大型零售商收取通道费的经济分析与规制研究

发布时间：2018-03-06 10:49

本文选题：通道费　切入点：纵向约束　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近几年,我国零售市场频繁出现零售商与生产商因通道费而产生纠纷的现象,零供矛盾也成为了社会关注的热点话题之一,学术界也对此进行了研究,但对于收取通道费是否属于合理的市场行为以及通道费的出现对市场主体以及社会福利的影响尚无定论。本文结合我国零售业发展现状,发现我国零售业的区域市场集中度较高,并通过实证研究,发现我国零售市场存在规模报酬递增的现象。随后,本文遵循SCP-R的经济分析框架,通过博弈模型的分析,分别讨论了大型零售商不收取通道费、收取与销售额无关的通道费、收取与销售额相关的通道费以及同时收取两种类型的通道费这四种情形下的市场均衡以及社会福利水平,得出了如下结论:收取与销售额相关的通道费有助于大型零售商议价能力的提升;大型零售商收取通道费并不会影响生产商对于小型零售商的垄断势力;在同一种情形下,生产商向小型零售商提出的批发价格会随着大型零售商批发价格的降低而降低;大型零售商收取通道费的行为并不会导致市场均衡价格的提高;大型零售商可以凭借通道费使其自身利润增加,这是通道费产生的内在动因;大型零售商更倾向于同时向生产商收取与销售额无关以及与销售额相关这两种类型的通道费,而非仅仅收取单一类型的通道费;大型零售商收取通道费的行为并不会造成社会福利的损失。此外,本文通过对博弈模型的分析,发现政府仅仅凭借禁止通道费收取的规制方式,并未提升社会福利水平,反而出现了政府规制失灵的现象。最后,在借鉴国外相关规制经验的同时,并结合本文理论模型的计算结果,提出我国不应对大型零售商收取通道费的行为进行规制,而应该从平衡零供双方市场力量入手,合理地限制大型零售商的市场势力,并加强生产商的市场地位,从而缓解零供矛盾,为市场竞争提供良好的政策环境,确保零售市场健康、有序、长久地发展,实现帕累托改进,最终实现社会福利的提升。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the retail market of our country frequently appears the phenomenon that retailers and producers have disputes because of the passage fee, the contradiction of zero supply has also become one of the hot topics of social concern, and the academic circles have also carried on the research on this. However, there is no conclusion on whether charging passage fee is a reasonable market behavior and the influence of passage fee on the market main body and social welfare. It is found that the regional market concentration of retail industry in China is relatively high, and through empirical research, it is found that there exists a phenomenon of increasing returns on scale in the retail market of China. Subsequently, this paper follows the economic analysis framework of SCP-R and analyzes by game model. In this paper, the market equilibrium and social welfare level of large retailers under the four conditions of not charging passage fees, charging passage fees unrelated to sales, collecting passage fees related to sales and charging two types of passage fees at the same time are discussed respectively. The following conclusions are drawn: the collection of passageway fees associated with sales increases the bargaining power of large retailers; the charging of passage fees by large retailers does not affect the monopoly power of producers over small retailers; in the same situation, The wholesale price proposed by the manufacturer to the small retailer will decrease with the decrease of the wholesale price of the large retailer, and the behavior of the large retailer to collect the passage fee will not lead to the increase of the market equilibrium price. Large retailers can make their own profits increase with the passage fee, which is the intrinsic cause of the passage fee; large retailers are more likely to charge the manufacturer both non-sales and sales related access fees. Instead of charging a single type of passage fee, the behavior of large retailers will not result in the loss of social welfare. In addition, through the analysis of the game model, It is found that the government does not raise the level of social welfare only by means of the regulation mode of prohibiting the collection of passage fees, but instead appears the phenomenon of government regulation failure. Finally, while learning from the relevant foreign regulatory experience, the government does not raise the level of social welfare. Combined with the calculation results of the theoretical model of this paper, it is proposed that our country should not regulate the behavior of large retailers in charging passage fees, but should start with balancing the market forces of both parties, and reasonably limit the market power of large retailers. And strengthen the market position of producers, so as to alleviate the contradiction between zero supply and supply, provide a good policy environment for market competition, ensure the healthy, orderly and long-term development of retail market, realize Pareto improvement, and finally realize the promotion of social welfare.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F724.2

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