EPR约束下的废旧家电回收策略优化模型

发布时间：2018-01-19 22:41

本文关键词： EPR 废旧家电生产企业回收渠道激励机制　出处：《天津理工大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：废旧家电产品的回收处理问题已成为当下社会的热点议题.对此,我国出台了一系列相关政策予以应对解决.其中,2016年12月印发的《生产者责任延伸制度推行方案》更是明确指出生产企业对其产品所需承担的资源环境责任从生产环节延伸至其产品的全生命周期.鉴于生产企业在废旧家电回收处理体系中的核心地位以及部分生产企业消极怠工等原因,本文在考虑EPR约束下,从生产企业角度出发,研究其废旧家电回收渠道的选择以及政府对其回收激励机制的设计问题.具体内容如下:1.EPR约束下,家电生产企业集中决策下实施废旧家电以旧换新回收策略.在消费者市场结构分析基础上,建立以企业利润最大化为目标的以旧换新回收策略优化模型,并根据我国家电行业EPR制度特点,构建政府与企业间竞争的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究在政府收益最大时的补贴和基金征收标准下,企业以旧换新回收产品最优定价决策,并与企业单一定价下相应结果进行比较.结果表明:在EPR约束下,政府最大化收益时的补贴和基金征收标准,对企业实施以旧换新回收策略的产品销量、总利润和废旧产品回收量的影响取决于企业成本结构、消费者结构、消费者效用和废旧产品回收处理能力.企业决策者需根据不同情形决定是否参与以旧换新回收实践.2.EPR约束下,家电产品直销与分销销售模式并存时,研究家电生产企业自发回购零售商和旧货流通者所回收废旧产品需满足的条件.通过构建以政府为领导者的供应链决策博弈模型,确定各成员的最优定价决策.基于此,分析政府补贴和基金的额度、新产品与再制造品成本差额、销售渠道价格差敏感度系数和回收渠道交叉价格敏感度系数对供应链中各成员决策的影响.研究表明:政府补贴越高,企业废旧产品回购价、零售商和旧货流通者的回收价及其各自回收量均越高;政府向企业征收处理基金越高,产品直销价、分销批发价和零售价均越高;新产品与再制造品成本差额越大,越有助于企业主动回收;消费者对销售渠道价格差越敏感,对零售商越不利;消费者对回收渠道交叉价格敏感度越高,对政府、企业和零售商利润越无益,而更有利于旧货流通者回收.3.EPR约束下,家电生产企业参与回收时,研究政府如何设计回收补贴激励来提高企业参与回收处理其自身废旧产品的积极性,进而增加其废旧家电回收处理量.为此,构建了以政府为上层决策者,制定其对废旧家电的回收补贴额度,而生产企业作为下层决策者依据政府决策来决定其废旧家电回收数量的二层规划模型,并进行了数值算例验证.求解分析发现,生产企业回收处理成本越低,其参与回收处理的积极性越高.当回收处理成本严格低于政府补贴与其回收效益时,生产企业可能会回收其当年全部废旧家电;当废旧家电回收市场竞争激烈时,政府对征收废旧家电回收处理基金,同时给予其拆解处理补贴会有效促进生产企业的回收积极性;针对不同的废旧家电,设置相应的回收处理基金标准更有益于社会福利最大化。
[Abstract]:Recycling and disposal of waste household appliances has become a hot topic in contemporary society. In this regard, China promulgated a series of relevant policies to solve. Among them, December 2016 issued the "extended producer responsibility system implementation plan" it is clear that the production enterprises to take the product resource environmental responsibility extends from production to the the whole life cycle of products. In view of the core status of manufacturing enterprises in the recycling of waste appliances in the system and part of the production enterprises go-slow and other reasons, considering the EPR constraints, starting from the enterprise perspective, the design problem of waste household appliances recycling channel choice and the government of the recovery of the incentive mechanism. The specific contents are as follows: 1.EPR under the constraints of the household appliance manufacturing enterprises under the centralized decision-making implementation of waste home appliance trade recovery strategy. In the consumer market based on the structure analysis, In order to establish the maximum profit as the goal of the new for old recovery strategy optimization model, and according to the characteristics of EPR system in China's household electrical appliance industry, construct the Stackelberg competition game model between government and enterprises, research in government revenue maximum subsidies and fund collection standards, enterprises for new product pricing decision in old recovery and, with the corresponding single enterprise pricing comparison. The results showed that under EPR constraint, the maximum benefit of the government subsidies and fund collection standards, the implementation of sales to old change new products recycling strategy for enterprises, influence depends on the total profit and the amount of recycling of waste products in the enterprise cost structure, the structure of consumers. The consumers' utility and waste recycling processing ability. Enterprise decision-makers need according to different circumstances to decide whether to participate in the new for old practice of recovering.2.EPR constraints, home appliances and direct sales model Type of household appliance manufacturing enterprises coexist, retailers and distributors to repurchase the spontaneous Vintage by recycling waste products to meet the conditions. Through the construction of the government decision-making model of supply chain game leader, to determine the optimal pricing decision of each member. Based on this analysis, the government subsidy and the amount of funds, new products and remanufactured products cost difference sales channels, the price difference sensitivity coefficient and recovery channel cross price sensitivity coefficient of each member in the supply chain decision. The study shows that the higher government subsidies, corporate waste products repurchase price, the price recovery of second-hand goods retailers and them and their recovery rate are higher; the government to levy higher fund processing enterprises direct sales of products, price, distribution, wholesale and retail prices are higher; new products and remanufactured products cost difference is bigger, more help enterprises active recovery; consumer price difference of sales channels The more sensitive, unfavorable to the retailers to consumers; recycling channels cross price the higher the sensitivity of the government, enterprises and retailers are more useless, and more conducive to the recovery of second-hand goods under.3.EPR constraints, household appliance manufacturing enterprises to participate in recycling, recycling subsidies on government how to design incentive to improve the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in recycling the waste products, thus increasing the recycling of waste appliances. Therefore, to build a government for the top decision makers, making the waste household appliances recycling subsidies and production enterprises as the lower level decision maker according to the government decision two level programming model of the number of waste household appliance, and the numerical for example. Analysis shows that the lower production cost of recycling, the recycling participation enthusiasm is higher. When the recycling cost strictly below the government subsidy and back Receive benefit, production enterprises may be recovered when all waste household appliances recycling waste household appliances; when the fierce market competition, the government imposed on recycling and disposal of waste household appliances fund, while giving the dismantling and disposal subsidies will effectively promote the enthusiasm of recycling production enterprises; the aim of waste household appliances, set the appropriate recycling fund standard beneficial to the maximization of social welfare.

【学位授予单位】：天津理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.6;F713.2;O225

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