash flow increases the discretionary cash available to managers and may exacerbate the principal-agent problem. This paper examines the agency cost effect of free cash flow from the perspective of on-the-job consumption. Based on the data of listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2010, this paper empirically tests the relationship between the free cash flow of listed companies, especially state-owned listed companies, and the degree of in-service consumption, and examines the correlation between in-service consumption and corporate performance. To improve the corporate governance structure, reasonable restraint agent behavior to provide policy advice.
【作者单位】：安徽财经大学研究生处;合肥工业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“国有企业自由现金流量优化与控制机制研究”(71172190) 国家社会科学基金“基于公平正义视角的国有企业高管薪酬制度研究”(09YJA630002)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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